16051
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Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
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Full Idea:
When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
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From:
Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
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A reaction:
This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
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3398
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Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
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A reaction:
An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.
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14494
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Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
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Full Idea:
Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
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From:
Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
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A reaction:
Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
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