14 ideas
14970 | Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: Normal propositional modal logics derive from the minimal system K: wffs of PC are axioms; □(p⊃q)⊃(□p⊃□q); uniform substitution; modus ponens; necessitation (α→□α). | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1) |
14971 | D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: If a frame contains any dead end or blind world, then D is not valid on that frame, ...but D is valid on every serial frame. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.1) |
14972 | S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: In S4 there are exactly 14 distinct modalities, and any modality may be reduced to one containing no more than three modal operators in sequence. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2) | |
A reaction: The significance of this may be unclear, but it illustrates one of the rewards of using formal systems to think about modal problems. There is at least an appearance of precision, even if it is only conditional precision. |
14973 | In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: S5 contains the four main reduction laws, so the first of any pair of operators may be deleted. Hence all but the last modal operator may be deleted. This leaves six modalities: p, ◊p, □p, and their negations. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2) |
14976 | Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: If one wants the quantifiers in each world to range only over the things that exist in that world, and one doesn't believe that the same things exist in every world, one would probably not want the Barcan formula. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.2) | |
A reaction: I haven't quite got this, but it sounds to me like I should reject the Barcan formula (but Idea 9449!). I like a metaphysics to rest on the actual world (with modal properties). I assume different things could have existed, but don't. |
14974 | A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.1.2) | |
A reaction: If a thing has a relation to two separate things, then those two things will also have that relation between them. If I am in the same family as Jim and as Jill, then Jim and Jill are in the same family. |
14975 | A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell] |
Full Idea: A de dicto necessary truth says that something is φ, that this proposition is a necessary truth, i.e. that in every accessible world something (but not necessarily the same thing in each world) is φ. | |
From: Max J. Cresswell (Modal Logic [2001], 7.2.1) | |
A reaction: At last, a really clear and illuminating account of this term! The question is then invited of what is the truthmaker for a de dicto truth, assuming that the objects themselves are truthmakers for de re truths. |
17771 | How we evaluate evidence depends on our background beliefs [Bayne] |
Full Idea: A claim that might be very plausible given one set of background beliefs might be highly implausible when evaluated in the light of a different set of background beliefs. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) |
17770 | Clifford's dictum seems to block our beliefs in morality, politics and philosophy [Bayne] |
Full Idea: Endorsing Clifford's dictum threatens to undermine our right to hold many of our most cherished beliefs about morality, politics, and philosophy, for these are domains in which it is notoriously difficult to secure consensus. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: I would say that those beliefs are amenable to evidence, but the evidence is often highly generalised, which is what makes those subjects notoriously difficult. The existence of a convention is a sort of evidence. |
17766 | Physicalism correlates brain and mind, explains causation by thought, and makes nature continuous [Bayne] |
Full Idea: The motivations for physicalism about the mind are that it accounts for correlations between states of the brain and states of thought, ...that it accounts for the causal role of thoughts, ...and that it does justice to the continuity of nature. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: [summary] That is a pretty good summary of why I am a physicalist about the mind. I take all other theories to be dead footnotes in the history of thought - unless someone can produce a really good new argument. Which they can't. |
17768 | Perception reveals what animals think, but humans can disengage thought from perception [Bayne] |
Full Idea: One striking feature of human thought involves our ability to disengage the focus of thought from that of our perceptual attention. ...To get a fix on what an animal is thinking about, one need only determine the object of its perceptual attention. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: What happens when an animal closes its eyes, or stirs violently during sleep? I take the hallmark of human thought to be its multi-level character, and this offers nice evidence for that view. Doing philosophy while driving a car is very revealing. |
17769 | Some people centre space on themselves; others centre space on the earth [Bayne] |
Full Idea: Egocentric conceptions of space employ a frame of reference that is focused on oneself; ...geocentric conceptions of space, by contrast, employ a frame of reference that is centred on the earth. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Famously, Europeans nearly always employ the egocentric conception, but many other cultures are geocentric. Thus the salt cellar is either 'to my left' or 'to the west'. In the latter view, everyone always knows their orientation (even indoors?). |
17767 | The alternative to a language of thought is map-like or diagram-like thought [Bayne] |
Full Idea: One could think that the structure of thought has more in common with that of maps or diagrams, and is not particularly language-like. | |
From: Tim Bayne (Thought: a very short introduction [2013], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It seems unwise to be ensnared by analogies on this one, since the phenomenon is buried deep. You can no more infer what goes on underneath than you can infer electrons from looking at trees? |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |