12 ideas
| 4483 | If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux] |
| Full Idea: If trope theorists say abstract singular terms name sets of tropes, what is the referent of 'is a unicorn'? The only candidate is the null set (with no members), but there is just one null set, so 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' will be identical. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.86) | |
| A reaction: Not crucial, I would think, given that a unicorn is just a horse with a horn. Hume explains how we do that, combining ideas which arose from actual tropes. |
| 4481 | Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.60) | |
| A reaction: Plato's view seems to be that we don't identify universals independently. We ascend The Line, or think about the shadows in The Cave, and infer the universals from an array of particulars (by dialectic). |
| 4477 | Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Universals come in hierarchies of generality. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.24) | |
| A reaction: If it is possible to state facts about universals, this obviously encourages a rather Platonic approach to them, as existent things with properties. But maybe the hierarchies are conventional, not natural. |
| 4482 | Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux] |
| Full Idea: In return for a one-category ontology (with particulars but no universals), the austere nominalist is forced to take a whole host of things (like being red, or triangular, or human) as unanalysable or primitive. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.68) | |
| A reaction: I see that 'red' might have to be primitive, but being human can just be a collection of particulars. It is no ontologically worse to call them 'primitive' than to say they exist. |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Nominalists have been very concerned to provide an account of the role of abstract singular terms (such as 'circularity'). | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.34) | |
| A reaction: Whether this is a big problem depends on our view of abstraction. If it only consists of selecting one property of an object and reifying it, then we can give a nominalist account of properties, and the problem is solved. |
| 4480 | Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux] |
| Full Idea: Any account of the identity of material objects which turns on the identity of places and times must face the objection that the identity of places and times depends, in turn, on the identities of the objects located at them. | |
| From: Michael J. Loux (Metaphysics: contemporary introduction [1998], p.56) | |
| A reaction: This may be a benign circle, in which we concede that there are two basic interdependent concepts of objects and space-time. If you want to define identity - in terms of what? |
| 7257 | All modern social systems seem to be conspiracies of the rich [More,T] |
| Full Idea: When I consider any social system that prevails in the modern world, I can't see it as anything but a conspiracy of the rich to advance their own interests under the pretext of organizing society. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: I'm afraid this is my own view of most conservative politics. I don't deny that there is a good case to be made for the conservative view (by Burke and Scruton, for example), but the rich will always latch onto its coat-tails. Cf. Idea 122. |
| 7254 | If you try to get elected, you should be permanently barred from seeking office [More,T] |
| Full Idea: In Utopia, anyone who deliberately tries to get himself elected to a public office is permanently disqualified from holding one. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: This echoes a thought found in Plato (Idea 2149). I've always liked this idea. Why can't we have elections were a group of the best people are invited to stand? Well, yes, it would lead to corruption... Still, the best should be pushed to the front. |
| 7255 | Only Utopians fail to see glory in warfare [More,T] |
| Full Idea: Utopians are practically the only people on earth who fail to see anything glorious in war. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: A refreshing thought for such an early date. Whatever dubious behaviour is nowadays attributed to Thomas More, you have to admire someone who writes this during the reign of Henry VIII. |
| 7253 | In Utopia, legal euthanasia is considered honourable [More,T] |
| Full Idea: In Utopia, officially sanctioned euthanasia is regarded as an honourable death. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: A bit surprising coming from a writer who is now a Catholic martyr and saint. |
| 7256 | In Utopia, the Supreme Being is identical with Nature [More,T] |
| Full Idea: Everyone in Utopia agrees that the Supreme Being (which they call Mythras) is identical with Nature. | |
| From: Thomas More (Utopia [1516], Bk 2) | |
| A reaction: This sounds remarkably like full-blown Spinozean pantheism, though it should be interpreted with caution. It certainly seems to show that pantheism was a possibility in the minds of late medieval religious thinkers. |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
| Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
| From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |