87 ideas
16606 | Original philosophers invariably seek inspiration from past thinkers [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Philosophers almost never strike out on wholly new ground, without the historical inspiration of some figure or other. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
16604 | Philosophy consists of choosing between Plato, Aristotle and Democritus [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The history of philosophy consists in a series of choices between three primordial rivals: Plato, Aristotle and Democritus. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau's point is that the importance of Democritus is not usually appreciated. As far as I can see, Democritus may have been the greatest of all philosophers, but most of his works are lost. His fragments are the best fragments. |
16586 | The commentaries of Averroes were the leading guide to Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The commentaries of Averroes on virtually the whole Aristotelian corpus became by far the most important scholastic guide to the interpretation of Aristotle. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.1) |
16568 | Modernity begins in the late 12th century, with Averroes's commentaries on Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: I tend to think of modernity as coming in the late twelfth century, with Averroes's magisterial commentaries on Aristotle. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 1.1) | |
A reaction: A rather quirky use of 'modernity', but this seems to be a huge landmark. Note that it comes from the Islamic Arab world, not from Europe. |
16653 | Once accidents were seen as real, 'Categories' became the major text for ontology [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Originally you count substances for ontology. Once there is the doctrine of real accidents (in the 14th cent) the list of ten categories begins to look like an inventory of the kinds of things there are, and 'Categories' looks like the fundamental text. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 12.1) | |
A reaction: Prior to this development, 'Categories' was treated as a mere beginner's text, once the major corpus of Aristotle had been rediscovered in the 13th century. The result of this development is sortal essentialism, which I don't like. |
16704 | In 1347, the Church effectively stopped philosophy for the next 300 years [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The year 1347 is a great milestone in the history of philosophy, because then the route to modern philosophy was blocked by Church authorities, and effectively put on hold for almost 300 years. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 19.3) | |
A reaction: It is interesting that it was 100 years after the Reformation before philosophy got going again, and then only thanks to one man. Islam stopped philosophy earlier. |
16605 | After c.1450 all of Plato was available. Before that, only the first half of 'Timaeus' was known [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: From the mid-fifteenth century forward, for the first time, the whole Platonic corpus was available in Ficino's Latin translation. Before then, only the first half of the 'Timaeus' had widely circulated in Latin. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.1) |
16607 | Renaissance Platonism is peripheral [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The fabled phenomenon of Renaissance Platonism is peripheral. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.3) | |
A reaction: The point is that only a few Italians pursued the Platonic line. Pasnau suggests Cartesian dualism as a possible influence from Plato. |
16715 | Plato only made an impact locally in 15th century Italy [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In certain limited circles in Italy, Plato made an impact in the fifteenth century, but his influence never came close to challenging Aristotle's. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 20.2) |
16781 | The 17th century is a metaphysical train wreck [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The seventeenth century is a metaphysical train wreck. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.6) | |
A reaction: This is, roughly, because the corpuscularian philosophy lacked the resources to answer all the problems dealt with by substantial forms. |
16610 | Philosophy could easily have died in 17th century, if it weren't for Descartes [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: As scholasticism collapsed in the 17th century, it might easily have happened is that philosophy simply died. That this did not happen is due in large part to René Descartes. …It is remarkable that this brilliant man insisted on still doing philosophy. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.5) | |
A reaction: The alternative view is, of course, that you just can't stop people from thinking philosophically (except by totalitarian education). Are there philosophers in North Korea, or among the Taliban? |
16677 | Anti-Razor: if you can't account for a truth, keep positing things until you can [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The Anti-Razor says 'whenever an affirmative proposition is truly stated, if one thing does not suffice to account for its truth, then one must posit things, and if two do not suffice then three, and so on to infinity'. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.3) | |
A reaction: This is quoted from an anonymous logic text of 1325. Apparently Ockham himself articulated the idea more than once. |
21032 | Speak truth only to those who deserve the truth [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The duty to tell the truth applies only to those who deserve the truth. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [from Benjamin Constant, in opposition to Kant] I prefer the idea that we should use people 'after our own honour and dignity' (Hamlet), which means speaking the truth even to Donald Trump (for those of you who remember 2018). But not always. |
21033 | Careful evasions of truth at least show respect for it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: A carefully crafted evasion pays homage to truth-telling in a way that an outright lie does not. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: Nicely put. He refers to an incident in Kant's life. I think of the great equivocation controversy at the time of the 1605 Gunpowder Plot. See the porter in Macbeth. All I ask is that people care about the truth. Many people don't. Why? |
16598 | Priority was a major topic of dispute for scholastics [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: For a scholastic author, hardly anything was so likely to precipitate a lengthy disputatio as talk of priority, in its various kinds. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.3) |
16727 | In mixtures, the four elements ceased to exist, replaced by a mixed body with a form [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The standard view was that in a mixture there is only the mixed body and its substantial form (gold). There are no further substantial forms of the elements, because the elements do not actually exist within the body. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 22.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to me to be the key idea that was overthrown in the seventeenth century, so that corpuscular matter kept aspects of its ingredients, which science could then investigate. With the substantial form, investigation seemed impossible. |
16732 | 17th C qualities are either microphysical, or phenomenal, or powers [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The seventeenth century is often said to have bequeathed us three ways of thinking about sensible qualities: either in reductive microphysical terms, or as internal phenomenal states, or else as powers or dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau goes on to claim that no one in the 17th century believed the third one. I take it to be a very new, and totally wonderful and correct, view. |
16733 | 17th century authors only recognised categorical properties, never dispositions [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, my claim is that authors during the period recognise only categorical properties, and never dispositional properties. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.1) |
16662 | The biggest question for scholastics is whether properties are real, or modes of substances [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Among scholastics the primary agreement is that what primarily exist are substances. The primary disagreement concerns the nature of their changeable properties. Are they real accidents, or mere modes of substance? | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 13.1) |
16767 | There is no centralised power, but we still need essence for a metaphysical understanding [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: One could empirically reject a centralised power within a substance - and still think a genuine substance requires a form of some more abstract kind, not for a physical explanation, but for a full metaphysical understanding of how things are. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.2) | |
A reaction: This divorce of the 'metaphysical' from the physical is a running theme in Pasnau, and he cites support from Leibniz. I'm not sure I understand 'metaphysical' understanding, if it is actually contrary to physics. I take it to be 'psychological'. |
16788 | Instead of adding Aristotelian forms to physical stuff, one could add dispositions [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Someone who wants to enrich a strict corpuscularian account with other metaphysical entities has alternatives other than Aristotelian hylomorphism. One can, for instance, introduce dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 28.2) | |
A reaction: This slightly throws me, because I have been flirting with a dispositional account of hylomorphism. The implication is that the form is abstract and structural, where the disposition is real and physical. But dispositions can do the job of forms. |
16738 | Scholastics reject dispositions, because they are not actual, as forms require [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastics reject anything like bare dispositions, on Aristotelian principles. Powers are forms, and forms actualise their subject, and are causally efficacious. Therefore no powers can be bare dispositions. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
A reaction: The point seems to be that a mere disposition is not actual, as a form is required to be. I would have thought that a power does not have to be operational to be actual. A live electric wire is a real phenomenon. It isn't waiting to be live. |
16649 | Scholastics say there is a genuine thing if it is 'separable' [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Among the scholastics (after Duns Scotus) it would be come to be taken for granted that the crucial test for being a genuine thing - a 'res' - is separability. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 11.2) | |
A reaction: The idea of separability is implicit in Aristotle. In borderline cases, it seems that they are tempted to claim that things like accidental properties are separable, simply because they want them to be genuine things. A criterion for separability? |
16785 | If you reject essences, questions of individuation become extremely difficult [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Given the accepted linkage between a thing's essence and its identity, the rejection of essences makes a complete mess out of questions of individuation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.6) | |
A reaction: I note that he talks of a thing having 'identity', contra the view of identity as a two-place relation. I agree with this, but there is a chicken-egg problem. Do I perceive an identity and surmise an essence, or surmise an essence and deduce identity? |
16680 | Scholastics thought Quantity could be the principle of individuation [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Quantity was a leading scholastic contender for the principle of individuation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.4) |
16628 | Corpuscularianism promised a decent account of substance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: One of the great attractions of corpuscularianism is that it promises to put our acquaintance with substances on a solid foundation. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 07.3) | |
A reaction: This is why the seventeenth century did not abandon 'substance', even though they banished 'substantial form'. |
16617 | Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism say only substances exist [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Corpuscularian critics of scholasticism tend to think that only substances exist. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.2) | |
A reaction: Pasnau treats this as an extreme 17th C reaction which was hopelessly inadequate as metaphysics. We have been struggling with the nature of 'properties' ever since, while losing our grip on the concept of a unified 'substance'. |
16741 | Scholastics wanted to treat Aristotelianism as physics, rather than as metaphysics [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: There is a broad scholastic tendency to understand Aristotelianism not in abstract, metaphysical terms, but as a concrete, physical theory of the world. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 23.5) | |
A reaction: This seems to give a good explanation of why Aristotelianism plummeted to oblivion in the 17th C. Pasnau obviously wants to revive it, by drawing a sharp line between metaphysics and science. I doubt the line. |
16777 | If crowds are things at all, they seem to be Substances, since they bear properties [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Crowds seem to be the bearers of properties, and if they are things at all, then there is no place for them other than in the category of Substance. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
A reaction: It is tempting to say, based on Aristotle, that a substance is whatever 1) bears properties, and 2) endures in spite of change, but a crowd is a nice problem case, because it looks too disunited to be a 'substance'. |
16615 | Scholastics use 'substantia' for thick concrete entities, and for thin metaphysical ones [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastic texts are rife with different senses of 'substantia', using the term to refer, among other things, both to thick concrete entities and to thin metaphysical ones. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau introduces 'thin' and 'thick' substance for this reason. I may adopt this. Without distinctions between thin and thick concepts of things we can get very muddled. I like the word to label something which is an 'entity'. |
16775 | For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: According to strict corpuscularianism the only real constituents of a substance are its integral parts. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 26.1) | |
A reaction: An understandable reaction to the emptiness of Aristotelian substantial forms in science. It seems to leave out the structural principles that distinguish one arrangement of parts from another. See Koslicki on this. |
16769 | If clay survives destruction of the statue, the statue wasn't a substance, but a mere accident [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The unitarian view of substance says it cannot be divided. If the clay can survive the destruction of the statue, then that shows that the statue was not a substance at all, and that its shape (or whatever made it a statue) was merely a passing accident. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 25.3) | |
A reaction: This seems to give the orthodox Aristotelian/Thomist reading, assuming that a substance only has one form, which unifies it. Since clay must have shape, and statues must have matter, I have never understood how there were two objects here. |
16602 | Corpuscularianism rejected not only form, but also the dependence of matter on form [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: What marks the rise of the corpuscularian movement is not just the rejection of form, but the rejection of matter as dependent on form. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) | |
A reaction: The point was that matter required form to have any kind of actual existence, but now matter can stand on its own. |
16612 | Hylomorphism may not be a rival to science, but an abstract account of unity and endurance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Hylomorphism admits of an alternative formulation, as an explanatory schema at a different level of analysis, not competing with corpuscular-mechanistic theory, but accounting for abstract features of the world - notably unity and endurance of substances. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau is clearly sympathetic. As a view of why normal objects have unity and persist over time it is almost the only decent theory around. Hawley, for example, struggles to explain how 'stages' of a thing are linked. Classical mereology is silly. |
16613 | Hylomorphism declined because scholastics made it into a testable physical theory [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Scholastics lost their grip on hylomorphism as a metaphysical theory, conceiving of it as a concrete, physical hypothesis about causal forces. Once form and matter were made subject to empirical research, their days were inevitably numbered. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 06.1) | |
A reaction: Pasnau seems to make a sharp distinction between science, and a separate realm he labels 'metaphysical'. You can't keep causation out of Aristotelian hylomorphism. The defence is that it is at a higher level of generality than science. |
16747 | Scholastics made forms substantial, in a way unintended by Aristotle [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The conception of form as somehow substantial took on new life among scholastic Aristotelians, and was developed in ways that Aristotle himself never suggested. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: This is music to we modern neo-Aristotelians, because scholasticism was rightly dumped in the 17th C, but we can go back and start again from what The Philosopher actually said. |
16759 | Scholastics began to see substantial form more as Aristotle's 'efficient' cause [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The whole scholastic conception of substantial form came to have more and more in common with an Aristotelian efficient cause. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
A reaction: Aristotle, of course, identified the form with the 'formal cause [aitia]', which is the shape of the statue, rather than the efficient cause, which is the sculptor. |
16748 | Aquinas says a substance has one form; Scotists say it has many forms [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Aquinas subscribes to the unitarian doctrine that a single substance has just a single substantial form, but authors like Scotus subscribe to a plurality of substantial forms. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: The Scotists seem to think that qualities themselve can have forms. I take it that Aristotle would have agreed with Aquinas. |
16671 | Scholastic Quantity either gives a body parts, or spreads them out in a unified way [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: On one version of Quantity realism it is what makes a body have parts; on another version, it is what makes the body's parts be spread out in a continuous and unified way. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 14.1) |
16596 | A substratum can't be 'bare', because it has a job to do [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: A completely bare substratum seems not just incoherent but also unable to carry out the function for which it is intended - to be a substratum. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.3) |
16579 | There may be different types of substrate, or temporary substrates [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The substratum thesis says …perhaps there is a different subject for different kinds of changes, and perhaps what endures through one kind of change will be corrupted by another. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16584 | If a substrate gives causal support for change, quite a lot of the ingredients must endure [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: When the substratum thesis is grounded on the idea that the ingredients must endure through the change, if they are to play a causal role, then it is natural to suppose that quite a lot of the ingredients must endure. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) | |
A reaction: Aristotle sharply distinguishes alteration from substantial change, but as the substrate gets thinner, the boundary between those two would blur. |
16580 | A substrate may be 'prime matter', which endures through every change [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The 'conservation thesis' about substrates says that there is a single, most basic substrate that endures through every material change, something we call 'prime matter'. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16749 | Aristotelians deny that all necessary properties are essential [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: For an Aristotelian not all necessary properties are essential; the essential properties are those that define a thing as what it is. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.1) | |
A reaction: I take it as basic that whatever is essential is in some way important, whereas necessities can be trivial. |
16694 | Typical successive things are time and motion [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The standard scholastic examples of 'entia successiva' are time and motion. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 18.1) | |
A reaction: Aristotle's examples of a day and the Games seem clearer, as time and motion do not count so clearly as 'things'. |
16583 | Weak ex nihilo says it all comes from something; strong version says the old must partly endure [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The weak ex nihilo principle says that everything comes from something, and the strong ex nihilo principle says that in everything new, something of the old must endure | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16783 | Essences must explain, so we can infer them causally from the accidents [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Without the explanatory role of essence, the underlying epistemic picture would be jeopardised, because there would no longer be any causal route by which we might get from accidents to essence. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 27.5) | |
A reaction: There is a slight whiff of circularity here. It could be that we are psychologically desperate for essences, and so we invent bogus causal routes from the accidents to get at them. Can we know there are essences awaiting us, on independent grounds? |
21036 | Not all deals are fair deals [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The mere fact that you and I make a deal is not enough to make it fair. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) |
21038 | Does consent create the obligation, or must there be some benefit? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Legal thinkers have debated this question for a long time: can consent create an obligation on its own, or is some element of benefit or reliance required? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Clearly mere consent could be under some compulsion, either by the other party, or by some other forces. Keeping a deathbed promise usually brings no benefit, but is a matter of honour. Ah, honour! Can anyone remember what that is? |
21039 | Moral contracts involve both consent and reciprocity; making the deal, and keeping it [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Despite a tendency to read consent into moral claims, it is hard to make sense of our morality without acknowledging the independent weight of reciprocity. If my wife is unfaithful I have two different grounds of outrage: our promise, and my loyalty. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The point is that Hobbes and co over-simplify what a contract is. Compare a contract with a promise. One must be two-sided, the other can be one-sided. |
21030 | The categorical imperative is not the Golden Rule, which concerns contingent desires [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The Golden Rule depends on contingent facts about how people like to be treated. The categorical imperative asks that we abstract from such contingencies and respect persons as rational beings, regardless of what they might want in particular situations. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: I think the Golden Rule is wrong for a different reason. It assumes that we all want similar things, which we don't. Focus on other people's needs, not yours. |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Given the stringent demands of the Kantian ethic, the moral law would seem almost to require a foundation in nothing, for any empirical precondition would undermine its priority. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984], 'Kantian') | |
A reaction: The idea of a value with 'a foundation in nothing' is particular anathema to me, because my project is to find a foundation for everything (in nature, which is the Given). Kant's only foundational value seems to be rational consistency. |
21031 | Man cannot dispose of himself, because he is not a thing to be owned [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Man cannot dispose over himself because he is not a thing; he is not his own property. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [Kant lecture note] This is an important qualification to persons as ends. If a person owned themselves, that would separate the person from what they owned. Sandel mentions selling your own organs. Kant is considering prostitution. Why is slavery wrong? |
20594 | Choosers in the 'original position' have been stripped of most human characteristics [Sandel, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
Full Idea: Sandel argues that people in the 'original position' have been stripped of everything that makes them recognisably human: their conceptions of the good, their nationality, family membership, religion, friendships and past histories. | |
From: report of Michael J. Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice [1982]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 4 'Communitarian' | |
A reaction: This draws attention to what a pure Enlightenment rational project Rawls is pursuing, in the spirit if Kant's ethics. Choosers in the original position become identical, and thus choose a homogeneous society. |
21035 | Just visiting (and using roads) is hardly ratifying the Constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is hard to see how just passing through town is morally akin to ratifying the Constitution. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: They say that philosophical ideas are never refuted, and no progress is made, but this sure put paid to John Locke. |
21037 | A ratified constitution may not be a just constitution [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The fact that a constitution is ratified by the people does not prove that its provisions are just. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: Yes indeed. And the fact that a majority won a referendum does not make their decision wise. Hence all constitutions must be open to evaluation. Gun laws in the US are the obvious example. |
21034 | A just constitution harmonises the different freedoms [Sandel] |
Full Idea: As Kant sees it, a just constitution aims at harmonising each individual's freedom with that of everyone else. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 05) | |
A reaction: [source?] Nice statement of the project. I increasingly see political philosophy as constitution design. I say philosophers have got fifty years to design an optimum constitution, and they should then down tools and promote it, in simple language. |
22258 | Passion for progress is always short-lived [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Progress demands passions that cannot last for long. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.35) | |
A reaction: The obvious example, for me, is the Labour Government in the UK, 1945-51. This is the kind of realism which progressive politicians must face up to. Unfortunately it is the logic of very ruthless revolutionaries. |
22259 | Conservatives are either individualistic, or communal [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Individualist conservatives believe people should be free to do as they please so long as they do not harm others. ...Communal conservatives, by contrast, believe government should affirm moral and religious values. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.38) | |
A reaction: Nozick represents the first group (as does J.S.Mill, usually seen as epitomising liberalism). He says the first group like volunteer armies and oppose welfare; the second group favour conscription and conservative welfare. |
22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Liberty in the modern procedural republic is defined in opposition to democracy, as an individual's guarantee against what the majority might will. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984], 'Present') | |
A reaction: And so I should hope. Sandel is sort of criticising this view, but it seems obvious that rights of this sort must be basic to any civilised democracy. But how do you decide those rights, if not by a majoritarian decision? |
22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The liberal claim that the right is prior to the good means that individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general good, and that the basic principles of justice cannot be premised on any particular vision of the good life. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984], 'The right') | |
A reaction: In Rawls, the first thesis is chosen from a neutral position, and the second is all that is needed to affirm rights as basic. These two are the target of Sandel's communitarian claims. Utilitarians will make the sacrifices. No consensus on the good life! |
21120 | The self is 'unencumbered' if it can abandon its roles and commitments without losing identity [Sandel, by Shorten] |
Full Idea: Sandel says liberals are committed to the 'unencumbered self', ..when it has no roles, commitments or projects that are 'so essential that turning away from them would call into question the person I am'. | |
From: report of Michael J. Sandel (Liberalism and the Limits of Justice [1982], p.86) by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02 | |
A reaction: This is a very penetrating criticism of liberalism. The liberal self that makes social and legal contracts and exercises basic political rights is not far from being a robot. It has the minimum needed to join a society. Belonging is quite different. |
22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For the liberal concept of justice we must stand to our circumstances always at a certain distance, whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as unencumbered selves in the case of Rawls. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984], 'Transcendental') | |
A reaction: Maybe the only way to be unencumbered is to be transcendental. There is an insecure feeling that if the self becomes immanent or encumbered it thereby loses its objective rationality. You wake up one morning and find you are a nazi? |
21049 | Liberal freedom was a response to assigned destinies like caste and class [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Liberal freedom developed as an antidote to political theories that consigned persons to destinies fixed by caste or class, station or rank, custom, tradition or inherited status. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 09) | |
A reaction: Virtually all human beings before modern times found that they had been 'assigned destinies'. The huge exception is war, especially civil war, which must be a huge liberation for many people, despite the danger. |
22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |
Full Idea: Sandel argues that liberalism is the politics of rights, while communitarianism is the politics of the common good. | |
From: report of Michael J. Sandel (Procedural republic and unencumbered self [1984]) by Avineri,S/De-Shalit,A - Intro to 'Communitarianism and Individualism' §4 | |
A reaction: The first thing on the agenda of the common good should be to assert and protect the rights of individual citizens. How could there be a common good which trampled on individuals? I agree that the common good is prior (e.g. in a pandemic). |
22260 | Modern liberalism fails to articulate a vision of the common good [Sandel] |
Full Idea: In recent years liberalism has faltered because of its failure to argue for a vision of the common good. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Beyond Individualism [1988], p.45) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's main theme. He derives his concept of the common good from the essential natures of persons and institutions. I greatly admire this. |
22265 | I can't defend the view that the majority values of a community are thereby right [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Insofar as 'communitarian' is another name for majoritarianism, or for the idea that rights should rest on the values that predominate in any given community at any given time, it is not a view I would defend. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Where') | |
A reaction: I should hope not. You could soon end up as a good nazi if you follow that route. Sandel defends a critical view of community values (implying a role for philosophy?). The community good must be continually negotiated. Sounds fine to me. |
22268 | If persons define themselves by a group membership, insults to that group are a real harm [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For persons who understand themselves as defined by the ethnic or religious group to which they belong, an insult to the group can inflict a harm as real and as damaging as some physical harms. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: In Britain many people fully define themselves by their allegiance to a football club. Really! They usually learn to laugh off an insult to their club, but it hurts. Laughing off an insult is an essential modern skill - up to a point. |
22267 | In the liberal view an insult to my group doesn't hurt me, since I'm defined by choices not groups [Sandel] |
Full Idea: By the liberal conception of a person, my dignity could never be damaged by an insult to a group with which I identify, because what matters is not my social role, but my capacity to choose that role. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Free speech') | |
A reaction: If I'm defined by my capacity to choose, and I choose to join some group, why is an insult to that group not an insult to my capacity to choose? How do you insult a liberal? 'I despise your individual freedom!'. |
21040 | Libertarians just want formal equality in a free market; the meritocratic view wants fair equality [Sandel] |
Full Idea: The libertarian view of distributive justice is a free market with formal equality of opportunity. The meritocratic view is a free market with fair equality of opportunity. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 06) | |
A reaction: The obvious question is what has to be done, by intervention, to make the market fair. There are two major rival views of equality here. Is the starting point fair, and is the race itself fair? |
21043 | Distributive justice concern deserts, as well as who gets what [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Debates about distributive justice are about not only who gets what but also what qualities are worthy of honour and reward. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: So the 'undeserving poor' get nuffink? Does just being a human being deserve anything? Obviously yes. That said, we can't deny the concept of 'appropriate reward'. |
21028 | We can approach justice through welfare, or freedom, or virtue [Sandel] |
Full Idea: We have identified three ways of approaching the distribution of goods: welfare, freedom and virtue. ...and these are three ways of thinking about justice. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: Virtue is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the problem. The best known instance of justice is punishment, which is a distribution of harms. |
21027 | Justice concerns how a society distributes what it prizes - wealth, rights, power and honours [Sandel] |
Full Idea: To ask whether a society is just is to ask how we distribute the things we prize - income and wealth, duties and rights, powers and opportunities, offices and honours. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 01) | |
A reaction: There is, of course, the prior question of what things should be controlled by a society for distribution. But there is also justice in the promotional and pay structure of institutions within a society, including private institutions. |
21042 | Should we redress wrongs done by a previous generation? [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Can we ever have a moral responsibility to redress wrongs committed by a previous generation? | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 07) | |
A reaction: Just asking for a friend. It seems to depend on how close we feel to the previous generation. Regretting the crime committed by a beloved parent is one thing. Despising the crime committed by some right bastard who shares my nationality is another. |
21048 | Work is not fair if it is negotiated, even in a fair situation, but if it suits the nature of the worker [Sandel] |
Full Idea: For the libertarian free exchange for labour is fair; for Rawls it requires fair background conditions; for Aristotle, for the work to be just it must be suited to the nature of the workers who perform it. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Aristotle's idea is powerful, and Sandel performs a great service in drawing attention to it. Imagine the key negotiation in an interview being whether this particular work suits your nature! |
21052 | Justice is about how we value things, and not just about distributions [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Justice is not only about the right way to distribute things. It is also about the right way to value things. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 10) | |
A reaction: This is Sandel's distinctively Aristotelian contribution to the justice debate - with which I have great sympathy. And, as he argues, the values of things arise out of assessing their essential natures. |
22266 | The case for religious liberty depends on the religion contributing to a morally good life [Sandel] |
Full Idea: Unless there were reason to believe that religious beliefs and practices contribute to morally admirable ways of life, the case for a right to religious liberty would be weakened. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (The Limits of Communitarianism [1998], 'Religious') | |
A reaction: I think many religious people would deny that their religion is primarily moral. (W.Blake: 'If morality is Christianity, then Socrates was the saviour'). Whose concept of a morally good life is Sandel referring to? |
21045 | Teleological thinking is essential for social and political issues [Sandel] |
Full Idea: It is not easy to dispense with teleological reasoning in thinking about social institutions and political practices. | |
From: Michael J. Sandel (Justice: What's the right thing to do? [2009], 08) | |
A reaction: I think teleological thinking is also indispensable in biology. You can't understand an ear or an eye if you don't know what it is FOR. If it relates to a mind, it is teleological. The eye of a dead person is for nothing. |
16609 | Atomists say causation is mechanical collisions, and all true qualities are microscopic [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: The atomist view is that causation is limited to collisions among corpuscles (which is 'mechanism'), and the only bodily qualities are those found at the microcorpuscular level; sensible qualities are in fact sensations. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 05.4) | |
A reaction: [Part of a full summary of atomism by Pasnau] |
16603 | In the 17th C matter became body, and was then studied by science [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century, matter becomes body, and body becomes the object of natural science. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 04.5) |
16592 | Atomism is the commonest version of corpuscularianism, but isn't required by it [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Atomism is the most common version of corpuscular prime matter, but it is not the only option. Indeed, atomism neither entails nor is entailed by the combination of corpuscularianism and the substratum thesis. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 03.2) | |
A reaction: The point is that the corpuscles may be endlessly divisible (which Lewis called 'gunk'). |
16750 | If there are just arrangements of corpuscles, where are the boundaries between substances? [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: If all there are corpuscles of various shapes and sizes, variously arranged, it is not easy to see how we might draw the boundary lines, at any given moment, between one substance and another. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.2) | |
A reaction: We still have precisely that problem, and it leads to the nihilism about ordinary objects found in Unger, Van Inwagen and Merricks. I have so far found modern defences of ordinary objects unpersuasive. |
16722 | Scholastic causation is by changes in the primary qualities of hot, cold, wet, dry [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: There is a scholastic theory of causation. Of Aristotle's Four Causes, the main one is the 'formal' cause, and that consists of changes in the primary, elemental qualities, which are hot, cold, wet and dry. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 21.2) | |
A reaction: [my summary] It is probably right to call this 'scholastic' rather than 'Aristotelian', as I take Aristotelian essence to run deeper than this, and involve principles as well as qualities. |
16760 | Substantial forms were a step towards scientific essentialism [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Substantial forms might well be viewed as an early step in the development of scientific essentialism. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 24.4) | |
A reaction: This is the scholastic view of substantial forms, which is much more physical and causal, rather than Aristotle's more abstract view. The rejection of substantial forms led to the 'Humean' view of laws of nature. |
16581 | Scholastic authors agree that matter was created by God, out of nothing [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Authors from 1274 to 1671 unanimously endorse the Christian doctrine that matter was created by God, before which time there was no material world at all. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 02.5) |
16642 | Transubstantion says accidents of bread and wine don't inhere in the substance [Pasnau] |
Full Idea: Transubstantiation maintains that the accidents of the bread and wine endure after consecration without inhering in the substance. | |
From: Robert Pasnau (Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 [2011], 10.3) | |
A reaction: It's a big puzzle to outsiders why softness and nice taste should have theological significance. If it is the body and blood of Christ, presumably a miracle has occurred, so normal theories don't apply. It is the key difficulty for scholastic metaphysics. |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |