8 ideas
7855 | Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau] |
Full Idea: It is sometimes contended that the whole idea of materialism is somehow empty, on the grounds that there is no proper way to characterize the 'physical' realm. | |
From: report of DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 1.1 | |
A reaction: [Papineau also cites Gabriel Segal] I agree with Papineau in rejecting this. Uncertainties about quantum states do not pose a problem, and the position tends to have an implicit dualism buried in it somewhere. |
12354 | A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin] |
Full Idea: A 'categorial' property is a property something has by virtue of being or having an item from one of the categories. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], V.5) | |
A reaction: I deny that these are 'properties'. A thing is categorised according to its properties. To denote the category as a further property is the route to madness (well, to a regress). |
12358 | Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin] |
Full Idea: Substance [ousia] is a principle [arché] and a kind of cause [aitia]. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], 1041a09) | |
A reaction: The fact that substance is a cause is also the reason why substance is the ultimate explanation. It is here that I take the word 'power' to capture best what Aristotle has in mind. |
12346 | Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin] |
Full Idea: The form of a thing (of a given kind) explains why certain matter constitutes a thing of that kind, and with this, Aristotle holds, we have reached explanatory bedrock. | |
From: Michael V. Wedin (Aristotle's Theory of Substance [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: We must explain an individual tiger which is unusually docile. It must have an individual form which makes it a tiger, but also an individual form which makes it docile. |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
6121 | There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: There are many psychophysical laws, linking sensations to non-mental features of those who have them; the industries of anaesthetics, scents, narcotics, sweeteners, coloured paints, loudspeakers and soft cushions depend on them. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.198) | |
A reaction: It may be expressing it a little strongly to call these 'laws', but they are certainly reliable regularities, and they are probably enough to undermine Davidson's claim that such laws don't exist. |
6122 | No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: Neither laws nor causation nor claims of supervenience (the last refuge of the physicalist) deprive psychology of the ontological authority of non-mental science. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.203) | |
A reaction: There is no need to defend the practice of psychologists (or garden designers) from the depradations of bandit physicalists. But what is the ontology of psychology if it isn't dualist or physicalist? |
1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |