61 ideas
| 10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both. |
| 10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
| A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
| 23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Naïve set theory is based on the principles that any formula defines a set, and that coextensive sets are identical. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.2) | |
| A reaction: The second principle is a standard axiom of ZFC. The first principle causes the trouble. |
| 10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
| 10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it). | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'. |
| 10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
| 10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2) |
| 10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5) |
| 10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
| 10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen] |
| 10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'. |
| 10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4) | |
| A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics] |
| 23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: In classical semantics the function of singular terms is to refer, and that of quantifiers, to range over appropriate domains of entities. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 7.1) |
| 23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Considered in isolation, the axioms of group theory are not assertions but comprise an implicit definition of some abstract structure, | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.5) | |
| A reaction: The traditional Euclidean approach is that axioms are plausible assertions with which to start. The present idea sums up the modern approach. In the modern version you can work backwards from a structure to a set of axioms. |
| 23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Mathematics investigates the deductive consequences of axiomatic theories, but it also needs its own foundational axioms in order to provide models for its various axiomatic theories. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a problem which faces the deductivist (if-then) approach. The deductive process needs its own grounds. |
| 23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If the 2nd Incompleteness Theorem undermines Hilbert's attempt to use a weak theory to prove the consistency of a strong one, it is still possible to prove the consistency of one theory, assuming the consistency of another theory. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.6) | |
| A reaction: Note that this concerns consistency, not completeness. |
| 23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Philosophical structuralism holds that mathematics is the study of abstract structures, or 'patterns'. If mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, then it is inevitable that the world is described by mathematics. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 11.1) | |
| A reaction: [He cites the physicist John Barrow (2010) for this] For me this is a major idea, because the concept of a pattern gives a link between the natural physical world and the abstract world of mathematics. No platonism is needed. |
| 14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'deductivist' version of eliminativist structuralism avoids ontological commitments to mathematical objects, and to modal vocabulary. Mathematics is formulations of various (mostly categorical) theories to describe kinds of concrete structures. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], 1) | |
| A reaction: 'Concrete' is ambiguous here, as mathematicians use it for the actual working maths, as opposed to the metamathematics. Presumably the structures are postulated rather than described. He cites Russell 1903 and Putnam. It is nominalist. |
| 14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'non-eliminative' version of mathematical structuralism takes it to be a fundamental insight that mathematical objects are really just positions in abstract mathematical structures. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that it is non-eliminativist because it is committed to the existence of mathematical structures. I oppose this view, since once you are committed to the structures, you may as well admit a vast implausible menagerie of abstracta. |
| 14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The 'modal' version of eliminativist structuralism lifts the deductivist ban on modal notions. It studies what necessarily holds in all concrete models which are possible for various theories. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Putnam 1967, and Hellman 1989] If mathematical truths are held to be necessary (which seems to be right), then it seems reasonable to include modal notions, about what is possible, in its study. |
| 14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: 'Set-theoretic' structuralism rejects deductive nominalism in favour of a background theory of sets, and mathematics as the various structures realized among the sets. This is often what mathematicians have in mind when they talk about structuralism. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
| A reaction: This is the big shift from 'mathematics can largely be described in set theory' to 'mathematics just is set theory'. If it just is set theory, then which version of set theory? Which axioms? The safe iterative conception, or something bolder? |
| 14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Structuralism can be distinguished from traditional Platonism in that it denies that mathematical objects from the same structure are ontologically independent of one another | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
| A reaction: My instincts strongly cry out against all versions of this. If you are going to be a platonist (rather as if you are going to be religious) you might as well go for it big time and have independent objects, which will then dictate a structure. |
| 14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Against extreme views that all mathematical objects depend on the structures to which they belong, or that none do, I defend a compromise view, that structuralists are right about algebraic objects (roughly), but anti-structuralists are right about sets. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], Intro) |
| 14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: If objects depend on the other objects, this would mean an 'upward' dependence, in that they depend on the structure to which they belong, where the physical realm has a 'downward' dependence, with structures depending on their constituents. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
| A reaction: This nicely captures an intuition I have that there is something wrong with a commitment primarily to 'structures'. Our only conception of such things is as built up out of components. Not that I am committing to mathematical 'components'! |
| 23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Modern logic requires that logical truths be true in all models, including ones devoid of any mathematical objects. It follows immediately that the existence of mathematical objects can never be a matter of logic alone. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 2) | |
| A reaction: Hm. Could there not be a complete set of models for a theory which all included mathematical objects? (I can't answer that). |
| 23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Game Formalism seeks to banish all semantics from mathematics, and Term Formalism seeks to reduce any such notions to purely syntactic ones. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.3) | |
| A reaction: This approach was stimulated by the need to justify the existence of the imaginary number i. Just say it is a letter! |
| 14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: We can give an exhaustive account of the identity of the empty set and its singleton without mentioning infinite sets, and it might be possible to defend the view that one natural number depends on its predecessor but not vice versa. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], V) | |
| A reaction: Linnebo uses this as one argument against mathematical structuralism, where the small seems to depend on the large. The view of sets rests on the iterative conception, where each level is derived from a lower level. He dismisses structuralism of sets. |
| 10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma. |
| 10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'. |
| 14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: There are two main ways of spelling out an 'intrinsic' property: if and only if it is shared by every duplicate of an object, ...and if and only if the object would have this property even if the rest of the universe were removed or disregarded. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], II) | |
| A reaction: [He cites B.Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopaedia article] How about an intrinsic property being one which explains its identity, or behaviour, or persistence conditions? |
| 10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
| A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
| 10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
| Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle. | |
| From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1) | |
| A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic. |
| 23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: It is a feature of criminal responsibility that it can be distributed without being divided. We can, that is, blame more than one person for a particular act without splitting up the blame we assign. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 19) | |
| A reaction: How far can this extend? To a large violent mob? To an entire nation? In court the responsibility is usually adjusted in the sentencing, rather than in the initial verdict. |
| 23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Double effect is defensible, I want to argue, only when the two outcomes are the product of a double intention - that 'good' be achieved, and that the foreseeable evil be reduced as far as possible. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 09) | |
| A reaction: A good proposal, I think. We have to accept evil side effects sometimes, but it is immoral to pursue some good 'whatever the cost'. |
| 23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: The substructure of the ethical world is a matter of deep and unending controversy, Meanwhile, however, we are living in the superstructure. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Pref) | |
| A reaction: This may be the best approach to ethics. Nearly all applied ethics takes the common sense consensus on values for granted. Personally I think that is because the substructure is the obvious success and failure of human functioning. |
| 20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Walzer says behind the veil of ignorance there would be no way to know how a particular good should be distributed, because we would not know the social meaning of the good in question. | |
| From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 4 'Communitarian' | |
| A reaction: Is Rawls actually proposing to decide details of distribution from behind the veil? There is just the maximin principle. What that means in practice would surely come once the society was under way. |
| 20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Complex equality tries to keep advantages in one area (such as money) from translating into advantages in politics or before the law. | |
| From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Tuckness,A/Wolf,C - This is Political Philosophy 3 'Complex' | |
| A reaction: Put like that, Walzer's complex equality becomes very interesting, and pinpoints a major problem of our age, where discrepancies of wealth have become staggeringly large at the top end. |
| 20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
| Full Idea: Michael Walzer argues for 'complex equality', saying different goods belong to different distributive 'spheres', each with its own distributive principles. | |
| From: report of Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice [1983]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 3 'Egalitarian' | |
| A reaction: Sounds interesting. Equality seems to make different demands when it concerns basic food for survival, or fine wines. You can spend your money freely, but hording in a crisis is frowned on. |
| 23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: If states possess rights more or less as individuals do, then it is possible to imagine a society among them more or less like the individuals. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
| A reaction: The state's rights must derive from the people. Plots of land don't have rights. In some states the people are in conflict. It can't just be the government which represents the rights of the state. |
| 23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: The defence of rights is a reason for fighting. I want now to stress again, and finally, that it is the only reason. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
| A reaction: Walzer states at the beginning, without discussion, that his moral assumptions are based on the notion of rights. This is tricky because rights are assigned by some people to other people, and claims of rights can be challenged. |
| 23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Every violation of an independent state is called aggression, which fails to differentiate between a seizure or imposition, and an actual conquest. …But what they have in common is that all aggressive acts justify forceful resistance. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 04) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] Walzer concedes that this makes 'aggression' rather imprecise, and small acts can be used as an excuse for desired violent resistance. Each entrant in August 1914 seems to have had a slightly different motive. |
| 23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Nuclear weapons are not designed for war at all. …They explode the idea of a just war. They are the first technological innovations that are simply not encompassable within the familiar moral world. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
| A reaction: A nuclear war can hardly lead to normal victory, if it destroys the thing you are trying to conquer. It is like bringing a machine gun to a boxing match. |
| 23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: States can use force in the face of threats of war, if there is a serious risk to territory or independence. They are then forced to fight, and are the victims of aggression. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 05) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He uses this to justify Israeli pre-emptive strikes against Palestinians. I don't think his confident assertion of this principle is justified. It is open to massive abuse. There are, though, clearly situations where he is right. |
| 23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Just wars may not be self-defence, if they are to help an independence struggle, or it is to save another country being invaded, or to prevent enslavement or massacre. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 06) | |
| A reaction: [summary] Modern wars support some examples of these, but also suggest that without a long-term plan, or an understanding of the country they are entering, such intercessions may worsen the situation. |
| 23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: The purpose of reprisals is not to win the war or prevent defeat, but simply to enforce the rules [of war]. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
| A reaction: That may be wishful thinking, since reprisals are often vastly more ruthless than the original offence, and there is often injustice in the nature of the reprisals, since they cannot be precise. |
| 23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Reprisal is the first resort of force. It is an alternative to war, and that description is an important argument in its favour. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
| A reaction: Enduring wrongs with dignity might be another alternative. Successful reprisals may be acceptable, but how do you assess their prospects? |
| 23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: With nuclear weapons, supreme emergency has become a permanent condition. …[283] But supreme emergency is never a stable position. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
| A reaction: The obvious instability of balanced mutual threat is a nuclear state which finds itself losing a war. |
| 23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Whenever there is some substantial chance of success, reprisals are the legitimate resort of a victim state; for no state can be required passively to endure attacks upon its citizens. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 13) | |
| A reaction: My concern is whether the reprisals have any direct connection to the attacks. They killed some of ours, so we will kill some of theirs is immoral. E.g. bombing Tripoli as reprisal for crashing the Lockerbie plane. |
| 23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Justice of war [ad bellum] and justice in war [in bello] are logically independent. It is perfectly possible for a just war to be fought unjustly, and for an unjust war to be fought in strict accordance with the rules. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 02) | |
| A reaction: The perfect decorum of an unjust firing squad might even make the crime worse. There is something chilling about an evil army conducting itself perfectly within the ethics of warfare. Better than the other thing, though. McMahan disagrees. |
| 23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Napoleon said 'Soldiers are made to be killed. …I do not care a fig for the lives of a million men'. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
| A reaction: [Two separate remarks attributed to Napoleon] He apparently often said things like this this later in his career. It strikes me as despicable, and anyone who still tries to present Napoleon as admirable should be ashamed. |
| 23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Just wars are limited wars; there are moral reasons for the statesmen and soldiers who fight them to be prudent and realistic. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 07) | |
| A reaction: This is rather profound, I think. Watch closely the behaviour of the good guys when they are winning the war. In general, to know someone's moral principles, the best indicator is how they behave when they have power. |
| 23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Soldiers fighting for an aggressor state are not themselves criminals: hence their war rights are the same as those of their opponents. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
| A reaction: Walzer's main support for this is that opposing armies never regard one another as intrinsically criminal. It seems inevitable, though, that even the invaders themselves see that they are a bit more criminal than the defenders. |
| 23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: The duties of individual soldiers …are precisely the same in wars of aggression and wars of defence. …The moral status of soldiers on both sides is very much the same; they are led to fight by their loyalty and their lawful obedience. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
| A reaction: He excludes war crimes. This is the thesis which Jeff McMahan objects to. It would be very odd to think that mafiosi and the legitimate police were morally equal, because the former are loyal. We should all try hard to avoid supporting unjust causes. |
| 23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: It would be difficult to condemn soldiers for anything they did in the course of a battle or a war that they honestly believed, and had good reason to believe, was necessary, or important, or simply useful in determining the outcome. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 08) | |
| A reaction: We can't blame unjust aggressors if their own lives are at stake, but what about in a surprise attack on the first day of the war (such as Pearl Harbour)? Or if they massacre the enemy with safe and overwhelming superiority? |
| 23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Objections to combatant equality appeal to a sliding scale of 'the more justice, the more right'. …It allows the justice of one's cause to make a difference in the way one fights. …The extreme says soldiers fightly justly can do anything that is useful. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 14) | |
| A reaction: This slippery slope fear seems to be Walzer's main argument in favour of the moral equality of combatants. See Jeff McMahan for the opposing view. |
| 23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Soldiers may stand to civilians like the crew of a liner to its passengers, for whom they must risk their lives. …But would they be so bound if the sailors had been kidnapped? | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 19) | |
| A reaction: The point, I assume, is that a conscripted army does not have the same obligations as volunteers. I can't imagine that principle being accepted in an army which is a mixture of the two. |
| 23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: The crucial distinction in the theory and practice of war is not between prohibited and acceptable weapons but between prohibited and acceptable targets. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 17) | |
| A reaction: Walzer presents this idea as arising out of discussions about nuclear deterrence. Gas attacks were accepted in WW1 trenches, but modern gas attacks on civilians are a crime. Are nuclear attacks on strictly military targets OK? E.g a fleet. |
| 23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: When one cannot count on the moral code of the oppressor, nonviolence is either a disguised form of surrender or a minimalist way of upholding communal values after a military defeat. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Afterword) | |
| A reaction: The point is that ruthless conquerors may just kill the nonviolent, so it would achieve nothing. Nonviolence is only a plausible strategy in a fairly civilised world. Hard to disagree. |
| 23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: Soldiers must feel safe among civilians if civilians are ever to be safe from soldiers. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], 11) | |
| A reaction: This is the great dilemma of any resistance movement. It is very easy for the soldiers to abuse their power, even if they do feel safe. Then what? |
| 23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
| Full Idea: We must begin by insisting upon the rules of war and by holding soldiers rigidly to the norms they set. The restraint of war is the beginning of peace. | |
| From: Michael Walzer (Just and Unjust Wars [1977], Afterword) | |
| A reaction: Last sentence of his book. Some cultures have a much greater tradition of ruthless cruelty than others, it seems. Most war ethics seems to concern how the good guys should respond to the bad guys (since the latter hardly care). |
| 1513 | The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus] |
| Full Idea: The Egyptians were the first to claim that the soul of a human being is immortal, and that each time the body dies the soul enters another creature just as it is being born. | |
| From: Herodotus (The Histories [c.435 BCE], 2.123.2) |