67 ideas
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions. |
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both. |
10779 | A comprehension axiom is 'predicative' if the formula has no bound second-order variables [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If φ contains no bound second-order variables, the corresponding comprehension axiom is said to be 'predicative'; otherwise it is 'impredicative'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) | |
A reaction: ['Predicative' roughly means that a new predicate is created, and 'impredicative' means that it just uses existing predicates] |
23445 | Naïve set theory says any formula defines a set, and coextensive sets are identical [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Naïve set theory is based on the principles that any formula defines a set, and that coextensive sets are identical. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.2) | |
A reaction: The second principle is a standard axiom of ZFC. The first principle causes the trouble. |
10781 | A 'pure logic' must be ontologically innocent, universal, and without presuppositions [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: I offer these three claims as a partial analysis of 'pure logic': ontological innocence (no new entities are introduced), universal applicability (to any realm of discourse), and cognitive primacy (no extra-logical ideas are presupposed). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §1) |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it). | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'. |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If my arguments are correct, the theory of plural quantification has no right to the title 'logic'. ...The impredicative plural comprehension axioms depend too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §4) |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2) |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5) |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: According to its supporters, second-order logic allow us to pay the ontological price of a mere first-order theory and get the corresponding monadic second-order theory for free. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §0) |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'. |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics] |
23447 | In classical semantics singular terms refer, and quantifiers range over domains [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: In classical semantics the function of singular terms is to refer, and that of quantifiers, to range over appropriate domains of entities. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 7.1) |
23443 | The axioms of group theory are not assertions, but a definition of a structure [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Considered in isolation, the axioms of group theory are not assertions but comprise an implicit definition of some abstract structure, | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.5) | |
A reaction: The traditional Euclidean approach is that axioms are plausible assertions with which to start. The present idea sums up the modern approach. In the modern version you can work backwards from a structure to a set of axioms. |
23444 | To investigate axiomatic theories, mathematics needs its own foundational axioms [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Mathematics investigates the deductive consequences of axiomatic theories, but it also needs its own foundational axioms in order to provide models for its various axiomatic theories. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.1) | |
A reaction: This is a problem which faces the deductivist (if-then) approach. The deductive process needs its own grounds. |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Valid deductive arguments have the property of monotonicity; if the conclusion Q follows from the premises P, then it will also follow if further premises P* are added to P. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: For perversity's sake we could add a new premise which contradicted one of the original ones ('Socrates is a god'). Or one premise could be 'I believe..', and the new one could show that the belief was false. Induction is non-monotonic. |
23446 | You can't prove consistency using a weaker theory, but you can use a consistent theory [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If the 2nd Incompleteness Theorem undermines Hilbert's attempt to use a weak theory to prove the consistency of a strong one, it is still possible to prove the consistency of one theory, assuming the consistency of another theory. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 4.6) | |
A reaction: Note that this concerns consistency, not completeness. |
23448 | Mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, and is thus bound to describe the world [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Philosophical structuralism holds that mathematics is the study of abstract structures, or 'patterns'. If mathematics is the study of all possible patterns, then it is inevitable that the world is described by mathematics. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 11.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites the physicist John Barrow (2010) for this] For me this is a major idea, because the concept of a pattern gives a link between the natural physical world and the abstract world of mathematics. No platonism is needed. |
14085 | 'Deductivist' structuralism is just theories, with no commitment to objects, or modality [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The 'deductivist' version of eliminativist structuralism avoids ontological commitments to mathematical objects, and to modal vocabulary. Mathematics is formulations of various (mostly categorical) theories to describe kinds of concrete structures. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], 1) | |
A reaction: 'Concrete' is ambiguous here, as mathematicians use it for the actual working maths, as opposed to the metamathematics. Presumably the structures are postulated rather than described. He cites Russell 1903 and Putnam. It is nominalist. |
14084 | Non-eliminative structuralism treats mathematical objects as positions in real abstract structures [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The 'non-eliminative' version of mathematical structuralism takes it to be a fundamental insight that mathematical objects are really just positions in abstract mathematical structures. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
A reaction: The point here is that it is non-eliminativist because it is committed to the existence of mathematical structures. I oppose this view, since once you are committed to the structures, you may as well admit a vast implausible menagerie of abstracta. |
14086 | 'Modal' structuralism studies all possible concrete models for various mathematical theories [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The 'modal' version of eliminativist structuralism lifts the deductivist ban on modal notions. It studies what necessarily holds in all concrete models which are possible for various theories. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
A reaction: [He cites Putnam 1967, and Hellman 1989] If mathematical truths are held to be necessary (which seems to be right), then it seems reasonable to include modal notions, about what is possible, in its study. |
14087 | 'Set-theoretic' structuralism treats mathematics as various structures realised among the sets [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: 'Set-theoretic' structuralism rejects deductive nominalism in favour of a background theory of sets, and mathematics as the various structures realized among the sets. This is often what mathematicians have in mind when they talk about structuralism. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], I) | |
A reaction: This is the big shift from 'mathematics can largely be described in set theory' to 'mathematics just is set theory'. If it just is set theory, then which version of set theory? Which axioms? The safe iterative conception, or something bolder? |
14089 | Structuralism differs from traditional Platonism, because the objects depend ontologically on their structure [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Structuralism can be distinguished from traditional Platonism in that it denies that mathematical objects from the same structure are ontologically independent of one another | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
A reaction: My instincts strongly cry out against all versions of this. If you are going to be a platonist (rather as if you are going to be religious) you might as well go for it big time and have independent objects, which will then dictate a structure. |
14083 | Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Against extreme views that all mathematical objects depend on the structures to which they belong, or that none do, I defend a compromise view, that structuralists are right about algebraic objects (roughly), but anti-structuralists are right about sets. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], Intro) |
14090 | In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: If objects depend on the other objects, this would mean an 'upward' dependence, in that they depend on the structure to which they belong, where the physical realm has a 'downward' dependence, with structures depending on their constituents. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], III) | |
A reaction: This nicely captures an intuition I have that there is something wrong with a commitment primarily to 'structures'. Our only conception of such things is as built up out of components. Not that I am committing to mathematical 'components'! |
23441 | Logical truth is true in all models, so mathematical objects can't be purely logical [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Modern logic requires that logical truths be true in all models, including ones devoid of any mathematical objects. It follows immediately that the existence of mathematical objects can never be a matter of logic alone. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 2) | |
A reaction: Hm. Could there not be a complete set of models for a theory which all included mathematical objects? (I can't answer that). |
23442 | Game Formalism has no semantics, and Term Formalism reduces the semantics [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Game Formalism seeks to banish all semantics from mathematics, and Term Formalism seeks to reduce any such notions to purely syntactic ones. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Philosophy of Mathematics [2017], 3.3) | |
A reaction: This approach was stimulated by the need to justify the existence of the imaginary number i. Just say it is a letter! |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The move from what can (or cannot) be known to exist to what does (or does not) exist has been dubbed the 'epistemic fallacy'. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6) | |
A reaction: This should be a standard concept in all philosophical discussion. It is the commonest, simplest, and most profound blunder made by philosophers, and they do it all the time. |
14091 | There may be a one-way direction of dependence among sets, and among natural numbers [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: We can give an exhaustive account of the identity of the empty set and its singleton without mentioning infinite sets, and it might be possible to defend the view that one natural number depends on its predecessor but not vice versa. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], V) | |
A reaction: Linnebo uses this as one argument against mathematical structuralism, where the small seems to depend on the large. The view of sets rests on the iterative conception, where each level is derived from a lower level. He dismisses structuralism of sets. |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4) | |
A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma. |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4) | |
A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'. |
14088 | An 'intrinsic' property is either found in every duplicate, or exists independent of all externals [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: There are two main ways of spelling out an 'intrinsic' property: if and only if it is shared by every duplicate of an object, ...and if and only if the object would have this property even if the rest of the universe were removed or disregarded. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Structuralism and the Notion of Dependence [2008], II) | |
A reaction: [He cites B.Weatherson's Stanford Encyclopaedia article] How about an intrinsic property being one which explains its identity, or behaviour, or persistence conditions? |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
Full Idea: For Psillos, properties in mature science are defined by the laws in which they feature. | |
From: report of Stathis Psillos (Scientific Realism [1999]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 3.5 | |
A reaction: This is a perfect example of the Humean approach getting everything the wrong way round. Laws are not primitives from which we derive our account of nature - they are generalisations built up from the behaviour of prior properties. |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem' | |
A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be. |
10782 | The modern concept of an object is rooted in quantificational logic [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Our modern general concept of an object is given content only in connection with modern quantificational logic. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification Exposed [2003], §2) | |
A reaction: [He mentions Frege, Carnap, Quine and Dummett] This is the first thing to tell beginners in modern analytical metaphysics. The word 'object' is very confusing. I think I prefer 'entity'. |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8) | |
A reaction: Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation. |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9) | |
A reaction: If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses. |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Unlike deductive arguments, induction is non-monotonic - that is, it can be invalidated by the addition of new premises. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1) | |
A reaction: This is a fancy way of stating the obvious, which is that induction is not a type of deduction. Hume is sometimes accused of this false assumption. Presumably induction is rational, even if it is not actually logical. |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three types of explanation are 'epistemic' (the event is expectable because of a law), or 'modal' (the event is necessary because of a law), or 'ontic' (it is shown how the event fits into the world's causal structure). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §11.1) | |
A reaction: Prediction, necessity or causes. It is hard to think of any other way to explain something. Presumably you would exclude necessities if you didn't believe in them. Hume would go for prediction, on the basis of regularities. Personally, I want it all. |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Explanation has to do with understanding; just citing a cause would not offer an adequate understanding, unless it was accompanied by the citation of a law that connects the two events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: It is surely undeniable that being told the cause but not the law will increase our understanding. Understanding and explanation come in degrees. Full understanding would require an explanation of the law, and beyond. Any relevant truth helps. |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The 'deductive-nomological' model became known as the 'covering law model': its main thesis is that laws and only laws adequately explain the occurrence of singular events. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: But presumably you need other events to derive a law, so you could say that a singular event can only be explained if it isn't singular. A regularity pattern would offer a partial explanation, before any law had been derived. |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If we use geometry and optics to explain the length of shadow cast by a flag-pole, this seems to be reversible, so that the shadow will explain the length of the pole. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.5) | |
A reaction: A neat example which presumably implies that an explanation must involve temporal statements. The laws of physics are totally reversible in time, and so will not suffice to explain events on their own. Time's arrow becomes an axiom of explanation? |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A crucial basic point, which must be drummed into the minds of ruthless Quinean naturalists, who want to explain everything by quarks and electrons |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Knocking over an ink bottle explains the stain on the carpet, and it is not in doubt because you cannot quote the laws involved; a 'causal story' can give a complete explanation without a law. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.6) | |
A reaction: But why is he so clumsy, and the bottle so unstable? Was it really (Freudian) an 'accident'? There is no end to complete explanation. But 'I was clumsy this once' and 'I am always clumsy' are equally good explanations. |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers focus on the so-called 'pragmatics of explanation' - that an explanation is an answer to a 'why' question, and the relevant answer will depend on the presuppositions or interests of the questioner. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems to me right. Explanation is an entirely human business, not a feature of nature, and most explanations will track back to the big bang if you have the patience, but they always terminate because of pragmatic considerations. But fobbing off? |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
Full Idea: An explanation amounts to the removal of the initial surprise that accompanied the occurrence of the event. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2) | |
A reaction: This is a nice simple point. It makes explanation relative. God requires no explanations, small children require many. The implication is that explanations make events predictable, which means they must either offer inductive generalisations, or laws. |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
Full Idea: There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7) | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis. |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle. | |
From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1) | |
A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic. |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.8) | |
A reaction: This is the core of Hume's is/ought claim - what he calls the mind 'spreading itself'. It is a powerful claim. Personally I think we have become TOO sceptical here, and have the delusion that crucial features of nature are created within our minds. |
20239 | Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious. | |
From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038 | |
A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism. |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
Full Idea: We cannot distinguish between good and bad explanations of some phenomena, unless we first distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This seems right, but it pushes us towards the idea that causation is non-analysable, and must be taken as a metaphysically basic axiom. If naturalistic accounts fail, that may be only alternative. |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme. |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: While Humeans base their theories on the intuition of regularity, their opponents base theirs on the intuition that there is an intrinsic relation between the properties of two particular things involved (like a hammer and a vase). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I favour the intrinsic relation of properties view, but this leaves the question of whether we can explain a relation, apart from observing the regularities associated with the properties. |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5) | |
A reaction: Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic. |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If causation is taken to be an 'intrinsic' relation, then that c causes e will have to depend entirely on the properties of c and e, and the relations between c and e. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.2) | |
A reaction: This view would move us towards 'essentialism', that the essences of objects produce the events and the laws, rather than external imposed forces and laws. |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The logical empiricists (esp. Hempel) analysed the concept of causation in terms of causal explanation, and analysed the latter as a species of deductive argument, with one premises stating a universal law (the so-called Deductive-Nomological model). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: This feels wrong, as deduction seems insufficiently naturalistic, and the assumption of a law as premise seems to beg heaps of questions. |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
Full Idea: If counterfactual claims can be made about causation, this suggests that there is more to it than mere regular succession. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §2.2) | |
A reaction: Interesting. Even Hume makes counterfactual claims in his first definition of cause, and all claims of causation seem to go beyond the immediate evidence. |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The statement "all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" seems to have all the features demanded of a lawlike statement, yet it can hardly be said to express a law. It is a merely true universal generalisation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.3) | |
A reaction: Nice example. A trickier case is "all cubes of uranium are smaller than one cubic mile", which sounds like part of a law. It suggests a blurred borderline between the two. How much gold is there in the universe? Is that fact a natural necessity? |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A rather important objection to Humeanism has been that regularity is not sufficient for causation. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Obviously a crucial problem, but the Humean view can defend itself by introducing other constant conjunctions. We don't observe events in isolation, but as part of a pattern of regularities. |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation. |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
Full Idea: A regularity can be used to predict a future event irrespective of whether it is deemed causal or not. A farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the cock's crow. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.1) | |
A reaction: This seems a highly significant criticism of any view that says regularity leads to causation, which is the basis of induction, which leads to counterfactual claims, and thus arrives a the laws of nature. |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
Full Idea: It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: Good example, but it doesn't demolish the regularity view. We should come to conscious minds last. There aren't many other unfailing regularities that are not laws. |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In the 'web-of-laws' approach, laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system, striking a good balance between simplicity and strength. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.6) | |
A reaction: Psillos attribute this view to Mill, Ramsey and Lewis. It is the obvious candidate for a fully developed Humean empiricist system, where regularities reinforce one another. I think laws are found in mechanisms, not in regularities, which are symptoms. |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002]) | |
A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism? |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
Full Idea: In "had the acrobat jumped, there would have been a safety net" the antecedent of the counterfactual (the jumping) is temporally later than the consequent (the installation of the net). | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §3.3) | |
A reaction: This blocks anyone (e.g. David Lewis) who tries to define counterfactual claims entirely in terms of a condition followed by a consequence. Nice example. |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual theory is a non-Humean relation between singular events; the thought is that causation makes a difference - to say that c causes e is to say that if c hadn't occurred, e wouldn't have occurred either. | |
From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4) | |
A reaction: Helpful. I'm beginning to think that this theory is wrong. It gives an account of how we see causation, and a test for it, but it says nothing about what causation actually is. |