Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hesiod, William Shakespeare and Diodorus Cronus

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9 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: For there was never yet philosopher/ That could endure the toothache patiently.
     From: William Shakespeare (Much Ado About Nothing [1600], V.i)
     A reaction: You can't argue with that. I do think that people who have studied philosophy at length are more likely to be 'philosophical' when faced with human misery, but only up to a point.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: Good reasons must of force give way to better.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], 4.3.205)
     A reaction: [Brutus to Cassius] This remark is an axiom of rationality. But, of course, reasons can come in groups, and three modest reasons may compete with one very good reason.
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
From the necessity of the past we can infer the impossibility of what never happens [Diod.Cronus, by White,MJ]
     Full Idea: Diodorus' Master Argument inferred that since what is past (i.e. true in the past) is necessary, and the impossible cannot follow from the possible, that therefore if something neither is nor ever will be the case, then it is impossible.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Michael J. White - Diodorus Cronus
     A reaction: The argument is, apparently, no longer fully clear, but it seems to imply determinism, or at least a rejection of the idea that free will and determinism are compatible. (Epictetus 2.19)
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
The Master Argument seems to prove that only what will happen is possible [Diod.Cronus, by Epictetus]
     Full Idea: The Master Argument: these conflict 1) what is past and true is necessary, 2) the impossible does not follow from the possible, 3) something possible neither is nor will be true. Hence only that which is or will be true is possible.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Epictetus - The Discourses 2.19.1
     A reaction: [Epictetus goes on to discuss views about which of the three should be given up] It is possible there will be a sea fight tomorrow; tomorrow comes, and no sea fight; so there was necessarily no sea fight; so the impossible followed from the possible.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Conditionals are true when the antecedent is true, and the consequent has to be true [Diod.Cronus]
     Full Idea: The connected (proposition) is true when it begins with true and neither could nor can end with false.
     From: Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]), quoted by Stephen Mumford - Dispositions 03.4
     A reaction: [Mumford got the quote from Bochenski] This differs from the truth-functional account because it says nothing about when the antecedent is false, which fits in also with the 'supposition' view, where A is presumed. This idea adds necessity.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Thought is unambiguous, and you should stick to what the speaker thinks they are saying [Diod.Cronus, by Gellius]
     Full Idea: No one says or thinks anything ambiguous, and nothing should be held to be being said beyond what the speaker thinks he is saying.
     From: report of Diodorus Cronus (fragments/reports [c.300 BCE]) by Aulus Gellius - Noctes Atticae 11.12.2
     A reaction: A key argument in favour of propositions, implied in this remark, is that propositions are never ambiguous, though the sentences expressing them may be
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / b. Volitionism
The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: The cause is in my will. I will not come./That is enough to satisfy the senate./But for your private satisfaction,/Because I love you, I will let you know.
     From: William Shakespeare (Julius Caesar [1599], II.ii)
     A reaction: This asserts the purest form of volitionism, but then qualifies it, because Caesar's will has been influenced by his wife's dreams.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Unlike us, the early Greeks thought envy was a good thing, and hope a bad thing [Hesiod, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Hesiod reckons envy among the effects of the good and benevolent Eris, and there was nothing offensive in according envy to the gods. ...Likewise the Greeks were different from us in their evaluation of hope: one felt it to be blind and malicious.
     From: report of Hesiod (works [c.700 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Dawn (Daybreak) 038
     A reaction: Presumably this would be understandable envy, and unreasonable hope. Ridiculous envy can't possibly be good, and modest and sensible hope can't possibly be bad. I suspect he wants to exaggerate the relativism.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
Our obedience to the king erases any crimes we commit for him [Shakespeare]
     Full Idea: We know enough if we know we are the king's men. Our obedience to the king wipes the crime of it out of us.
     From: William Shakespeare (Henry V [1599]), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 03
     A reaction: He is referring to the slaughter of the French servants behind the lines at Agincourt. A classic expression of 'I was just obeying orders', which was rejected at Nurnberg in 1946. Depends on the seriousness of the crime.