38 ideas
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The logic of ZF Set Theory is classical first-order predicate logic with identity. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.121) | |
A reaction: This logic seems to be unable to deal with very large cardinals, precisely those that are implied by set theory, so there is some sort of major problem hovering here. Boolos is fairly neutral. |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Maybe the axioms of extensionality and the pair set axiom 'force themselves on us' (Gödel's phrase), but I am not convinced about the axioms of infinity, union, power or replacement. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.130) | |
A reaction: Boolos is perfectly happy with basic set theory, but rather dubious when very large cardinals come into the picture. |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception. | |
From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3 |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We should abandon the idea that the use of plural forms commits us to the existence of sets/classes… Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. There are not two sorts of things in the world, individuals and collections. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]), quoted by Henry Laycock - Object | |
A reaction: The problem of quantifying over sets is notoriously difficult. Try http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/object/index.html. |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The naïve view of set theory (that any zero or more things form a set) is natural, but inconsistent: the things that do not belong to themselves are some things that do not form a set. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.127) | |
A reaction: As clear a summary of Russell's Paradox as you could ever hope for. |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
Full Idea: According to the iterative conception, every set is formed at some stage. There is a relation among stages, 'earlier than', which is transitive. A set is formed at a stage if and only if its members are all formed before that stage. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.126) | |
A reaction: He gives examples of the early stages, and says the conception is supposed to 'justify' Zermelo set theory. It is also supposed to make the axioms 'natural', rather than just being selected for convenience. And it is consistent. |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
Full Idea: Weak Limitation of Size: If there are no more Fs than Gs and the Gs form a collection, then Fs form a collection. Strong Limitation of Size: A property F fails to be collectivising iff there are as many Fs as there are objects. | |
From: report of George Boolos (Iteration Again [1989]) by Michael Potter - Set Theory and Its Philosophy 13.5 |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Is there, in addition to the 200 Cheerios in a bowl, also a set of them all? And what about the vast number of subsets of Cheerios? It is haywire to think that when you have some Cheerios you are eating a set. What you are doing is: eating the Cheerios. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: In my case Boolos is preaching to the converted. I am particularly bewildered by someone (i.e. Quine) who believes that innumerable sets exist while 'having a taste for desert landscapes' in their ontology. |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
Full Idea: Boolos's conception of plural logic is as a reinterpretation of second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Oliver,A/Smiley,T - What are Sets and What are they For? n5 | |
A reaction: Oliver and Smiley don't accept this view, and champion plural reference differently (as, I think, some kind of metalinguistic device?). |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos has proposed an alternative understanding of monadic, second-order logic, in terms of plural quantifiers, which many philosophers have found attractive. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 3.5 |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The metatheory of second-order logic is hopelessly set-theoretic, and the notion of second-order validity possesses many if not all of the epistemic debilities of the notion of set-theoretic truth. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.45) | |
A reaction: Epistemic problems arise when a logic is incomplete, because some of the so-called truths cannot be proved, and hence may be unreachable. This idea indicates Boolos's motivation for developing a theory of plural quantification. |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: In an indisputable technical result, Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can be used to interpret monadic second-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], Intro) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed Intro |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
Full Idea: Boolos discovered that any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], §1) by Øystein Linnebo - Plural Quantification Exposed p.74 |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may be of the opinion that no sentence ought to be considered as a truth of logic if, no matter how it is interpreted, it asserts that there are sets of certain sorts. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.44) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that in no way should any proper logic assert the existence of anything at all. Presumably interpretations can assert the existence of numbers or sets, but we should be able to identify something which is 'pure' logic. Natural deduction? |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Indispensable to cross-reference, lacking distinctive content, and pervading thought and discourse, 'identity' is without question a logical concept. Adding it to predicate calculus significantly increases the number and variety of inferences possible. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.54) | |
A reaction: It is not at all clear to me that identity is a logical concept. Is 'existence' a logical concept? It seems to fit all of Boolos's criteria? I say that all he really means is that it is basic to thought, but I'm not sure it drives the reasoning process. |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
Full Idea: One may say that '∀x x=x' means 'everything is identical to itself', but one must realise that one's answer has a determinate sense only if the reference (range) of 'everything' is fixed. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.46) | |
A reaction: This is the problem now discussed in the recent book 'Absolute Generality', of whether one can quantify without specifying a fixed or limited domain. |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Boolos proposes that second-order quantifiers be regarded as 'plural quantifiers' are in ordinary language, and has developed a semantics along those lines. In this way they introduce no new ontology. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 7 n32 | |
A reaction: This presumably has to treat simple predicates and relations as simply groups of objects, rather than having platonic existence, or something. |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: Standard second-order existential quantifiers pick out a class or a property, but Boolos suggests that they be understood as a plural quantifier, like 'there are objects' or 'there are people'. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.4 | |
A reaction: This idea has potential application to mathematics, and Lewis (1991, 1993) 'invokes it to develop an eliminative structuralism' (Shapiro). |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Abandon the idea that use of plural forms must always be understood to commit one to the existence of sets of those things to which the corresponding singular forms apply. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.66) | |
A reaction: It seems to be an open question whether plural quantification is first- or second-order, but it looks as if it is a rewriting of the first-order. |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
Full Idea: Boolos virtually patented the new device of plural quantification. | |
From: report of George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984]) by José A. Benardete - Logic and Ontology | |
A reaction: This would be 'there are some things such that...' |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
Full Idea: A weak completeness theorem shows that a sentence is provable whenever it is valid; a strong theorem, that a sentence is provable from a set of sentences whenever it is a logical consequence of the set. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.52) | |
A reaction: So the weak version says |- φ → |= φ, and the strong versions says Γ |- φ → Γ |= φ. Presumably it is stronger if it can specify the source of the inference. |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
Full Idea: Boolos asks why on earth compactness, whatever its virtues, should be definitive of logic itself. | |
From: report of George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975]) by Ian Hacking - What is Logic? §13 |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The existence of infinitely many natural numbers seems to me no more troubling than that of infinitely many computer programs or sentences of English. There is, for example, no longest sentence, since any number of 'very's can be inserted. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: If you really resisted an infinity of natural numbers, presumably you would also resist an actual infinity of 'very's. The fact that it is unclear what could ever stop a process doesn't guarantee that the process is actually endless. |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
Full Idea: To the best of my knowledge nothing in mathematics or science requires the existence of very high orders of infinity. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.122) | |
A reaction: He is referring to particular high orders of infinity implied by set theory. Personally I want to wield Ockham's Razor. Is being implied by set theory a sufficient reason to accept such outrageous entities into our ontology? |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
Full Idea: The notions of infinity and countability can be characterized by second-order sentences, though not by first-order sentences (as compactness and Skolem-Löwenheim theorems show), .. as well as well-ordering, progression, ancestral and identity. | |
From: George Boolos (On Second-Order Logic [1975], p.48) |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
Full Idea: It is no surprise that we should be able to reason mathematically about many of the things we experience, for they are already 'abstract'. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: He has just given a list of exemplary abstract objects (Idea 10489), but I think there is a more interesting idea here - that our experience of actual physical objects is to some extent abstract, as soon as it is conceptualised. |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Ontological commitment is carried by first-order quantifiers; a second-order quantifier needn't be taken to be a first-order quantifier in disguise, having special items, collections, as its range. They are two ways of referring to the same things. | |
From: George Boolos (To be is to be the value of a variable.. [1984], p.72) | |
A reaction: If second-order quantifiers are just a way of referring, then we can see first-order quantifiers that way too, so we could deny 'objects'. |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
Full Idea: It's a kind of lunacy to think that sound scientific philosophy demands that we think that we see ink-tracks but not words, i.e. word-types. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems to link him with Armstrong's mockery of 'ostrich nominalism'. There seems to be some ambiguity with the word 'see' in this disagreement. When we look at very ancient scratches on stones, why don't we always 'see' if it is words? |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
Full Idea: I am rather a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence. Smaller numbers, sets and functions don't offend my sense of reality. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.128) | |
A reaction: The great Boolos is rather hard to disagree with, but I disagree. Logicians love abstract objects, indeed they would almost be out of a job without them. It seems to me they smuggle them into our ontology by redefining either 'object' or 'exists'. |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
Full Idea: We twentieth century city dwellers deal with abstract objects all the time, such as bank balances, radio programs, software, newspaper articles, poems, mistakes, triangles. | |
From: George Boolos (Must We Believe in Set Theory? [1997], p.129) | |
A reaction: I find this claim to be totally question-begging, and typical of a logician. The word 'object' gets horribly stretched in these discussions. We can create concepts which have all the logical properties of objects. Maybe they just 'subsist'? |
17499 | Theoretical models can represent, by mapping onto the data-models [Portides] |
Full Idea: The semantic approach contends that theoretical models ...are candidates for representing physical systems by virtue of the fact that they stand in mapping relations to corresponding data-models. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: Sounds like a neat and satisfying picture. |
17498 | In the 'received view' models are formal; the 'semantic view' emphasises representation [Portides, by PG] |
Full Idea: The 'received view' of models is that they are Tarskian formal axiomatic calculi interpreted by meta-mathematical models. The 'semantic' view of models gives equal importance to their representational capacity. | |
From: report of Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'background') by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: The Tarskian view is the one covered in my section on Model Theory. Portides favours the semantic account, and I am with him all the way. Should models primarily integrate with formal systems, or with the world? Your choice... |
17501 | Representational success in models depends on success of their explanations [Portides] |
Full Idea: Models are representational, independently of the strength of their relation to theory, depending on how well they achieve the purpose of providing explanations for what occurs in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: This doesn't sound quite right. It seems possible to have a perfect representation of a system which remains quite baffling (because too complex, or with obscure ingredients). Does the stylised London tube map explain well but represent badly? |
17502 | The best model of the atomic nucleus is the one which explains the most results [Portides] |
Full Idea: The unified model can be considered a better representation of the atomic nucleus in comparison to the liquid-drop and shell models, because it explains most of the known results about the nucleus. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: The point here is that models are evaluated not just by their accuracy, but by their explanatory power. Presumably a great model is satisfying and illuminating. Do the best models capture the essence of a thing? |
17496 | 'Model' belongs in a family of concepts, with representation, idealisation and abstraction [Portides] |
Full Idea: A better understanding of 'model', as used in science, could be achieved if we examine it as a member of the triad of concepts of representation, idealisation and abstraction. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Abstraction seems to have a bad name in philosophy, and yet when you come to discuss things like models, you can't express it any other way. |
17497 | Models are theory-driven, or phenomenological (more empirical and specific) [Portides] |
Full Idea: 'Theory-driven' models are constructed in a systematic theory-regulated way by supplementing the theoretical calculus with locally operative hypotheses. 'Phenomenological' models deploy semi-empirical results, with ad hoc hypotheses, and extra concepts. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Intro') | |
A reaction: [compressed] I am not at all clear about this distinction, even after reading his whole article. The first type of model seems more general, while the second seems tuned to particular circumstances. He claims the second type is more explanatory. |
17500 | General theories may be too abstract to actually explain the mechanisms [Portides] |
Full Idea: If theoretical models are highly abstract and idealised descriptions of phenomena, they may only represent general features, and fail to explain the specific mechanisms at work in physical systems. | |
From: Demetris Portides (Models [2008], 'Current') | |
A reaction: [compressed] While there may be an ideal theory that explains everything, it sounds right capturing the actual mechanism (such as the stirrup bone in the ear) is not at all theoretical. |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle has a structure Boolos calls an 'abstraction principle'. Within the scope of two universal quantifiers, a biconditional connects an identity between two things and an equivalence relation. It says we don't care about other differences. | |
From: George Boolos (Is Hume's Principle analytic? [1997]), quoted by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.7 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the traditional principle of abstraction by ignoring some properties, but dressed up in the clothes of formal logic. Frege tries to eliminate psychology, but Boolos implies that what we 'care about' is relevant. |