Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hippolytus, Samuel Alexander and Matthew Cobb

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5 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
To be is to have causal powers [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: To be is to have causal powers.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927], §4), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation
     A reaction: This is sometimes called Alexander's Principle. It is first found in Plato, and is popular with physicalists, but there are problem cases... A thing needs to exist in order to have causal powers. To exist is more than to be perceived.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
There is a single mouse neuron which has 862 inputs and 626 outputs [Cobb]
     Full Idea: Researchers have recently described a single inhibitory neuron in a region called the visual thalamus of the mouse - it has 862 input synapses and 626 output synapses.
     From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], 11)
     A reaction: This is the kind of fact which philosophers of mind must be aware of when offering accounts of thought which are in danger of being simplistic.
The brain is not passive, and merely processing inputs; it is active, and intervenes in the world [Cobb]
     Full Idea: A number of scientists are now realising that, by viewing the brain as a computer that passively responds ot inputs and processes data, we forget that it is an active organ, part of the body intervening in the world.
     From: Matthew Cobb (The Idea of the Brain [2020], Intro)
     A reaction: I like any idea which reminds us that nature is intrinsically active, and not merely passive. Laws are in nature, not imposed on it. My preferred ontology, based on powers as fundamental, applies to the brain, as well as to physics. No free will needed.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do, no purpose to serve, a species of noblesse which depends on the work of its inferiors, but is kept for show and might as well, and undoubtedly would in time be abolished.
     From: Samuel Alexander (Space, Time and Deity (2 vols) [1927], 2:8), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Nonreductivist troubles with ment.causation IV
     A reaction: Wonderful! Kim quotes this, and labels the implicit slogan (to be real is to have causal powers) 'Alexander's Dictum'. All the examples given of epiphenomena are only causally inert within a defined system, but they act causally outside the system.
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
     Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism supposes something to exist in nature which has nothing to do and no purpose to serve.
     From: Samuel Alexander (works [1927]), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.129
     A reaction: An objection, but not, I think, a strong one. The fact, for example, that sweat is shiny is the result of good evolutionary reasons, but I cannot think of any purpose which it serves. All events which are purposeful are likely to have side-effects.