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16236
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Maybe our persistence conditions concern bodies, rather than persons [Olson, by Hawley]
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Full Idea:
Instead of attributing person-like persistence conditions to bodies, we could attribute body-like persistence conditions to persons, …so human persons are identical with human organisms.
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From:
report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by Katherine Hawley - How Things Persist 5.10
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A reaction:
In the case of pre-birth and advanced senility, Olson thinks we could have the body without the person, so person is a 'phase sortal' of bodies. A good theory, which seems to answer a lot of questions. 'Person' may be an abstraction.
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6669
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For 'animalism', I exist before I became a person, and can continue after it, so I am not a person [Olson, by Lowe]
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Full Idea:
According to 'animalism', I existed before I was a person and I may well go one existing for some time after I cease to be a person; hence, I am not essentially a person, but a human organism.
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From:
report of Eric T. Olson (The Human Animal [1997]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.10
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A reaction:
There is a very real sense in which an extremely senile person has 'ceased to exist' (e.g. as the person I used to love). On the whole, though, I think that Olson is right, and yet 'person' is an important concept. Neither concept is all-or-nothing.
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2171
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The 'will' doesn't exist; there is just conclusion, then action [Homer, by Williams,B]
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Full Idea:
Homer left out another mental action lying between coming to a conclusion and acting on it; and he did well, since there is no such action, and the idea is the invention of bad philosophy.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE]) by Bernard Williams - Shame and Necessity II - p.37
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A reaction:
This is a characteristically empiricist view, which is found in Hobbes. The 'will' seems to have a useful role in folk psychology. We can at least say that coming to a conclusion that I should act, and then actually acting, are not the same thing.
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21819
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Plato says the Good produces the Intellectual-Principle, which in turn produces the Soul [Homer, by Plotinus]
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Full Idea:
In Plato the order of generation is from the Good, the Intellectual-Principle; from the Intellectual-Principle, the Soul.
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From:
report of Homer (The Iliad [c.850 BCE], 509b) by Plotinus - The Enneads 5.1.08
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A reaction:
The doctrine of Plotinus merely echoes Plato, in that case, except that the One replaces the Form of the Good. Does this mean that what is first in Plotinus is less morally significant, and more concerned with reason and being?
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