Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irenaeus, Wilson,G/Schpall,S and Anaximander

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
5988 Anaximander produced the first philosophy book (and maybe the first book) [Anaximander, by Bodnár]
     Full Idea: Anaximander was the first to produce a philosophical book (later conventionally titled 'On Nature'), if not the first to produce a book at all.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by István Bodnár - Anaximander
     A reaction: Wow! Presumably there were Egyptian 'books', but this still sounds like a stupendous claim to fame.
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
1496 The earth is stationary, because it is in the centre, and has no more reason to move one way than another [Anaximander, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Something which is established in the centre and has equality in relation to the extremes has no more reason to move up than it has down or to the sides (so the earth is stationary)
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A26) by Aristotle - On the Heavens 295b11
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
14874 Anaximander saw the contradiction in the world - that its own qualities destroy it [Anaximander, by Nietzsche]
     Full Idea: Anaximander discovers the contradictory character of our world: it perishes from its own qualities.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Friedrich Nietzsche - Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 19 [239]
     A reaction: A lovely gloss on Anaximander, though I am not sure that I understand what Nietzsche means.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
20014 Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: There are different levels of action, including at least: unconscious and/or involuntary behaviour, purposeful or goal-directed activity, intentional action, and the autonomous acts or actions of self-consciously active human agents.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1)
     A reaction: The fourth class is obviously designed to distinguish us from the other animals. It immediately strikes me as very optimistic to distinguish four (at least) clear categories, but you have to start somewhere.
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 4. Action as Movement
20019 Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some say that the movement's of agent's body are never actions. It is only the agent's direct moving of, say, his leg that constitutes a physical action; the leg movement is merely caused by and/or incorporated as part of the act of moving.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
     A reaction: [they cite Jennifer Hornsby 1980] It seems normal to deny a twitch the accolade of an 'action', so I suppose that is right. Does the continual movement of my tongue count as action? Only if I bring it under control? Does it matter? Only in forensics.
20021 Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers have favored the overt arm movement the agent performs, some favor the extended causal process he initiates, and some prefer the relevant event of trying that precedes and 'generates' the rest.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.2)
     A reaction: [Davidson argues for the second, Hornsby for the third] There seems no way to settle this, and a compromise looks best. Mere movement won't do, and mere trying won't do, and whole processes get out of control.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
20022 To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If someone fires a bullet to kill someone, misses, and dislodges hornets that sting him to death, this implies that an intentional action must include succeeding in a manner according to the original plan.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [their example, compressed] This resembles Gettier's problem cases for knowledge. If the shooter deliberately and maliciously brought down the hornet's nest, that would be intentional murder. Sounds right.
20023 If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If someone enters the lottery with the bizarre belief that they can control who wins, and then wins it, that suggest that intentional actions must not depend on sheer luck, but needs competent exercise of the relevant skill.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: A nice companion to Idea 20022, which show that a mere intention is not sufficient to motivate and explain an action.
20025 We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: If an agent tries to do something by two different means, only one of which can succeed, then the behaviour is rational, even though one of them is an attempt to do an action which cannot succeed.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [a concise account of a laborious account of an example from Bratman 1984, 1987] Bratman uses this to challenge the 'Simple View', that intention leads straightforwardly to action.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
20031 On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler terms.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 4)
     A reaction: This is the traditional view found in Hume, and is probably endemic to folk psychology. They cite Bratman 1987 as the main opponent of the view.
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / d. Group intentions
20028 Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Rational group action may involve a 'collectivising of reasons', with participants acting in ways that are not rationally recommended from the individual viewpoint. This suggests that groups can be rational, intentional agents.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [Pettit 2003] is the source for this. Gilbert says individuals can have joint commitment; Pettit says the group can be an independent agent. The matter of shared intentions is interesting, but there is no need for the ontology to go berserk.
20027 If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: An account of mutual obligation to do something may require that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of 'joint commitment'.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 2)
     A reaction: [attributed to Margaret Gilbert 2000] If 'we' are trying to do something, that seems to give an externalist picture of intentions, rather like all the other externalisms floating around these days. I don't buy any of it, me.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
20016 Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: A Strong Cognitivist is someone who identifies an intention with a certain pertinent belief about what she is doing or about to do.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: (Sarah Paul 2009 makes this distinction) The belief, if so, seems to be as much counterfactual as factual. Hope seems to come into it, which isn't exactly a belief.
20017 Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: A Weak Cognitivist holds that intentions are partly constituted by, but are not identical with, relevant beliefs about the action. Grice (1971) said an intention is willing an action, combined with a belief that this will lead to the action.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed] I didn't find Strong Cognitivism appealing, but it seems hard to argue with some form of the weak version.
20018 Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Strong Cognitivists say intentions/beliefs are not based on observation or evidence, and are causally reliable in leading to appropriate actions, so this is a mode of 'practical' knowledge that has not been derived from observation.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed - Stanford unnecessarily verbose!] I see no mention in this discussion of 'hoping' that your action will turn out OK. We are usually right to hope, but it would be foolish to say that when we reach for the salt we know we won't knock it over.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
20012 Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Some have maintained that we explain why an agent acted as he did when we explicate how the agent's normative reasons rendered the action intelligible in his eyes.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: Modern psychology is moving against this, by showing how hidden biases can predominate over conscious reasons (as in Kahnemann's work). I would say this mode of explanation works better for highly educated people (but you can chuckle at that).
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
20029 Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: Most causalists allow that reason explanations are teleological, but say that such purposive explanations are analysable causally, where the primary reasons for the act are the guiding causes of the act.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], 3)
     A reaction: The authors observe that it is hard to adjudicate on this matter, and that the concept of the 'cause' of an action is unclear.
20013 It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
     Full Idea: The view that reason explanations are somehow causal explanations remains the dominant position.
     From: Wilson,G/Schpall,S (Action [2012], Intro)
     A reaction: I suspect that this is only because no philosopher has a better idea, and the whole issue is being slowly outflanked by psychology.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
1495 Anaximander introduced the idea that the first principle and element of things was the Boundless [Anaximander, by Simplicius]
     Full Idea: Anaximander said that the first principle and element of existing things was the boundless; it was he who originally introduced this name for the first principle.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], A09) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.24.14-
     A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus
405 The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless [Anaximander]
     Full Idea: The essential nature, whatever it is, of the non-limited is everlasting and ageless.
     From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B2), quoted by (who?) - where?
13222 The Boundless cannot exist on its own, and must have something contrary to it [Aristotle on Anaximander]
     Full Idea: Those thinkers are in error who postulate ...a single matter, for this cannot exist without some 'perceptible contrariety': this Boundless, which they identify with the 'original real', must be either light or heavy, either hot or cold.
     From: comment on Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Aristotle - Coming-to-be and Passing-away (Gen/Corr) 329a10
     A reaction: A dubious objection, I would say. If there has to be a contrasting cold thing to any hot thing, what happens when the cold thing is removed?
404 Things begin and end in the Unlimited, and are balanced over time according to justice [Anaximander]
     Full Idea: The non-limited is the original material of existing things; their source is also that to which they return after destruction, according to necessity; they give justice and make reparation to each other for injustice, according to the arrangement of Time.
     From: Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE], B1), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 24.13-
     A reaction: Simplicius is quoting Theophrastus
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
1746 The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable [Anaximander, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The parts of all things are susceptible to change, but the whole is unchangeable.
     From: report of Anaximander (fragments/reports [c.570 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 02.An.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
20698 Irenaeus says evil is necessary for perfect human development [Irenaeus, by Davies,B]
     Full Idea: Echoing Irenaeus, John Hick argues that the existence of evil is necessary for the perfect development of human beings. Hick understands evil in the light of God's desire not to coerce people into accepting him.
     From: report of Irenaeus (works [c.190]) by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 3 'Notable'
     A reaction: I don't suppose I could opt out of perfect development? If I endure the evil, can I be guaranteed that my development will be 'perfect'. Oh, and could I just check what is meant by 'development'?