65 ideas
| 12223 | It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The fallacy of 'ad obscurum per obscurius' is to explain the obscure by appeal to what is more obscure. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §3) | |
| A reaction: Not strictly a fallacy, so much as an example of inadequate explanation, along with circularity and infinite regresses. |
| 12230 | Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Anyone should agree that a justification for regarding a singular term as having objectual reference is provided just as soon as one has justification for regarding as true certain atomic statements in which it functions as a singular term. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
| A reaction: The meat of this idea is hidden in the word 'certain'. See Idea 10314 for Hale's explanation. Without that, the proposal strikes me as absurd. |
| 10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: If we stipulate that 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, we speedily arrive at the contradiction that 'heterological' is itself heterological just in case it is not. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2) |
| 10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals, not arithmetical truths which are not truths of logic, but that logical truth likewise defies complete deductive characterization. ...Gödel's result has no specific bearing on the logicist project. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], §2 n5) | |
| A reaction: This is the key defence against the claim that Gödel's First Theorem demolished logicism. |
| 8784 | Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The result of joining Hume's Principle to second-order logic is a consistent system which is a foundation for arithmetic, in the sense that all the fundamental laws of arithmetic are derivable within it as theorems. This seems a vindication of logicism. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: The controversial part seems to be second-order logic, which Quine (for example) vigorously challenged. The contention against most attempts to improve Frege's logicism is that they thereby cease to be properly logical. |
| 8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The Julius Caesar problem is the problem of supplying a criterion of application for 'number', and thereby setting it up as the concept of a genuine sort of object. (Why is Julius Caesar not a number?) | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: One response would be to deny that numbers are objects. Another would be to derive numbers from their application in counting objects, rather than the other way round. I suspect that the problem only real bothers platonists. Serves them right. |
| 10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The relativization of ontology to theory in structuralism can't avoid carrying with it a relativization of truth-value, which would compromise the objectivity which structuralists wish to claim for mathematics. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2 n26) | |
| A reaction: This is the attraction of structures which grow out of the physical world, where truth-value is presumably not in dispute. |
| 10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: It is not clear how the view that natural numbers are purely intra-structural 'objects' can be squared with the widespread use of numerals outside purely arithmetical contexts. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2 n26) | |
| A reaction: I don't understand this objection. If they refer to quantity, they are implicitly cardinal. If they name things in a sequence they are implicitly ordinal. All users of numbers have a grasp of the basic structure. |
| 8788 | Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: It is only if logic is metaphysically and epistemologically privileged that a reduction of mathematical theories to logical ones can be philosophically any more noteworthy than a reduction of any mathematical theory to any other. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 8) | |
| A reaction: It would be hard to demonstrate this privileged position, though intuitively there is nothing more basic in human rationality. That may be a fact about us, but it doesn't make logic basic to nature, which is where proper reduction should be heading. |
| 10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The neo-Fregean takes a more optimistic view than Frege of the prospects for the kind of contextual explanation of the fundamental concepts of arithmetic and analysis (cardinals and reals), which he rejected in 'Grundlagen' 60-68. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], §1) |
| 8783 | Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Two modern approaches to logicism are the quantificational approach of David Bostock, and the abstraction-free approach of Neil Tennant. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 1 n2) | |
| A reaction: Hale and Wright mention these as alternatives to their own view. I merely catalogue them for further examination. My immediate reaction is that Bostock sounds hopeless and Tennant sounds interesting. |
| 12225 | Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: A third way has been offered to 'make sense' of neo-Fregeanism: we should reject Quine's well-known criterion of ontological commitment in favour of one based on 'truth-maker theory'. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §4 n19) | |
| A reaction: [The cite Ross Cameron for this] They reject this proposal, on the grounds that truth-maker theory is not sufficient to fix the grounding truth-conditions of statements. |
| 12224 | Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: It is claimed that neo-Fregeans are committed to 'maximalism' - that whatever can exist does. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §4) | |
| A reaction: [The cite Eklund] They observe that maximalism denies contingent non-existence (of the £20 note I haven't got). There seems to be the related problem of 'hyperinflation', that if abstract objects are generated logically, the process is unstoppable. |
| 12226 | The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Identity is sometimes read so that 'Pegasus is Pegasus' expresses a truth, the non-existence of any winged horse notwithstanding. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5) | |
| A reaction: This would give you ontological commitment to truth, without commitment to existence. It undercuts the use of identity statements as the basis of existence claims, which was Frege's strategy. |
| 12229 | Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: There is a compatibilist view which says that it is for the abundant properties to play the role of 'bedeutungen' in semantic theory, and the sparse ones to address certain metaphysical concerns. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
| A reaction: Only a philosopher could live with the word 'property' having utterly different extensions in different areas of discourse. They similarly bifurcate words like 'object' and 'exist'. Call properties 'quasi-properties' and I might join in. |
| 18443 | A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The good standing of a predicate is already trivially sufficient to ensure the existence of an associated property, a (perhaps complex) way of being which the predicate serves to express. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
| A reaction: 'Way of being' is interesting. Is 'being near Trafalgar Sq' a way of being? I take properties to be 'features', which seems to give a clearer way of demarcating them. They say they are talking about 'abundant' (rather than 'sparse') properties. |
| 10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Objects, as distinct from entities of other types (properties, relations or, more generally, functions of different types and levels), just are what (actual or possible) singular terms refer to. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: I find this view very bizarre and hard to cope with. It seems either to preposterously accept the implications of the way we speak into our ontology ('sakes'?), or preposterously bend the word 'object' away from its normal meaning. |
| 4669 | Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover] |
| Full Idea: We think of 'persons' as conscious, able to form relationships, capable of thought, having emotional responses, and having some sense of their own identity. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4) | |
| A reaction: A notable addition to Locke's definition is the capacity for relationships. So are autistic children not persons? Is feeling necessary? Mr Spock is then in trouble. |
| 10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: The new kind of abstract objects are not creations of the human mind. ...The existence of such objects depends upon whether or not the relevant equivalence relation holds among the entities of the presupposed kind. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: It seems odd that we no longer have any choice about what abstract objects we use, and that we can't evade them if the objects exist, and can't have them if the objects don't exist - and presumably destruction of the objects kills the concept? |
| 8786 | One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: An example of a first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines; a higher-order example (which refers to first-order predicates) defines 'equinumeral' in terms of one-to-one correlation (Hume's Principle). | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is the way modern logicians now treat abstraction, but abstraction principles include the elusive concept of 'equivalence' of entities, which may be no more than that the same adjective ('parallel') can be applied to them. |
| 12227 | Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Abstractionism needs a face-value, existentially committed reading of the terms occurring on the left-hand sides together with sameness of truth-conditions across the biconditional. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §5) | |
| A reaction: They employ 'abstractionism' to mean their logical Fregean strategy for defining abstractions, not to mean the older psychological account. Thus the truth-conditions for being 'parallel' and for having the 'same direction' must be consistent. |
| 12228 | Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: Abstraction principles purport to introduce fundamental means of reference to a range of objects, to which there is accordingly no presumption that we have any prior or independent means of reference. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §8) | |
| A reaction: There's the rub! They make it sound like a virtue, that we open up yet another heaven of abstract toys to play with. As fictions, they are indeed exciting new fun. As platonic discoveries they strike me as Cloud-Cuckoo Land. |
| 12231 | Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: It takes, over and above the possession of sense, the truth of relevant contexts to ensure reference. | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (The Metaontology of Abstraction [2009], §9) | |
| A reaction: Reference purely through sense was discredited by Kripke. The present idea challenges Kripke's baptismal realist approach. How do you 'baptise' an abstract object? But isn't reference needed prior to the establishment of truth? |
| 10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
| Full Idea: There are many statements which are plausibly viewed as conceptual truths (such as 'what is yellow is extended') which do not qualify as analytic under Frege's definition (as provable using only logical laws and definitions). | |
| From: B Hale / C Wright (Intro to 'The Reason's Proper Study' [2001], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is because the early assumptions of Frege were mathematical and logical, and he was trying to get away from Kant. That yellow is extended is a truth for non-linguistic beings. |
| 4656 | A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover] |
| Full Idea: A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.6) | |
| A reaction: Presumably the right to rest on Sunday doesn't conflict with the right to disabled parking on weekdays. He has, though, a point… |
| 4657 | Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The doctrine of double effect says (crudely) it is wrong to intentionally do a bad act for its good consequences, but it may be permissible to do a good act despite its foreseeable bad consequences. (..Shoot an innocent man to avoid his agonising death?) | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §6) | |
| A reaction: Glover rejects this principle, because he is a utilitarian. The principle implies a doubtful sharp distinction between an act and its consequences. If you foresee bad consequences, why do you go ahead and do it? I doubt if there are purely good acts. |
| 4658 | Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The acts and omissions doctrine says failure to perform an act, when there are foreseen bad consequences of the failure, is usually better than performing a different act which has the same foreseen consequences. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7) | |
| A reaction: Is it better if my neglect causes famine in Ethiopia than if my theft causes it? Glover (a consequentialist) rejects this. Depends. What are reasonable expectations? Acts set an example. Minor bad acts are clearly better than callous negligence. |
| 4659 | It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover] |
| Full Idea: If someone is being kept alive on a respirator and I switch it off, this makes death no more certain than if, when attaching the patient to the machine, I fail to switch it on. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7.4) | |
| A reaction: In practice, though, neglect is more excusable than a bad act, and (crucially) bad actions always indicate a bad character, whereas neglect may indicate a good person who is very busy. Neglect can, of course, be very wicked. |
| 4660 | Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §7.8) | |
| A reaction: This does suggest why we get angry with bad actions, but are very tolerant of omissions. It is also easier to motivate positive actions than to worry about things undone. Omissions can be disgraceful. |
| 4661 | What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It is not wrong to kill because of the intrinsic value of life or consciousness, or because people have a right to life, but because we shouldn't reduce worthwhile life, or thwart someone's desire to live, or inflict fear or pain. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a utilitarian view. It is not clear how we decide 'worthwhile' without a notion of intrinsic value. It is unclear why this desire is respected if many other desires are not. |
| 4648 | 'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It seems best to define 'death' in terms of irreversible loss of consciousness itself, since it is from this alone that our interest in the electrical activity of the brain derives. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.3) | |
| A reaction: I see the point, but this implies no further interest in a loved one who will not regain consciousness. What about subconscious acitivity, or dreamlike states without proper awareness of the external world? |
| 3785 | You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover] |
| Full Idea: A mistake of consequentialists is to treat actions as though they can somehow be isolated from the people performing them. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
| A reaction: I agree. The weather produces consequences. Morality is about people. Crocodiles, for example, are exempt. |
| 3786 | Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Forming the intention to use nuclear retaliation if attacked may both be the best way to avoid the catastrophe of nuclear war and at the same time be morally corrupting. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) | |
| A reaction: A famous moment in 2017 when Jeremy Corbyn refused to say he would be willing to use the weapons, if elected. It would be hard to sustain a determination to do it, and then reject it at the crucial moment. |
| 4650 | The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.9) | |
| A reaction: A nice illustration of the fact that neat distinctions nearly always begin to blur when you think about reality. But a blurred distinction is still a distinction… |
| 3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
| 3782 | Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG] |
| Full Idea: Objections to utilitarianism as maximisation of preferences: faded past desires or the desires of the dead; obtaining desires and happiness are different; fewer desires are easier to satisfy; pain is good if it can be removed. | |
| From: report of Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Two) by PG - Db (ideas) |
| 3787 | Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Rule-utilitarianism seems either to collapse into act-utilitarianism, or else it is only partly utilitarian. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Six) |
| 3783 | How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover] |
| Full Idea: There are deep problems for utilitarianism in trying to work out what the ideal population size would be. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Four) |
| 4675 | The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Accepting views about the sanctity of life of the foetus commits us to a policy of drastically increasing the proportion of the population who are seriously abnormal. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.7) | |
| A reaction: This is a utilitarian view, and one with which I sympathise. We can't steamroller women's feelings for some greater dream about humanity, but the larger picture is vital to the discussion. |
| 4654 | Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Respect for autonomy seems to give priority to decisions based on your present outlook, even if your future outlook will be quite different, and it gives no support for any sort of paternalism, or for considering the interests of potential people. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.3) | |
| A reaction: The first point does give a plausible justification for paternalism. Potential people are not a problem if respect for autonomy is not the only valuable thing. We presumably desire that future humans will be autonomous. |
| 4655 | If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover] |
| Full Idea: If you found a whole community who did not mind dying (because it is no more to regret than going to sleep), then according to the autonomy principle there would be no objection to killing the whole community. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §5.3) | |
| A reaction: I presume you would at least ask them if they desired death! They might regret being put to sleep. And respect for autonomy need not be the only value. |
| 20751 | As a young girl assumes her status as feminine, she acts in a more fragile immobile way [Young,IM] |
| Full Idea: The young girl acquires many subject habits of feminine body comportment - walking, tilting her head, standing and sitting like a girl, and so on ….The more a girl assumes her status as feminine, the more she takes herself to be fragile and immobile. | |
| From: Iris Marion Young (On Female Body Experience [2005], p.43), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 3 'Aspects' | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as true of young women, but it largely wears off as they get older, at least among modern women. A whole book could be written about women and smiling. |
| 4680 | Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The appeal to autonomy has much more force where the person's decision is of great importance to them (as in suicide), than it has when it concerns a lesser decision (such as whether to wear a seatbelt). | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.5) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably uncontroversial. Planning regulations show the intrusiveness on an individual is crucial. I trim your hedge, or your hair, or your tonsils, or your beliefs… |
| 4670 | Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing intrinsically good in a person being alive, and the idea of a 'right to life' should be rejected. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
| A reaction: If pleasure or benefit can be intrinsically good, I don't see why life can't be. The notion of a 'natural' or 'self-evident' right does look dubious to me. Rights are earned and given. Robinson Crusoe has no rights. |
| 4668 | You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It seems that the bearers of rights must at least have the capacity to desire what they have a right to, which is something the foetus does not have. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.4) | |
| A reaction: Obviously we could say a person has a right to something they don't desire (such as freedom). How about: a mental defective has the right not to be laughed at, even if they don't understand the mockery? |
| 4649 | If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover] |
| Full Idea: I am arguing that, if someone's life is worth living, this is one reason why it is directly wrong to kill him. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §3.7) | |
| A reaction: This is an attempt to find a modern utilitarian criterion of value. A problem case would be someone for whom only sadism made their life worth living. |
| 4651 | Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Utilitarians have two direct objections to killing (the fear and pain, and the loss of future happiness), and two concerns about side-effects (the loss to friends and community, and the bad precedent and public anxiety caused). | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
| A reaction: This invites obvious counterexamples, of somewhat unhappy, lonely people, who can be quietly killed with no qualms. Who will be callous enough to do this deed for us? |
| 4671 | What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover] |
| Full Idea: If the only objection to killing (or not conceiving) is the impersonal one of not reducing the amount of worthwhile life, there seems nothing wrong with eliminating one worthwhile life if another is substituted. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
| A reaction: This invites us to value a life in itself, rather than for what it makes possible (e.g. 'worthwhile' activity). It doesn't follow that the life is 'sacred' - only that it has some intrinsic value. And why not? |
| 4676 | The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The 'no trade-off' position: killing may be justified if it prevents other deaths, but not in defence of the quality of other lives, or by the miserable life of the person killed. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §12.2) | |
| A reaction: As a utilitarian, Glover opposes this, since death is not the only source of unhappiness. Would we (if necessary) kill a terrorist who was burning down all our art galleries or churches? I would, if it was the only way. |
| 4685 | Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover] |
| Full Idea: There is often a big discrepancy between what a society will spend on saving the life of a known person in peril, and what it will spend to reduce the future level of fatal accidents. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §16.3) | |
| A reaction: This is a good point in favour of utilitarian approaches, which ask for impersonal calculation (which presumably embody an ideal of justice, buried somewhere in utilitarianism). But it isn't just 'sentimentality'. |
| 4683 | Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Involuntary euthanasia can normally be ruled out, because it falls foul of the autonomy objection, and it is likely to have appalling side-effects. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
| A reaction: The only defence of it is if the prospects are utterly horrible and the subject cannot grasp them. However, is this true of children or the very old. Paternalism may be appropriate, if the decider has reliably depressing knowledge? |
| 4682 | Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Voluntary euthanasia is done at the request of the person themselves. Involuntary euthanasia is killing someone in their own interests, but disregarding views they could express. Non-voluntary euthanasia is killing someone who cannot express any views. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.1) | |
| A reaction: Seems a clear and satisfactory distinction, despite the possibility of borderline cases. A look of pain on a face? An inarticulate person? Deliberate ambiguity? Misunderstanding? |
| 4684 | Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It is often suggested that medical intervention which goes beyond easing pain or distress is not saving life but 'prolonging the act of dying'. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §15.6) | |
| A reaction: This is an important idea to keep in mind, but still a very difficult call to make. It needs to be presented to those who fight for life, at any cost in money, time, medical resources, or suffering. May people probably give up unnecessarily. |
| 4681 | The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It is argued that the mass murders of the Nazi period had their small beginnings in the Nazi euthanasia programme. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §14.2) | |
| A reaction: This is the 'slippery slope' problem, and it seems undeniable that killing gets easier as you do more of it (e.g. on a farm). But not all slopes are slippery, if the focus is retained on reasons and justifications. |
| 4667 | How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover] |
| Full Idea: How would we react to abortion if mothers had transparent wombs, so that foetuses were visible? | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Ultrasound scans have done this. The feeling of 'quickening' has always made a difference. Should these empathies affect our judgements? |
| 4665 | Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It is suggested that conception cannot be the boundary for the beginning of a genetic person, because monozygotic twins can split at any time during the first two weeks. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
| A reaction: Interesting, but not convincing. If I suddenly learned that I could fission into twins tomorrow, I would be no less of a single person today. |
| 4652 | If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The main utilitarian objection to killing (that it results in the loss of future years of happiness) seems an equally powerful objection to deliberately not conceiving a happy child. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §4.4) | |
| A reaction: This makes perfect sense, unless you give intrinsic value to existing lives, but none at all to potential lives. Virtue ethics helps here, but genetic engineering is a nightmare for Aristotle. |
| 4662 | Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Defenders of at least some abortions tend to focus on the early stages of pregnancy, when an embryo is very different from a baby, while opponents tend to focus on the later stages of pregnancy, when abortion resembles infanticide. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
| A reaction: Seems true. If we ask which part of pregnancy we should focus on, the only plausible picture seems to be 'all of it', despite the confusing picture which results. |
| 4663 | If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The case against abortion rests either on the claim that the foetus is a human being (or a potential human being), or on the different claim that the foetus is a person (or potential person). | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9) | |
| A reaction: The obvious problem with 'potential' is that every time Jack meets Jill there is a potential birth. And an early foetus is barely human, and clearly not a person. |
| 4664 | If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to see how the 'potential' argument can succeed against abortion without also succeeding against contraception. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.2) | |
| A reaction: It would even make it wrong not to introduce a given man to a given woman, if you thought they might be attracted! Maybe 'incipient' would be a better word than 'potential'? A person has been 'initiated'? Do words matter that much? |
| 4673 | Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
| A reaction: This conclusion follows from a denial of any intrinsic value to a foetus, which in turns seems to imply that an adult human has no intrinsic value. Something must have intrinsic value, or nothing has any value at all. |
| 4666 | If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover] |
| Full Idea: Supporters of the theory that 'viability' is the boundary at one end of life have to explain why it is not equally relevant at the other end. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §9.3) | |
| A reaction: A very nice problem for what looks at first like an intuitively good test. Someone dependent on a dialysis machine is not 'viable'. Before modern medicine, this objection was much less forceful. But I'm not 'viable' if I have to be fed. |
| 4672 | Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover] |
| Full Idea: If a foetus or baby has a poor chance of a worthwhile life, it may be directly wrong not to replace it by a baby with a better chance - though this consideration may be outweighed by side-effects. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.1) | |
| A reaction: I can't disagree with this. In early pregnancy, if we object to termination, why can't we object if the more 'worthwhile' child is not conceived. We want good human lives. |
| 4674 | It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover] |
| Full Idea: I think it is always right for a qualified person capable of performing an abortion to do so when requested by the mother. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §11.4) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a question if the father is vehemently opposed. Glover concedes the right of a doctor to refuse. What if it is late in pregnancy, the baby will be instantly adopted, and the mother's motive seems malicious? |
| 4679 | One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover] |
| Full Idea: One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Causing Death and Saving Lives [1977], §13.2) | |
| A reaction: A nicely chilling question. Enthusiasts want never to sleep. If I would prefer to be unconscious 20 hours every day (for a long period), there doesn't seem much point, does there? |