Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Irving M. Copi, A.C. Ewing and Wallace, J

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10 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification

10009	Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
	Full Idea: In a famous paper, Wallace argued that all interpretations of quantifiers (including the substitutional interpretation) are, in the end, variants of that proposed by Tarski (in 1936).
	From: report of Wallace, J (On the Frame of Reference [1970]) by Thomas Baldwin - Interpretations of Quantifiers
	A reaction: A significant-looking pointer. We must look elsewhere for Tarski's account, which will presumably subsume the objectual interpretation as well. The ontology of Tarski's account of truth is an enduring controversy.

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers

12312	The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
	Full Idea: With respect to scientific usage, we can say that the real essence of a thing will consist very largely of powers or, in modern terms, dispositional properties.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.718)
	A reaction: Once again, Copi is a hero. I personally love the word 'powers' in metaphysics (and dislike the word 'properties', which is lost in a fog of confusion). See Molnar on 'powers' and Mumford on 'dispositions'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory

10937	Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
	Full Idea: The 'explanatory characterization' says that the essential properties of an object are the object's deepest explanatory properties, which explain the other properties of the object - and which Copi claims is mind-independent.
	From: report of Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954]) by Adolph Rami - Essential vs Accidental Properties §2
	A reaction: It is, of course, normal to see a good explanation as being dependent on the interests of the audience. Perhaps this account should be in terms of causal powers. See Shoemaker on properties.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence

12308	In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
	Full Idea: In the sphere of scientific enquiry the distinction between real and nominal essence tends to disappear; the scientist's classification of things is intended to be in terms of their real essences.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.716)
	A reaction: Thus we have disputes over what is the 'real' classification of natural kinds such as animals. There is not much point in a classification system that does not at least reflect some aspects of reality.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object

12303	Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
	Full Idea: If we can distinguish the different kinds of change (alteration, locomotion, growth, diminution), then we can say that a given attribute is essential to an object if its loss would result in the destruction of that object.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.707-8)
	A reaction: As Copi is aware, this is a necessary condition for a property for essence, but not sufficient. If an attribute were necessary but non-essential, its loss would also be destruction. We say the essential attributes must also have some explanatory role.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism

21513	We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
	Full Idea: I think it is wrong to tie down the advocates of the coherence theory to a precise definition. ...It would be altogether unreasonable to demand that the moral ideal should be exhaustively defined, and the same may be true of the ideal of thought.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.231), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 7.6
	A reaction: I strongly agree. It is not a council of despair. I think the criteria of coherence can be articulated quite well (e.g by Thagard), and the virtues of enquiry can also be quite well specified (e.g. by Zagzebski). Very dissimilar evidence must cohere.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique

21497	If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
	Full Idea: Without a detailed account, coherence is reduced to the mere muttering of the word 'coherence', which can be interpreted so as to cover all arguments, but only by making its meaning so wide as to rob it of almost all significance.
	From: A.C. Ewing (Idealism: a critical survey [1934], p.246), quoted by Erik J. Olsson - Against Coherence 2.2
	A reaction: I'm a fan of coherence, but it is a placeholder, involving no intrinsic or detailed theory. I just think it points to the reality of how we make judgements, especially practical ones. We can categorise the inputs, and explain the required virtues.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism

18671	The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]
	Full Idea: The ground for an attitude lies not in some other ethical concept, goodness, but in the concrete, factual characteristics of what we pronounce good. ...We shall not be better off if we interpolate an indefinable characteristic of goodness besides.
	From: A.C. Ewing (The Definition of Good [1948], p.172), quoted by Francesco Orsi - Value Theory 1.4
	A reaction: This is a forerunner of Scanlon's Buck-Passing theory of the source of value (in other properties). I approve of this approach. If I say 'actually this very strong cheese is really good', I'm not adding goodness to the cheese.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

12307	Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
	Full Idea: Modern science seeks to know the real essences of things, and its increasing successes seem to be bringing it progressively nearer to that goal.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.715)
	A reaction: This is from a notable pioneering paper, which outlined scientific essentialism even before Marcus and Kripke began to offer a modern account of essence to give it backing. Compare Popper, who thinks essences are will-o-the-wisps.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences

12310	Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]
	Full Idea: Contrary to Locke, I should hold that real essences are in principle knowable, and contrary to Aristotle, I should hold that non-essential or accidental properties can also be objects of scientific knowledge.
	From: Irving M. Copi (Essence and Accident [1954], p.717)
	A reaction: Copi has just become my hero. Aristotle's account of definition is on the brink of allowing fine-tuned essences, but he thinks universal understanding blocks knowledge of individuals. But cross-referencing of universals pinpoints individuals.