Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J Fodor / E Lepore, Anjan Chakravarrty and Albertus Magnus

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

9 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

15148	Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Powers explain behaviours regardless of whether they are necessary for membership in a particular class of things.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
	A reaction: This seems right, and is important for driving a wedge between powers and essences. If there are essences, they are not simply some bunch of powers.

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism

16756	Substantial forms must exist, to explain the stability of metals like silver and tin [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: There is no reason why the matter in any natural thing should be stable in its nature, if it is not completed by a substantial form. But we see that silver is stable, and tin and other metals. Therefore they will seem to be perfected by substantial forms.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On Minerals [1260], III.1.7), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 24.2
	A reaction: Illuminating. This may be the best reason for proposing substantial forms. Once materialism arrives, the so-called 'laws' of nature have to be imposed on the material to do the job - but what the hell is a law supposed to be?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind

15145	A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: The modern concept of a kind essence is a set of intrinsic properties that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the membership of something in a class of things, or 'kind'.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: I am always struck by the problem that the kind itself is constructed from the individuals, so circularity always seems to loom.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism

15147	Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities

16718	Primary qualities are the cause of all the other sensible qualities [Albertus Magnus]
	Full Idea: The primary qualities of tangible things are the cause of all the other sensible qualities.
	From: Albertus Magnus (On 'Generation and Corruption' [1261], II.1.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 21.2
	A reaction: This makes the primary qualities sound suspiciously like the essence.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations

15144	Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Scientific practices such as prediction and explanation regarding causal phenomena are concerned not merely with kinds having essences, but also with kinds lacking them.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 1)
	A reaction: Not quite clear what he has in mind, but explanation should certainly involve a coherent picture, and not just the citation of some underlying causal mechanism.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds

15146	Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
	A reaction: This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature

15151	Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty]
	Full Idea: Causal laws often do not make reference to kinds of objects at all, but rather summarize relations between quantitative, causally efficacious properties of objects.
	From: Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 3)
	A reaction: This would only be a serious challenge if it was not possible to translate talk of properties into talk of kinds, and vice versa.