15147
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Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty]
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Full Idea:
The fact that members of some cluster kinds are subjects of causal generalizations reflects the degree to which they share causally efficacious properties, not the fact that they may be composed of essence kinds per se.
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From:
Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
I think this is right. I am a fan of individual essences, but not of kind essences. I take kinds, and kind explanations, to be straightforward inductive generalisations from individuals. Extreme stabilities give the illusion of a kind essence.
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9381
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If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
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Full Idea:
The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
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From:
report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
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A reaction:
This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!
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15146
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Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty]
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Full Idea:
Many of the kinds we theorize about and experiment on today simply do not have essences. We can distinguish 'essence kinds', such as electrons, and 'cluster kinds', such as biological species.
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From:
Anjan Chakravarrty (Inessential Aristotle: Powers without Essences [2012], 2)
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A reaction:
This is an important point for essentialists. He offers a strict criterion, in Idea 15145, for mind membership, but we might allow species to have essences by just relaxing the criteria a bit, and acknowledging some vagueness, especially over time.
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15194
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Time, as it appears in standard modern science, is bad verificationist metaphysics [Smith,Q, by Le Poidevin]
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Full Idea:
Smith argues that the theories of time which appear in the Special and General Theories of Relativity and in orthodox quantum mechanics are false metaphysical theories, based on verificationist assumptions.
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From:
report of Quentin Smith (Absolute Simultaneity and Infinity of Time [1998]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Intro to 'Questions of Time and Tense' 4
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A reaction:
I wouldn't have to confidence to stand up to the panoply of modern scientists, but I am glad Quentin Smith is having a go. I love Shoemaker's three worlds example, which defies all physics.
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