Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J Fodor / E Lepore, Erving Goffman and Jean Buridan

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8 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason

1403	A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
	Full Idea: A rational donkey faced with two totally identical piles of hay would be unable to decide which one to eat first, and would therefore starve to death
	From: report of Jean Buridan (talk [1338]) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: also De Caelo 295b32 (Idea 19740).

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object

16678	Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
	Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4
	A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher.

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers

16793	A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3
	A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals?

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary

16726	Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
	Full Idea: The entire difficulty in this question is why through a knowledge of the primary tangible qualities we cannot come to a knowledge of flavors or odors, since these are their causes, since we often go from knowledge of causes to knowing their effects.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics [1344], I.28c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.2
	A reaction: He is commenting on Idea 16725. Still a nice puzzle in the philosophy of mind. Will neuroscientists ever be able to infer to actual character of some quale, just from the structures of the neurons?

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration

16577	Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
	A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science.

14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction

16576	Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
	Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron.
	From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
	A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11.

16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct

8044	Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre]
	Full Idea: Erving Goffman has liquidated the self into its role-playing, arguing that the self is no more than 'a peg' on which the clothes of the role are hung.
	From: report of Erving Goffman (Presentation of Self in Everyday Life [1959]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory Ch.3
	A reaction: A rather unsympathetic expression of his view, but it seems to be a widely held view among students of sociology. But then sociologists are almost committed a priori to a social and relativist view of truth, persons, knowledge, religion etc.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!