Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J Fodor / E Lepore, Paul Bernays and Stuart Hampshire

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

---

5 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory

10304	Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays]
	Full Idea: Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics.
	From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934])

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism

10303	Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays]
	Full Idea: A restricted Platonism does not claim to be more than, so to speak, an ideal projection of a domain of thought.
	From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.261)
	A reaction: I have always found Platonism to be congenial when it talks of 'ideals', and ridiculous when it talks of a special form of 'existence'. Ideals only 'exist' because we idealise things. I may declare myself, after all, to be a Restricted Platonist.

6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique

10306	Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays]
	Full Idea: Mathematical abstraction does not have a lesser degree than logical abstraction, but rather another direction.
	From: Paul Bernays (On Platonism in Mathematics [1934], p.268)
	A reaction: His point is that the logicists seem to think that if you increasingly abstract from mathematics, you end up with pure logic.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility

20166	A man is a responsible agent to the extent he has an intention, and knows what he is doing [Hampshire]
	Full Idea: A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.
	From: Stuart Hampshire (Thought and Responsibility [1960], p.178), quoted by John Kekes - The Human Condition 07.1
	A reaction: Kekes quote this (along with Frankfurt, Hart etc) as the 'received view' of responsibility, which he attacks.