Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J Fodor / E Lepore, Richard T.W. Arthur and William K. Clifford

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4 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility

19378	Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
	Full Idea: For Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, if a state of things is possible, it must occur at some time, whether past, present or future. For Leibniz possibility makes no reference to time; an individual is possible if its concept contains no contradiction.
	From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 4 'Contingent')
	A reaction: It has always struck me as fallacious to say that anything that is possible must at some time occur. If '6' is possible on the die, what will constrain it to eventually come up when thrown? Mere non-contradiction doesn't imply possibility either.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

6587	It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
	Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
	From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
	A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.

17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism

19380	Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]
	Full Idea: The Jesuits rejected occasionalism ... because it is incompatible with the Catholic interpretation of the Eucharist, which there is genuine change of substance of the bread into the substance of Christ (transubstantiation).
	From: Richard T.W. Arthur (Leibniz [2014], 5 'Substance')
	A reaction: Not sure I understand this, but I take it that the Eucharist needs a real relation across the substance-spirit boundary, and not just a co-ordination.

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism

9381	If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian]
	Full Idea: The Master Argument for linguistic holism is: Some of an expression's inferences are relevant to fixing its meaning; there is no way to distinguish the inferences that are constitutive (from Quine); so all inferences are relevant to fixing meaning.
	From: report of J Fodor / E Lepore (Holism: a Shopper's Guide [1993], §III) by Paul Boghossian - Analyticity Reconsidered
	A reaction: This would only be if you thought that the pattern of inferences is what fixes the meanings, but how can you derive inferences before you have meanings? The underlying language of thought generates the inferences? Meanings are involved!