Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for J.B. Watson, Geoffrey Hellman and William K. Clifford

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7 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism

8921	Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
	Full Idea: With developments in modern mathematics, structuralist ideas have become commonplace. We study 'abstract structures', having relations without regard to the objects. As Hilbert famously said, items of furniture would do.
	From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
	A reaction: Hilbert is known as a Formalist, which suggests that modern Structuralism is a refined and more naturalist version of the rather austere formalist view. Presumably the sofa can't stand for six, so a structural definition of numbers is needed.

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism

8698	Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend]
	Full Idea: The modal structuralist thinks of mathematical structures as possibilities. The application of mathematics is just the realisation that a possible structure is actualised. As structures are possibilities, realist ontological problems are avoided.
	From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 4.3
	A reaction: Friend criticises this and rejects it, but it is appealing. Mathematics should aim to be applicable to any possible world, and not just the actual one. However, does the actual world 'actualise a mathematical structure'?

9557	Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara]
	Full Idea: Hellman represents statements of pure mathematics as elliptical for modal conditionals of a certain sort.
	From: report of Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics 5.3
	A reaction: It's a pity there is such difficulty in understanding conditionals (see Graham Priest on the subject). I intuit a grain of truth in this, though I take maths to reflect the structure of the actual world (with possibilities being part of that world).

10263	Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman]
	Full Idea: The usual way to show that a sentence is possible is to show that it has a model, but for Hellman presumably a sentence is possible if it might have a model (or if, possibly, it has a model). It is not clear what this move brings us.
	From: comment on Geoffrey Hellman (Mathematics without Numbers [1989]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.3
	A reaction: I can't assess this, but presumably the possibility of the model must be demonstrated in some way. Aren't all models merely possible, because they are based on axioms, which seem to be no more than possibilities?

8922	Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
	Full Idea: There is the tantalizing possibility that perhaps mathematical objects 'have no nature' at all, beyond their 'structural role'.
	From: Geoffrey Hellman (Structuralism [2007], §1)
	A reaction: This would fit with a number being a function rather than an object. We are interested in what cars do, not the bolts that hold them together? But the ontology of mathematics is quite separate from how you do mathematics.

13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism

6587	It is always wrong to believe things on insufficient evidence [Clifford]
	Full Idea: It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
	From: William K. Clifford (works [1870]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason Ch.4
	A reaction: This is a famous remark, but is in danger of being tautological unless one gives some account of what 'insufficient' means. If Clifford means the evidence must be conclusive, this is nonsense. 'Never believe if there is no evidence' is better.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

7517	I could take a healthy infant and train it up to be any type of specialist I choose [Watson,JB]
	Full Idea: Give me a dozen healthy infants, and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select - doctor, artist, beggar, thief - regardless of his ancestry.
	From: J.B. Watson (Behaviorism [1924], Ch.2), quoted by Steven Pinker - The Blank Slate
	A reaction: This was a famous pronouncement rejecting the concept of human nature as in any way fixed - a total assertion of nurture over nature. Modern research seems to be suggesting that Watson is (alas?) wrong.