73 ideas
13310 | Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca] |
Full Idea: What grounds could I possibly have for supposing that a person who has no acquaintance with books will never be a wise man? For wisdom does not lie in books. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: A useful warning to the likes of me, who may have retreated from the hurly-burly of the agora (see Callicles in Plato's 'Gorgias'), under the illusion that detachment is needed for wisdom. Maybe involvement is needed for wisdom. |
13560 | A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca] |
Full Idea: I do not call any man wise who is subservient to anything. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §11) | |
A reaction: At the very least, a wise man should be subservient to a wiser man. |
13295 | Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There is nothing a wise man does reluctantly; he escapes necessity because he wills what necessity is going to force on him. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 054) | |
A reaction: He is discussing death in this letter. The difficulty here is sliding into fatalism. For instance, if you are informed that you have cancer, it is tempting to become 'wise' and will your own death, but lots of people fight it, and win. |
13317 | Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Philosophy takes as her aim the state of happiness. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090) | |
A reaction: A startlingly forthright view. It seems to neglect what I take to be the main aim of philosophy, which is to achieve understanding. I presume true happiness would follow from that. Seneca must now explain why soporific pleasure is wrong. |
13293 | What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Shall I tell you what philosophy holds out for humanity? Counsel. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 048) | |
A reaction: See Quine for a flat modern denial of this claim (Idea 9764). There is a modern tendency to see ethics and political thought operating at a meta- or metameta- level. I take the main ethical theories to be very illuminating of real life. |
13309 | That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There's no reason for you to assume that, X being something without which Y could never have come about, Y came about as a result of the assistance of X. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: This thought originates with Carneades, reported by Cicero. This is a clear message to the likes of Mackie, who are in danger of thinking that giving the preconditions of something is sufficient to give its causes. |
13313 | Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Even the philosophers have descended to the level of drawing distinctions between the uses of different syllables and discussing the proper meanings of prepositions and conjunctions. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: How wonderfully prescient! The vast industry of modern philosophy of language exactly fits Seneca's description. I don't quite share his contempt, of course, and I think Seneca would have a bit of sympathy with modern analysis (just a bit!). |
4456 | Epistemological Ockham's Razor demands good reasons, but the ontological version says reality is simple [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Ockham's Razor has an epistemological version, which says we should not multiply existences or explanations without adequate reason, and an ontological version, which says reality is simple, and so a simpler ontology represents it more accurately. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A nice distinction. Is it reality which is simple, or us? One shouldn't write off the ontological version. If one explanation is simpler than the others, there may be a reason in nature for that. |
4474 | Existence theories must match experience, possibility, logic and knowledge, and not be self-defeating [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A theory of existence should 1) be consistent with what actually exists, 2) be consistent with what could exist, 3) not make existence impossible (e.g. in space-time), 4) not violate logic, 5) make knowing the theory possible. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: A nice bit of metaphilosophical analysis. I still doubt whether a theory of existence is possible (something has to be 'given' a priori), but this is a good place to start the attempt. |
4461 | Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Tropes are (says Campbell) substances (in Hume's sense), and indeed resemble his impressions conceived realistically rather than idealistically. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: An interesting link. It doesn't get rid of the problem Hume has, of saying when two impressions are the same. Are they types or tokens? Trope-theory claims they are tokens. Hume's ontology includes 'resemblance'. |
4462 | A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland] |
Full Idea: A property-instance must be spread out in space, or it is not clear how a colour nature can be present, but then it has to be a complex entity, and tropes are supposed to be simple entities. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Seems a fair point. Nothing else in reality can be sharply distinguished, so why should 'simple' and 'complex'? |
4463 | In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a decorator says that they used four colours to decorate a house, four tropes is not what was meant, and the statement seems to view colours as universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Although I am suspicious of using language to deduce ontology, you have to explain why certain statements (like this) are even possible to make. |
4451 | If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If properties are universals, what account can be given of the individuation of two entities that have all their pure properties in common? | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Is this a big problem? Maybe only a space-time location can do it. Or, in the nice case where the universe is just two identical spheres, it may be impossible. |
4453 | One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland] |
Full Idea: One version of realism says that the universal does not enter into the being of its instances, and thus is a One-Over-Many. One version of this is the model/copy view, but this is not widely held, because of difficulties such as the Third Man Argument. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This presumably arises if the model is held to have the properties of the copy (self-predication), and looks like a bad theory |
4464 | Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Traditional realism is the view that a property is a universal construed as a multiply exemplifiable abstract entity that is a numerically identical constituent in each of its instances. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Put like that, it seems hard to commit oneself fully to realism. How can two red buses contain one abstract object spread out between them. Common sense says there are two 'rednesses' which resemble one another, which is a version of nominalism. |
4449 | Evidence for universals can be found in language, communication, natural laws, classification and ideals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Those who believe in universals appeal to the meaningfulness of language, the lawlike nature of causation, the inter-subjectivity of thinking, our ability to classify new entities, gradation, and the need for perfect standards or paradigms. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Of these, language and communication ought to be explicable by convention, but classification and natural laws look to me like the best evidence. |
4450 | The traditional problem of universals centres on the "One over Many", which is the unity of natural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Historically the problem of universals has mainly been about the "One over Many", which involves giving an account of the unity of natural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This still strikes me as the main problem (rather than issues of language). If universals are not natural, they must be analysed as properties, which break down into causation, which is seen as a human convention. |
4454 | The One-In-Many view says universals have abstract existence, but exist in particulars [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Another version of realism says is One-In-Many, where the universal is not another particular, but is literally in the instances. The universal is an abstract entity, in the instances by means of a primitive non-spatiotemporal tie of predication. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like Aristotle (and is Loux's view of properties and relations). If they are abstract, why must they be confined to particulars? |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Many properties (being even) and relations (musical intervals, being a father) are such that it is not clear what it would mean to take them as natural things existing in space. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: 'Being even' certainly seems to be a property, and it is a struggle to see how it could exist in space, unless it is a set of actual or potential brain states. |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Realism about universals is supported by the phenomenon of abstract reference - that is the fact that properties themselves have properties ('red is a colour'), and stand in relation to other properties ('red is more like orange than like blue'). | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: While a property may be an obviously natural feature, properties of properties seem more likely to be the produce of human perception and convention. It is a good argument, though. |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If a property is held to be at the location of the particular, then if there are two objects having the same property, and one object is stationary and the other is moving, the realist is forced to say that the universal is both moving and at rest. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: The target of this comment is D.M.Armstrong. The example nicely illustrates the problem of trying to combine science and metaphysics. It pushes you back to Platonism, but that seems wrong too… |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
Full Idea: When one attends to something existing in space, one attends to an instance of redness, not to redness itself (which is a colour, which resembles orange). The facts about red itself are not spatial facts, but are traditionally seen as a priori synthetic. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is the fact that properties can themselves have properties (and so on?), which seems to take us further and further from the natural world. |
4472 | Redness is independent of red things, can do without them, has its own properties, and has identity [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Four arguments for Platonism: 1) there are truths about redness (it's a colour) even if nothing red exists, 2) redness does not depend on particulars, 3) most universals are at some time not exemplified, 4) universals satisfy the criteria of existence. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This adds up to quite a good case, particularly the point that things can be said about redness which are independent of any particular, but the relationships between concepts and the brain seems at the heart of the problem. |
4459 | Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Moderate nominalism attempts to embrace the existence of properties while avoiding universals. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Clearly there is going to be quite a struggle to make sense of 'exists' here (Russell tries 'subsists). Presumably each property must be a particular? |
4458 | Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Resemblance Nominalism is clearly superior to Class Nominalism, since the former offers a clear ground for distinguishing between natural and unnatural classes. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Important. It seems evident to me that there are natural classes, and the only ground for this claim would be either the resemblance or the identity of properties. |
4457 | There can be predicates with no property, and there are properties with no predicate [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Linguistic predicates are neither sufficient nor necessary for specifying a property. Predicates can be contrived which express no property, properties are far more numerous than linguistic predicates, and properties are what make predicates apply. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to me conclusive, and is a crucial argument against anyone who thinks that our metaphysics can simply be inferred from our language. |
4471 | We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Some argue that compared to sets, the identity conditions for properties are obscure, and so properties, including realist depictions of them, should be rejected. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: I have never thought that difficulty in precisely identifying something was a good reason for denying its existence. Consider low morale in a work force. 2nd thoughts: I like this! |
4476 | Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false [Moreland] |
Full Idea: Most philosophers think that the identity of indiscernibles is false. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: This is as opposed to the generally accepted 'indiscernibility of identicals'. 'Discernment' is an epistemological concept, and 'identity' is an ontological concept. |
13297 | To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca] |
Full Idea: To the four Aristotelian causes Plato adds a fifth in the model - what he himself calls the 'idea' - this being what the sculptor had constantly before his eyes as he executed the intended work. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 065) | |
A reaction: A very interesting interpretation. I take the four 'causes' to be primarily the four 'explanations', and it exactly fits how we should understand Plato, as offer a crucial underlying explanation. The statue is Aristotle's example. |
4460 | Abstractions are formed by the mind when it concentrates on some, but not all, the features of a thing [Moreland] |
Full Idea: If something is 'abstract' it is got before the mind by an act of abstraction, that is, by concentrating attention on some (but not all) of what is presented. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: Presumably it usually involves picking out the behavioural or causal features, and leaving out the physical features - though I suppose it works for physical properties too… |
13307 | If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Nothing's outside your scope when it comes to measurement. Well, if you're such an expert, measure a man's soul; tell me how large or how small that is. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: This is Descartes's non-spatial argument, which I take to be one of the four main props to his mind-body dualism. As always, it is expressed with beautiful concision by Seneca. |
4455 | It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable [Moreland] |
Full Idea: It is always open to a philosopher to claim that some entity or other is unanalysable. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: For example, Davidson on truth. There is an onus to demonstrate why all attempted analyses fail. |
21399 | Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca] |
Full Idea: It makes a very great difference whether you refer to the person directly, or speak about him. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 117.13), quoted by A.A. Long - Hellenistic Philosophy 4.3.2 | |
A reaction: We seem to think that the distinctiveness of reference was first spotted by Frege. Not so. |
13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
Full Idea: The highest good is harmony of spirit. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §08) | |
A reaction: This idea is straight from Plato's Republic. |
13325 | Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca] |
Full Idea: One of the causes of the troubles that beset us is the way our lives are guided by the example of others; instead of being set to rights by reason we're seduced by convention. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 123) | |
A reaction: An interesting practical spin and critique of the standard metaethical idea that morality is just convention. If you think morality is convention, presumably your moral duty is to imitate your neighbours. Nice deconstruction. |
22239 | Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen] |
Full Idea: Seneca held that human beings owe the original acquisition of the concept of virtue to an analogy with bodily health and strength | |
From: report of Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 120.5) by James Allen - Soul's Virtue and the Health of the Body p.76 | |
A reaction: This is an unusual view, even for a stoic, but shows how close the concepts of health and virtue were. Notice that it is strength as well as health. Plato just emphasises mental and physical harmony. |
13294 | We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca] |
Full Idea: I already know what death is like - it will be the same after me as it was before me. ..Only an utter idiot would think a lamp was worse off when it was put out than before it was lit. ..What does it matter whether you cease to be or never begin? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 054) | |
A reaction: These sentiments are, interestingly, derived from the epicureans, rather than from the stoic tradition, but to us they probably look close together, where they looked like opponents at the time. |
13299 | Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There's nothing so very great about living - all your slaves and all the animals do it. What is, however, a great thing is to die in a manner which is honourable, enlightened and courageous. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077) | |
A reaction: You get the feeling that Seneca actually thought suicide was better than a natural death. Did he actually seek his own death? It is an odd interpretation of his own stoic injunction to 'live according to nature'. |
13300 | It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Wouldn't you think a man a prize fool if he burst into tears because he didn't live a thousand years ago? A man is such a fool for shedding tears because he isn't going to be alive a thousand years from now. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077) | |
A reaction: These thoughts are traditional, dating back to Epicurus, but Seneca is exceptionally going at finding new variations and examples to reinforce the basic thought. |
13321 | Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Can anything be sweeter than to find that you are so dear to your wife that this makes you dearer to yourself? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 104) | |
A reaction: Another lovely penetrating remark from Seneca. I suppose a symptom of low self-esteem might be 'why does she love someone as worthless as me?', but that would be unusual. |
13292 | Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca] |
Full Idea: No one can lead a happy life if he thinks only of himself and turns everything to his own purposes. You should live for the other person if you wish to live for yourself. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 048) | |
A reaction: It is important to see this as a key aspect of the ancient aspiration to virtue. The end result is not far from Christianity. It is simplistic to see the quest for virtue as a crass self-obsessed quest for self-improvement. We are social. |
13550 | To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca] |
Full Idea: To be always happy and to pass through life without any mental distress is to lack knowledge of one half of nature. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §4) | |
A reaction: These kind of paradoxes plague virtue theory, and any theory which aims at an ideal. Heaven, for example, seems to have no problems to solve, which spells boredom. The fascination of corrupt people is their superior knowledge of the world. |
13303 | A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca] |
Full Idea: A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 078) | |
A reaction: Seneca is a very penetrating thinker about ordinary life - an aspect of philosophy which is nowadays totally neglected by the most eminent philosophers. |
13302 | Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca] |
Full Idea: As it is with a play, so it is with life - what matters is not how long the acting lasts, but how good it is. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077) | |
A reaction: A very nice epigram, culminating the wonderful Letter 77 on the subject of death. A play needs to be a decent length if it is to exhibit its qualities. It would be heartbreaking if all of Shakespeare's plays were just 20-minute sketches. |
13301 | We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca] |
Full Idea: You are scared of death - but how heedless of it you are while you are dealing with a dish of choice mushrooms! | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077) | |
A reaction: A beautifully simple observation, from the greatest philosopher of death. Maybe hospices should concentrate on sex, drugs and rock and roll. |
13323 | The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca] |
Full Idea: The whole object of luxurious living is the delight it takes in irregular ways and in not merely departing from the correct course but going to the farthest point away from it, and in eventually even taking a stand diametrically opposed to it. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 122) | |
A reaction: A rather conservative and puritanical remark, but worthy of contemplation even for committed hedonists. It is just a sad facts that most pleasures diminish with familiarity. Small children make delightful remarks. Imagine if they repeated them. |
13318 | Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Nature does not give a man virtue; the process of becoming a good man is an art. ...Virtue only comes to a character which has been thoroughly schooled and trained and brought to a pitch of perfection by unremitting practice. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090) | |
A reaction: This is an important gloss from a leading stoic on the slogan of 'live according to nature'. One might say that the natural life must be 'tracked' (as Philip Larkin says we track happiness). The natural life is, above all, the rational life, for stoics. |
13324 | Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca] |
Full Idea: For those who follow nature everything is easy and straightforward, whereas for those who fight against her life is just like rowing against the stream. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 102) | |
A reaction: A classic statement of the well-known stoic slogan, but expressed with Seneca's characteristic elegance. There is always a slight hidden of dubious fatalism in the slogan. 'Rage, rage, against the dying of the light!' - Dylan Thomas. |
13559 | I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca] |
Full Idea: You ask what I seek from virtue? Virtue herself. For she has nothing better, she is herself her own reward. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §09) | |
A reaction: Presumably this is the source of the popular saying that 'virtue is its own reward'. The trouble is that this doesn't seem a very persuasive thing to say to a sceptic who doubts whether being virtuous is worth the trouble. |
13554 | True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There is no more reliable proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can happen to make you disturbed. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §06) | |
A reaction: He specifically opposes Aristotle's view that there are times when anger is appropriate, and failure to be very angry indeed is a failure of character. |
13305 | Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca] |
Full Idea: What really ruins our characters is the fact that none of us looks back over his life. We think a little about what we are going to do, and fail to think about what we have done, yet plans for the future depend on the past. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 083) | |
A reaction: One always assumes that writings about the wisdom of daily life will be one mass of clichés, but Seneca proves otherwise. With a pang I realise that I may be too guilty of not thinking about the past. I've even been proud of it. |
13561 | Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca] |
Full Idea: In the case of virtue excess should not be feared, since in virtue resides moderation. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §13) | |
A reaction: This seems to imply that all of the virtues are unified in the one achievement of the virtuous state. It leaves the notion of 'virtue' a bit thin in content, though. |
13562 | It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Why, to your shame, are you so careless that you do not know your handful of slaves by sight? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17) |
13556 | Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca] |
Full Idea: When the lamp has been removed from my sight, and my wife, no stranger now to my habit, has fallen silent, I examine the whole of my day and retrace my actions and words; I hide nothing from myself. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §36) |
13308 | It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca] |
Full Idea: What's the use of overcoming opponent after opponent in the wrestling or boxing rings if you can be overcome by your temper? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: He has such a nice way of presenting what might be traditional and commonplace ideas. If you see life as a battle, then you should think very carefully about who the opponents are - because they may be hiding within. |
13553 | Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Other vile passions affect only the worst sort of men, but anger creeps up even on enlightened me who are otherwise sane. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §04) | |
A reaction: A very interesting observation for anyone who is trying to analyse the key issues in virtue theory. |
13312 | Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca] |
Full Idea: To want to know more than is sufficient is a form of intemperance. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: This comes as a bit of a surprise, given the high value that philosophers place on knowledge. I'm reminded of Auberon Waugh's criticism of the Scots as a 'wildly over-educated people'. I think the problem is what you could have been doing instead. |
13552 | Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Other vices drive the mind on, anger hurls it headlong; ..other vices revolt from good sense, this one from sanity; ...other vices seize individuals, this is the one passion that sometimes takes hold of an entire state. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Anger (Book 3) [c.60], §01) | |
A reaction: He particularly dislikes anger because it is the vice that leads to violence. |
13549 | Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Nothing bad can happen to a good man. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §2) | |
A reaction: This is a pithy summary of a well know ancient attitude - one that is rejected by Aristotle, but defended by Socrates. It depends what you mean by 'bad' - but that is a rather modern response. |
13564 | There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca] |
Full Idea: What doubt can there be that the wise man has greater scope for displaying his powers if he is rich than if he is poor, since in the case of poverty only one kind of virtue exists - refusal to be bowed down and crushed. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §22) | |
A reaction: It is against this view that I see Jesus proposing poverty as central to virtue. But then he has the surprising view (to Seneca) that humility is a virtue. What Nietzsche calls the slaves' inversion of values. |
13563 | Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §17) |
13565 | If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Wealth is not a good; for it it was, it would make men good. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §24) | |
A reaction: An immediately attractive argument, but should we assume that anything which is good will enhance our personal goodness? If goodness is a habit, then continual pursuit of wealth is the test case to examine. Seneca is right! |
13315 | To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca] |
Full Idea: In the Golden Age, to govern was to serve, not to rule. No one used to try out the extent of his power over those to whom he owed that power in the first place. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 090) | |
A reaction: I spent my professional career trying to persuade people that management should be a subjection to the managed. Wake up! The second half of this idea is the interesting bit - the temptation to just 'try out' your powers gets to them all. |
20948 | Human cultures are organisms which grow, and then fade and die [Spengler, by Bowie] |
Full Idea: Spengler relies upon the idea of human cultures as organisms which grow and then inevitably die, having lost their vitality. | |
From: report of Oswald Spengler (The Decline of the West [1918]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 2 'Herder' | |
A reaction: He should have thought more about technology. If the 'West' collapses and is replaced by China (say), the new Chinese culture will be barely distinguishable from the West, because they will pursue similar technologies. |
13557 | Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Human concerns are not so happily arranged that the majority favours the better things. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On the Happy Life [c.60], §02) | |
A reaction: On the whole Seneca is unimpressed by democracy, as people are rushed into decisions by the crowd, and live to regret them. |
13290 | One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Part of my joy in learning is that it puts me in a position to teach. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 006) | |
A reaction: This doesn't quite distinguish between bad learning and good learning, but I take a commitment to wanting to teach what you know as an essential part of wanting to know. |
13322 | Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca] |
Full Idea: A person teaching and a person learning should have the same end in view: the improvement of the latter. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 108) | |
A reaction: [He cites a philospher called Attalus for this remark] This is worthy to be up in the hall of every educational institution in the world, and especially in the staff rooms. |
13298 | Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There are many occasions on which a man should leave life not only bravely but for reasons which are not as pressing as they might be - the reasons which restrain us being not so pressing either. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 077) | |
A reaction: This is an interesting and startling claim from the great champion of suicide, who nobly and memorably committed suicide himself. But we all dread a loved one miscalculating Seneca's dialectic, and dying when living would have been better. |
13319 | If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca] |
Full Idea: No one has power over us when death is in our own power. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 091) | |
A reaction: A classic slogan for the stoic view of suicide, an idea that crops up in Shakespeare's 'Julius Caesar'. He doesn't seem to have understood that they can take away your shoelaces. |
13320 | Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca] |
Full Idea: There are times when, however pressing one's reasons to the contrary, one's dying breath must be held back as it is passing one's lips, even if this is torture, simply out of consideration for one's dear ones. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 104) | |
A reaction: This is, of course, a highly significant counterbalance to his normal acceptance of suicide. I wish anyone who is planning suicide would heed it. They have no idea how much suffering will usually result from their action. |
13548 | The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca] |
Full Idea: The waves increase by degrees, approaching to the hour and day proportionately larger or smaller in volume as they are attracted by the star we call the moon, whose power controls the ocean's surge. | |
From: Seneca the Younger (On Providence [c.60], §1) | |
A reaction: ....just in case anyone thought that Isaac Newton had invented gravity. |
13311 | Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca] |
Full Idea: Look how many questions there are on time. Does it have an existence of its own? Does anything exist prior to time, independently of it? Did it begin with the universe, or did it exist even before then? | |
From: Seneca the Younger (Letters from a Stoic [c.60], 088) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that the questions have shifted or become any clearer after two thousand years, despite Einstein and co. Note that discussions of time were not initiated by Augustine. |
4473 | 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists [Moreland] |
Full Idea: 'Presentism' is the view that only the present moment exists. | |
From: J.P. Moreland (Universals [2001], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: And Greek scepticism doubted even the present, since there is no space between past and future. It is a delightfully vertigo-inducing idea. |