Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Andy Douglas and Stephen R. Grimm

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5 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Unlike knowledge, you can achieve understanding through luck [Grimm]
     Full Idea: It may be that understanding is compatible with luck, in a way that knowledge is not.
     From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 3)
     A reaction: [He cites Kvanvig and Prichard] If so, then we cannot say that knowledge is a lesser type of understanding. If you ask a trusted person how a mechanism works, and they have a wild guess that is luckily right, you would then understand it.
'Grasping' a structure seems to be modal, because we must anticipate its behaviour [Grimm]
     Full Idea: 'Graspng' a structure would seem to bring into play something like a modal sense or ability, not just to register how things are, but also to anticipate how certain elements of the system would behave.
     From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 2)
     A reaction: In the case of the chronology of some historical events, talking of 'grasping' or 'understanding' seems wrong because the facts are static and invariant. That seems to support the present idea. But you might 'understand' a pattern if you can reproduce it.
You may have 'weak' understanding, if by luck you can answer a set of 'why questions' [Grimm]
     Full Idea: There may be a 'weak' sense of understanding, where all you need to do is to be able to answer 'why questions' successfully, where one might have come by this ability in a lucky way.
     From: Stephen R. Grimm (Understanding [2011], 3)
     A reaction: We can see this point (in Idea 19691), but the idea that one could come by true complex understanding of something by purely lucky means is a bit absurd. Surely you would get one or two why questions wrong? 100%, just by luck?
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
We could know what a lion thinks by mapping both its brain patterns and its experiences [Douglas,A]
     Full Idea: In principle, it seems possible to monitor both the brain activity and the external experiences of a lion cub from birth, and by extensive mapping of one against the other to work out fairly accurately what a lion is thinking.
     From: Andy Douglas (talk [2003])
     A reaction: This has limitations (e.g. we could monitor the external events, but not the way the lion experiences them), but it seems to me to offer a real theoretical possibility of breaching the mental privacy of an inarticulate creature.