Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Stathis Psillos and PG

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


246 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
     Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01)
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
     Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02)
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03)
     A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense.
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
     Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04)
     A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation.
Aletheia: truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Aletheia: truth
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05)
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
     Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06)
     A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives.
Ananke: necessity [PG]
     Full Idea: Ananke: necessity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07)
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
     Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08)
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
     Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09)
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
     Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10)
     A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element.
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
     Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11)
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
     Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12)
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
     Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13)
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
     Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14)
     A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical.
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
     Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'.
Chronismos: separation [PG]
     Full Idea: Chronismos: separation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16)
Diairesis: division [PG]
     Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17)
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
     Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18)
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
     Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21)
Diaphora: difference [PG]
     Full Idea: Diaphora: difference
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22)
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
     Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation.
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
     Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24)
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
     Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25)
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
     Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26)
     A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
     Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27)
Empeiron: experience [PG]
     Full Idea: Empeiron: experience
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28)
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
     Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power?
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31)
Enkrateia: control [PG]
     Full Idea: Enkrateia: control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled.
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
     Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33)
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34)
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35)
     A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'.
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
     Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36)
Ergon: function [PG]
     Full Idea: Ergon: function, work
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37)
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
     Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly?
Eros: love [PG]
     Full Idea: Eros: love, desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41)
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
     Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42)
     A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure.
Genos: type, genus [PG]
     Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43)
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
     Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44)
Horismos: definition [PG]
     Full Idea: Horismos: definition
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45)
Hule: matter [PG]
     Full Idea: Hule: matter
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46)
     A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'!
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
     Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47)
     A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'.
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
     Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48)
     A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects.
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
     Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51)
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
     Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52)
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
     Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53)
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
     Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54)
Meson: the mean [PG]
     Full Idea: Meson: the mean
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55)
     A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
     Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56)
     A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic.
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
     Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57)
Morphe: form [PG]
     Full Idea: Morphe: form
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58)
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
     Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59)
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
     Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61)
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62)
     A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19
Orexis: desire [PG]
     Full Idea: Orexis: desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63)
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
     Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia']
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer.
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
     Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65)
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
     Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66)
Philia: friendship [PG]
     Full Idea: Philia: friendship
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67)
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68)
     A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise.
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English.
Physis: nature [PG]
     Full Idea: Physis: nature
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72)
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
     Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73)
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
     Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74)
     A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem.
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
     Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75)
     A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too.
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76)
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77)
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
     Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78)
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
     Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81)
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82)
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
     Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83)
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
     Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84)
Theos: god [PG]
     Full Idea: Theos: god
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85)
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
     Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86)
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
     Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87)
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory.
To ti estin: essence [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti estin: essence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91)
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
     Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
     Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030])
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001)
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250)
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415)
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430)
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437)
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460)
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471)
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500)
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
     Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504)
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528)
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550)
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
     Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557)
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564)
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
     Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573)
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601)
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633)
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640)
347: death of Plato [PG]
     Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653)
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657)
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665)
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670)
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
     Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678)
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693)
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699)
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739)
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771)
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843)
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915)
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922)
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940)
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
     Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065)
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080)
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170)
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200)
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263)
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
     Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310)
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387)
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
     Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523)
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
     Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622)
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642)
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910)
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015)
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
     Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090)
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115)
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166)
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266)
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280)
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328)
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347)
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470)
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513)
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543)
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580)
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619)
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620)
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633)
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641)
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650)
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651)
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
     Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662)
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665)
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676)
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687)
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690)
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
     Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697)
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713)
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734)
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739)
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762)
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781)
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785)
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789)
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807)
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818)
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840)
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843)
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848)
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
     Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859)
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861)
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882)
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884)
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885)
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888)
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890)
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895)
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900)
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903)
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904)
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908)
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910)
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912)
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921)
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927)
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930)
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
     Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931)
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933)
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942)
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943)
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
     Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945)
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947)
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950)
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953)
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956)
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962)
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967)
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971)
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972)
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
     Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
     Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The traditional conception of Reason is that all beliefs should be justified (that is, backed up by reasons) in order to be rational.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6)
     A reaction: I think it is the duty of all philosophers to either defend this traditional view, or quit philosophy for some other activity. Rorty suggests hermeneutics. In a democracy, rulers should be continually required to give reasons for their decisions.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
     Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
     Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
     Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
     Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said".
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
     Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague.
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Valid deductive arguments have the property of monotonicity; if the conclusion Q follows from the premises P, then it will also follow if further premises P* are added to P.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1)
     A reaction: For perversity's sake we could add a new premise which contradicted one of the original ones ('Socrates is a god'). Or one premise could be 'I believe..', and the new one could show that the belief was false. Induction is non-monotonic.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
     Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect!
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The move from what can (or cannot) be known to exist to what does (or does not) exist has been dubbed the 'epistemic fallacy'.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.6)
     A reaction: This should be a standard concept in all philosophical discussion. It is the commonest, simplest, and most profound blunder made by philosophers, and they do it all the time.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
     Full Idea: For Psillos, properties in mature science are defined by the laws in which they feature.
     From: report of Stathis Psillos (Scientific Realism [1999]) by J Ladyman / D Ross - Every Thing Must Go 3.5
     A reaction: This is a perfect example of the Humean approach getting everything the wrong way round. Laws are not primitives from which we derive our account of nature - they are generalisations built up from the behaviour of prior properties.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The argument for fundamental powers is that fundamental particles are simple, without internal structure. Hence they have no parts which can be the bearers of further properties (powers or non-powers) which in turn ground the properties of the particles.
     From: Stathis Psillos (What do powers do when they are not manifested? [2006], p.151), quoted by Anna Marmodoro - Do powers need powers to make them powerful? 'The Problem'
     A reaction: If a power is basic, what has the power? I think the best answer is that at the fundamental level this is a false dichotomy. If you could zoom in, you would say that basic substance is active in a way that everyday stuff doesn't appear to be.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
     Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
     Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos]
     Full Idea: There can be predictions without explanations, as when a barometer successfully predicts storms, but on its own it does not explain them.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.8)
     A reaction: Actually, barometers contribute to explanations. A reasonable predictor might offer no explanation ('if he's out, she's probably out too'), but an infallible predictor is almost certain to involve causation, which helps a lot in explanation.
If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos]
     Full Idea: There can be explanations without predictions, as when we explain a previous position of Mars from its present one, plus a law.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.9)
     A reaction: If we don't mind stretching the word, I think we can 'predict' the past, as where I predict the location of an Egyptian tomb from my study of papyruses.
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Unlike deductive arguments, induction is non-monotonic - that is, it can be invalidated by the addition of new premises.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §9.2.1)
     A reaction: This is a fancy way of stating the obvious, which is that induction is not a type of deduction. Hume is sometimes accused of this false assumption. Presumably induction is rational, even if it is not actually logical.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The three types of explanation are 'epistemic' (the event is expectable because of a law), or 'modal' (the event is necessary because of a law), or 'ontic' (it is shown how the event fits into the world's causal structure).
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §11.1)
     A reaction: Prediction, necessity or causes. It is hard to think of any other way to explain something. Presumably you would exclude necessities if you didn't believe in them. Hume would go for prediction, on the basis of regularities. Personally, I want it all.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Explanation has to do with understanding; just citing a cause would not offer an adequate understanding, unless it was accompanied by the citation of a law that connects the two events.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
     A reaction: It is surely undeniable that being told the cause but not the law will increase our understanding. Understanding and explanation come in degrees. Full understanding would require an explanation of the law, and beyond. Any relevant truth helps.
The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The 'deductive-nomological' model became known as the 'covering law model': its main thesis is that laws and only laws adequately explain the occurrence of singular events.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
     A reaction: But presumably you need other events to derive a law, so you could say that a singular event can only be explained if it isn't singular. A regularity pattern would offer a partial explanation, before any law had been derived.
If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos]
     Full Idea: If we use geometry and optics to explain the length of shadow cast by a flag-pole, this seems to be reversible, so that the shadow will explain the length of the pole.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.5)
     A reaction: A neat example which presumably implies that an explanation must involve temporal statements. The laws of physics are totally reversible in time, and so will not suffice to explain events on their own. Time's arrow becomes an axiom of explanation?
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos]
     Full Idea: There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: A crucial basic point, which must be drummed into the minds of ruthless Quinean naturalists, who want to explain everything by quarks and electrons
An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Knocking over an ink bottle explains the stain on the carpet, and it is not in doubt because you cannot quote the laws involved; a 'causal story' can give a complete explanation without a law.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.6)
     A reaction: But why is he so clumsy, and the bottle so unstable? Was it really (Freudian) an 'accident'? There is no end to complete explanation. But 'I was clumsy this once' and 'I am always clumsy' are equally good explanations.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Some philosophers focus on the so-called 'pragmatics of explanation' - that an explanation is an answer to a 'why' question, and the relevant answer will depend on the presuppositions or interests of the questioner.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: This seems to me right. Explanation is an entirely human business, not a feature of nature, and most explanations will track back to the big bang if you have the patience, but they always terminate because of pragmatic considerations. But fobbing off?
An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos]
     Full Idea: An explanation amounts to the removal of the initial surprise that accompanied the occurrence of the event.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.2)
     A reaction: This is a nice simple point. It makes explanation relative. God requires no explanations, small children require many. The implication is that explanations make events predictable, which means they must either offer inductive generalisations, or laws.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation
It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos]
     Full Idea: There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7)
     A reaction: This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.8)
     A reaction: This is the core of Hume's is/ought claim - what he calls the mind 'spreading itself'. It is a powerful claim. Personally I think we have become TOO sceptical here, and have the delusion that crucial features of nature are created within our minds.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
     Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
     Full Idea: We cannot distinguish between good and bad explanations of some phenomena, unless we first distinguish between causal and non-causal explanations.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: This seems right, but it pushes us towards the idea that causation is non-analysable, and must be taken as a metaphysically basic axiom. If naturalistic accounts fail, that may be only alternative.
Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The platitudes of causation are that 1) causes make a difference (counterfactually or probabilistically), 2) causes are recipes for events, 3) causes explain their effects, and 4) causes are evidence for effects.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: A nice piece of analysis which offers some problems for anyone (like Russell) who wants to analyse causation completely out of our conceptual scheme.
Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
     Full Idea: While Humeans base their theories on the intuition of regularity, their opponents base theirs on the intuition that there is an intrinsic relation between the properties of two particular things involved (like a hammer and a vase).
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: I favour the intrinsic relation of properties view, but this leaves the question of whether we can explain a relation, apart from observing the regularities associated with the properties.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The three ways to divide theories on causation are: between generalist and singularist, between intrinsic and extrinsic characterisations of the causal relationship, and between reductive and non-reductive approaches.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5)
     A reaction: Okay. I vote for singularist, intrinsic and reductive. I'm guessing that that pushes me towards Salmon and Dowe's theory of the 'transfer of conserved quantities', which is certainly reductive, doesn't need regularities in the events, and seems intrinsic.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
     Full Idea: If causation is taken to be an 'intrinsic' relation, then that c causes e will have to depend entirely on the properties of c and e, and the relations between c and e.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.2)
     A reaction: This view would move us towards 'essentialism', that the essences of objects produce the events and the laws, rather than external imposed forces and laws.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The logical empiricists (esp. Hempel) analysed the concept of causation in terms of causal explanation, and analysed the latter as a species of deductive argument, with one premises stating a universal law (the so-called Deductive-Nomological model).
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: This feels wrong, as deduction seems insufficiently naturalistic, and the assumption of a law as premise seems to beg heaps of questions.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
     Full Idea: If counterfactual claims can be made about causation, this suggests that there is more to it than mere regular succession.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §2.2)
     A reaction: Interesting. Even Hume makes counterfactual claims in his first definition of cause, and all claims of causation seem to go beyond the immediate evidence.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
"All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The statement "all gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" seems to have all the features demanded of a lawlike statement, yet it can hardly be said to express a law. It is a merely true universal generalisation.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.3)
     A reaction: Nice example. A trickier case is "all cubes of uranium are smaller than one cubic mile", which sounds like part of a law. It suggests a blurred borderline between the two. How much gold is there in the universe? Is that fact a natural necessity?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos]
     Full Idea: A rather important objection to Humeanism has been that regularity is not sufficient for causation.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: Obviously a crucial problem, but the Humean view can defend itself by introducing other constant conjunctions. We don't observe events in isolation, but as part of a pattern of regularities.
A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The Humean view depends on the conjunction of two general theses: first, causation is tied to regularity; secondly, causal facts supervene on non-causal facts.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4)
     A reaction: If causation is just regularities, this means it is patterns observed by us, which means causation doesn't actually exist. So Hume is wrong. Singular causation is possible, and needs explanation.
The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos]
     Full Idea: A regularity can be used to predict a future event irrespective of whether it is deemed causal or not. A farmer can predict that dawn has broken on hearing the cock's crow.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §8.1)
     A reaction: This seems a highly significant criticism of any view that says regularity leads to causation, which is the basis of induction, which leads to counterfactual claims, and thus arrives a the laws of nature.
It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos]
     Full Idea: It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], Intro)
     A reaction: Good example, but it doesn't demolish the regularity view. We should come to conscious minds last. There aren't many other unfailing regularities that are not laws.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos]
     Full Idea: In the 'web-of-laws' approach, laws are those regularities that are members of a coherent system of regularities, in particular, a system that can be represented as a deductive axiomatic system, striking a good balance between simplicity and strength.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §5.6)
     A reaction: Psillos attribute this view to Mill, Ramsey and Lewis. It is the obvious candidate for a fully developed Humean empiricist system, where regularities reinforce one another. I think laws are found in mechanisms, not in regularities, which are symptoms.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos]
     Full Idea: Many philosophers will find dispositional essentialism unappealing, not least because it seems to fail to explain how (and in virtue of what) there is this supposed fundamental distinction between essential and non-essential properties.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002])
     A reaction: Maybe there is no precise definition, but any idiot can see that some properties of gold are essential (mass) and others non-essential (attractive to jackdaws). It's a fair question, but is this the strongest objection to essentialism?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos]
     Full Idea: In "had the acrobat jumped, there would have been a safety net" the antecedent of the counterfactual (the jumping) is temporally later than the consequent (the installation of the net).
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §3.3)
     A reaction: This blocks anyone (e.g. David Lewis) who tries to define counterfactual claims entirely in terms of a condition followed by a consequence. Nice example.
Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos]
     Full Idea: The counterfactual theory is a non-Humean relation between singular events; the thought is that causation makes a difference - to say that c causes e is to say that if c hadn't occurred, e wouldn't have occurred either.
     From: Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §4.5.4)
     A reaction: Helpful. I'm beginning to think that this theory is wrong. It gives an account of how we see causation, and a test for it, but it says nothing about what causation actually is.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
     Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God)
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
     Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])