Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jacques Lenfant, Theodosius and Paul M. Churchland

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7 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
     Full Idea: The whole question is to know if the force to act in bodies is in matter something distinct and independent of everything else that one conceives there. Without that, this force cannot be its essence, and will remain the result of some primitive quality.
     From: Jacques Lenfant (Letters to Leibniz [1693], 1693.11.07), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 8
     A reaction: This challenge to Leibniz highlights the drama of trying to simultaneously arrive at explanations of things, and to decide the nature of essence. Leibniz replied that force is primitive, because it is the 'principle' of behaviour and dispositions.
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: We can't say the school of Pyrrho is sceptical, because the motion of the mind in each individual is incomprehensible to others, so we don't know Pyrrho's disposition.
     From: report of Theodosius (Chapters on Scepticism [c.100 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.Py.8
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: It may well be that completed neuroscience will not include a reduction of folk psychology, but why should that be a reason to regard it as false? It would only be a reason if irreducibility entailed that they could not possibly both be true.
     From: comment on Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981]) by Robert Kirk - Mind and Body §3.9
     A reaction: If all our behaviour had been explained by a future neuro-science, this might not falsify folk psychology, but it would totally marginalise it. It is still possible that dewdrops are placed on leaves by fairies, but this is no longer a hot theory.
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Eliminative materialism says our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena is a radically false theory, so defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaced (rather than reduced).
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes [1981], Intro)
     A reaction: It is hard to see what you could replace the idea of a 'belief' with in ordinary conversation. We may reduce beliefs to neuronal phenomena, but we can't drop the vocabulary of the macro-phenomena. The physics of weather doesn't eliminate 'storms'.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
If folk psychology gives a network of causal laws, that fits neatly with functionalism [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: The portrait of folk psychology as a network of causal laws dovetailed neatly with the emerging philosophy of mind called functionalism.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], II)
     A reaction: And from the lower levels functionalism is supported by the notion that the brain is modular. Note the word 'laws'; this implies an underlying precision in folk psychology, which is then easily attacked. Maybe the network is too complex for simple laws.
Many mental phenomena are totally unexplained by folk psychology [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology fails utterly to explain a considerable variety of central psychological phenomena: mental illness, sleep, creativity, memory, intelligence differences, and many forms of learning, to cite just a few.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: If folk psychology is a theory, it will have been developed to predict behaviour, rather than as a full-blown psychological map. The odd thing is that some people seem to be very bad at folk psychology.
Folk psychology never makes any progress, and is marginalised by modern science [Churchland,PM]
     Full Idea: Folk psychology has not progressed significantly in the last 2500 years; if anything, it has been steadily in retreat during this period; it does not integrate with modern science, and its emerging wallflower status bodes ill for its future.
     From: Paul M. Churchland (Folk Psychology [1996], III)
     A reaction: [compressed] However, while shares in alchemy and astrology have totally collapsed, folk psychology shows not the slightest sign of going away, and it is unclear how it ever could. See Idea 3177.