42 ideas
| 501 | Reason is a more powerful persuader than gold [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: In power of persuasion, reasoning is far stronger than gold. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B051), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 2.04.12 |
| 9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: It doesn't follow from the fact that a given sentence is being used to implicitly define one of its ingredient terms, that it is not a factual statement. 'This stick is a meter long at t' may define an ingredient terms and express something factual. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: This looks like a rather good point, but it is tied in with a difficulty about definition, which is deciding which sentences are using a term, and which ones are defining it. If I say 'this stick in Paris is a meter long', I'm not defining it. |
| 6345 | Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Boghossian argues that minimalism is incoherent because it says truth both is and is not a property; the essence of minimalism is that, unlike traditional theories, truth is not a property, yet properties are needed to explain the theory. | |
| From: report of Paul Boghossian (The Status of Content [1990]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Post.8 | |
| A reaction: I doubt whether this is really going to work as a demolition, because it seems to me that no philosophers are even remotely clear about what a property is. If properties are defined causally, it is not quite clear how truth would ever be a property. |
| 9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: Conventualism is a factualist view: it presupposes that sentences of logic have truth values. It differs from a realist view in its conception of the source of those truth values, not on their existence. I call the denial of truths Non-Factualism. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: It barely seems to count as truth is we say 'p is true because we say so'. It is a truth about an agreement, not a truth about logic. Driving on the left isn't a truth about which side of the road is best. |
| 9295 | Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties? |
| 9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: Isn't it overwhelmingly obvious that 'Either snow is white or it isn't' was true before anyone stipulated a meaning for it, and that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences? | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
| A reaction: Boghossian would have to believe in propositions (unexpressed truths) to hold this - which he does. I take the notion of truth to only have relevance when there are minds around. Otherwise the so-called 'truths' are just the facts. |
| 9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate a special evidence-gathering faculty of intuition. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
| A reaction: I don't see at all why one has to postulate a 'faculty' in order to talk about intuition. I take an intuition to be an apprehension of a probable truth, combined with an inability to articulate how the conclusion was arrived at. |
| 9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: The analytic theory of the apriority of logic arose indirectly, as a by-product of the attempt to explain in what a grasp of the meaning of the logical constants consists. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: Preumably he is referring to Wittgenstein's anguish over the meaning of the word 'not' in his World War I notebooks. He first defined the constants by truth tables, then asserted that they were purely conventional - so logic is conventional. |
| 9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: If there is no sentence I must hold true if it is to mean what it does, then there is no basis on which to argue that I am entitled to hold it true without evidence. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: He is exploring Quine's view. Truth by convention depends on agreeing which part of the usage of a term constitutes its defining sentence(s), and that may be rather tricky. Boghossian says this slides into the 'dreaded indeterminacy of meaning'. |
| 9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: It is consistent with a belief's being a priori in the strong sense that we should have pragmatic reasons for dropping it from our best overall theory. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], n 6) | |
| A reaction: Does 'dropping it' from the theory mean just ignoring it, or actually denying it? C.I. Lewis is the ancestor of this view. Could it be our 'best' theory, while conflicting with beliefs that were strongly a priori? Pragmatism can embrace falsehoods. |
| 9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: If we learn geometrical truths by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: This refers to the development of non-Euclidean geometries, though the main misleading concerns parallels, which involves infinity. Boghossian cites 'distance' as a concept the Euclideans had misunderstood. Why shouldn't intuitions be wrong? |
| 9293 | Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good. |
| 9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: Conceptual Role Semantics must explain what properties an inference or sentence involving a logical constant must have, if that inference or sentence is to be constitutive of its meaning. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: This is my perennial request that if something is to be defined by its function (or role), we must try to explain what properties it has that make its function possible, and those properties will be the more basic explanation. |
| 9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: 'Conceptual role semantics' says the logical constants mean what they do by virtue of figuring in certain inferences and/or sentences involving them and not others, ..so some inferences and sentences are constitutive of an expression's meaning. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §III) | |
| A reaction: If the meaning of the terms derives from the sentences in which they figure, that seems to be meaning-as-use. The view that it depends on the inferences seems very different, and is a more interesting but more risky claim. |
| 9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: Could there be a fact of the matter about what each expression means, but no fact of the matter about whether they mean the same? | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §II) | |
| A reaction: He is discussing Quine's attack on synonymy, and his scepticism about meaning. Boghossian and I believe in propositions, so we have no trouble with two statements having the same meaning. Denial of propositions breeds trouble. |
| 17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
| Full Idea: Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity (truth purely in virtue of meaning, debunked by Quine, he says) from epistemic analyticity (knowability purely in virtue of understanding - a notion in good standing). | |
| From: report of Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996]) by Carrie Jenkins - Grounding Concepts 2.4 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This fits with Jenkins's claim that we have a priori knowledge just through understanding and relating our concepts. She, however, rejects that idea that a priori is analytic. |
| 9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
| Full Idea: The epistemological notion of analyticity: a statement is 'true by virtue of meaning' provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for justified belief in its truth; the metaphysical reading is that it owes its truth to its meaning, not to facts. | |
| From: Paul Boghossian (Analyticity Reconsidered [1996], §I) | |
| A reaction: Kripke thinks it is neither, but is a purely semantic notion. How could grasp of meaning alone be a good justification if it wasn't meaning which was the sole cause of the statement's truth? I'm not convinced by his distinction. |
| 514 | Beauty is merely animal without intelligence [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Physical beauty is merely animal unless intelligence be present. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B105) |
| 525 | Behave well when alone, and feel shame in you own eyes [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Do not say or do what is base, even when you are alone. Learn to feel shame in your own eyes much more than before others. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B244), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.31.7 | |
| A reaction: I like this. How you think and behave when unobserved is the true test of who you are. Feeling shame at a very private failing is an interesting phenomenon. |
| 502 | Good breeding in men means having a good character [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Good breeding in cattle depends on physical health, but in men on a well-formed character. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B057), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.29.18 | |
| A reaction: In our ultra-democratic age (supposedly) it is heresy to talk about good breeding, or some people being superior to others. But surely people should aim to improve their characters? |
| 507 | Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtuous love consists of decorous desire for the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B073), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.5.23 | |
| A reaction: Is it possible to love something without seeing it as beautiful? A badly crippled dog, for example. If not, that seems to reveal something about beauty. |
| 521 | We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22 | |
| A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me. |
| 505 | Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069) | |
| A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)? |
| 508 | Only accept beneficial pleasures [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Accept no pleasure unless it is beneficial. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B074) | |
| A reaction: Maybe all pleasures bestow some benefit - even if they are linked to harm. I struggle to see what is wrong with a harmless and non-beneficial pleasure, and I doubt if anyone could explain it to me. |
| 520 | The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B194), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.03.46 | |
| A reaction: Only, of course, for those able to perceive the nobility. In what does the 'nobility' consist, other than in the morally acceptable pleasure? Hard to explain 'noble'. Just 'wow!'? |
| 522 | Moderation brings more pleasures, and so increases pleasure [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Moderation multiplies pleasures, and increases pleasure. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B211), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.27 | |
| A reaction: So moderation is a sneaky trick to avoid moderation? I presume the most intense pleasures are mostly unfamiliar, and so add novelty to the mix. Apart from eating chocolate, of course. |
| 506 | Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not an adult [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Immoderate desire is the mark of a child, not a man. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B070) | |
| A reaction: Not factually correct, since the world is full of adults who have immoderate desires (notably for money). However, there are plenty of grown ups who don't seem very adult. |
| 523 | It is as brave to master pleasure as to overcome the enemy [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The brave man is not only he who overcomes the enemy, but he who is stronger than pleasures. Some men are masters of cities, but are enslaved by women. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B214), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.07.25 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if 'bravery' is the relevant virtue here.Sounds like self-control or temperance. I suspect that mastering a city is quite pleasurable, if that's your thing. |
| 503 | Virtue doesn't just avoid evil, but also doesn't desire it [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Virtue consists, not in avoiding wrong-doing, but in having no wish thereto. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B062), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.17.37 |
| 518 | A bad life is just a drawn-out death [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: To live badly is not just to live badly, but to spend a long time dying. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B160), quoted by (who?) - where? |
| 497 | Be virtuous from duty, not from fear [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Refrain from crimes not through fear but through duty [deon]. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B041), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.95 | |
| A reaction: [not sure about the translation here] |
| 499 | Repentance of shameful deeds is salvation [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Repentance for shameful deeds is salvation in life. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B043) |
| 524 | Virtue comes more from practice than from nature [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: More men become good through practice than by nature. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B242), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.29.66 |
| 519 | One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: One must avoid even speaking of evil deeds. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B190), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.01.91 |
| 500 | The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the person wronged [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The wrongdoer is more unfortunate than the man wronged. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B045) |
| 1539 | The endless desire for money is a crueller slavery than poverty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Unless a point of satiety is reached, the desire for money is far more cruel than the utmost poverty, because the greater the desire, the greater the need | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B219), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.10.43 |
| 526 | Small appetite makes poverty equal to wealth [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Small appetite makes poverty equivalent to wealth. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B284), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.33.24 |
| 511 | It is better to have one intelligent friend than many unintelligent [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: The friendship of one intelligent man is better than that of all the unintelligent. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B098) |
| 498 | It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: It is a great thing, when one is in adversity, to think of duty. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B042), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 4.44.68 | |
| A reaction: Something wrong with the translation here, if there is no Greek word for 'duty'. |
| 1541 | It is better to be poor in a democracy than be rich without freedom [Democritus (attr)] |
| Full Idea: Poverty in a democracy is as preferable to what is called prosperity under autocracy as freedom is to slavery. | |
| From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B251), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.40.42 |
| 9292 | The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture. |
| 9294 | No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann] |
| Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another. | |
| From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition. |