Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jeremiah, Iamblichus and Stuart Glennan

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11 ideas

14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan]
     Full Idea: In the empiricist tradition theories were understood to be deductive closures of sets of laws, explanations were understood as arguments from covering laws, and reduction was understood as a deductive relationship between laws of different theories.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: A lovely crisp summary of the whole tradition of philosophy of science from Comte through to Hempel. Mechanism and essentialism are the new players in the game.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan]
     Full Idea: Modern champions of mechanisms say models should identify both the parts and their spatial, temporal and functional organisation, ...and the practical importance of diagrams in addition to or in place of linguistic representations of mechanisms.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'Discover')
     A reaction: Apparently chemists obtain much more refined models by using mathematics than they did by diagrams or 3D models (let alone verbal descriptions). For that reason, I'm thinking that 'model' might be a better term than 'mechanism'.
Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan]
     Full Idea: To a significant degree, a mechanistic philosophy of science can be seen as an alternative to an earlier logical empiricist tradition in philosophy of science that gave pride of place to laws of nature.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: Lovely! Someone who actually spells out what's going on here. Most philosophers are far too coy about explaining what their real game is. Mechanism is fine in chemistry and biology. How about in 'mathematical' physics, or sociology?
Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan]
     Full Idea: There are two sorts of mechanisms: systems consist of collections of parts that interact to produce some behaviour, and processes are sequences of activities which produce some outcome.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: [compressed] The second one is important because it is more generic, and under that account all kinds the features of the world that need to be explained can be subsumed. E.g. hyperinflation in an economy is a 'mechanism'.
17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan]
     Full Idea: 17th century mechanists said that interactions governed by chemical, electrical or gravitational forces would have to be explicable in terms of the operation of some atomistic (or corpuscular) kinetic mechanism.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'Intro')
     A reaction: Glennan says science has rejected this, so modern mechanists do not reduce mechanisms to anything in particular.
Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan]
     Full Idea: One of the advantages of the move from nomological to mechanistic modes of explanation is that the latter allows for explanations involving exception-ridden generalizations.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'regular')
     A reaction: The lawlike approach has endless problems with 'ceteris paribus' ('all things being equal') laws, where specifying all the other 'things' seems a bit tricky.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P]
     Full Idea: Jeremiah was the first to perceive the possibility that powerlessness and goodness were somehow linked; ...he comes close to the notion that the state itself was inherently evil.
     From: report of Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II
     A reaction: This looks like the first seeds of the anarchist idea. You abandon the state for something 'higher'. 'Perceive' rather begs the question of whether he is right. This is the full 'inversion of values' of Nietzsche.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan]
     Full Idea: Causation can be analyzed in terms of mechanisms because (except for fundamental causal interactions) causally related events will be connected by intervening mechanisms.
     From: Stuart Glennan (Mechanisms [2008], 'causation')
     A reaction: This won't give us the metaphysics of causation (which concerns the fundamentals), but this strikes me as a very coherent and interesting proposal. He mentions electron interaction as non-mechanistic causation.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah]
     Full Idea: Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth?
     From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:24), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 03 'Where'
     A reaction: If the Lord is omnipresent, then He must be present in each one of us. But does the Lord interact with each of us?
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Pythagoreans believe it is absurd to seek for goodness anywhere except with the gods [Iamblichus]
     Full Idea: The thinking behind Pythagorean philosophy is that people behave in an absurd fashion if they try to find any source for the good other than the gods.
     From: Iamblichus (Life of Pythagoras [c.290], 137)
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah]
     Full Idea: Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? Do I not fill heaven and earth?
     From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:23), quoted by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 3
     A reaction: I assume this was often quoted by eighteenth century divines, against the rise of deism.