15 ideas
| 18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: Free logics say 1) singular terms are allowed that do not designate anything that exists; sometimes 2) is added: the domain of discourse is allowed to be empty. Logics with both conditions are called 'universally free logics'. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.3) | |
| A reaction: I really like the sound of this, and aim to investigate it. Karel Lambert's writings are the starting point. Maybe the domain of logic is our concepts, rather than things in the world, in which case free logic sounds fine. |
| 18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: Under its now standard principal interpretation, the monadic predicate variables in second-order logic range over subsets of the domain on individuals. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: This is an interpretation in which properties are just sets of things, which is fine if you are a logician, but not if you want to talk about anything important. Still, we must play the game. Boolos introduced plural quantification at this point. |
| 18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: Ontological quantifiers might just as well range over all the entities needed for the semantics. ...The minimal way would be to just stop calling '∃' an 'existential quantifier', and always read it as 'there is...' rather than 'there exists...'. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: There is no right answer here, but it seems to be the strategy adopted by most logicians, and the majority of modern metaphysicians. They just allow abstracta, and even fictions, to 'exist', while not being fussy what it means. Big mistake! |
| 18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: A cursory examination shows that mathematicians have no aversion to saying that this-or-that mathematical entity exists. But is this a different sense of 'existence'? | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: For those of us like me and my pal Quine who say that 'exist' is univocal (i.e. only one meaning), this is a nice challenge. Quine solves it by saying maths concerns sets of objects. I, who don't like sets, am puzzled (so I turn to fictionalism...). |
| 18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: There are sensible ways to maike a distinction between different kinds of being. ..One need not fear that this leads to a 'bloated ontology'. ...We need only distinguish 'ontological commitment' from 'existential commitment' | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.6) | |
| A reaction: He speaks of giving fictional and abstract entities a 'lower score' in existence. I think he means the 'ontological' commitment to be the stronger of the two. |
| 18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: The paradox of negative existentials says that if 's' does not designate something, then the sentence 's is non-existent' is untrue. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: This only seems be a problem for logicians. Everyone else can happily say 'my coffee is non-existent'. |
| 18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: Parmenides was correct - one cannot speak of that which is not, even to say that it is not. But one can speak of concepts and say of them that they do not correspond to anything real. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 2.5) | |
| A reaction: [This summarises Alonso Church, who was developing Frege] This sounds like the right thing to say about non-existence, but then the same principle must apply to assertions of existence, which will also be about concepts and not things. |
| 18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: The medieval philosophers and then Leibniz were keen on finding 'principles of individuation', and the idea appears again in Frege, to be taken up in some respects by Wittgenstein. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: I take a rather empirical approach to this supposed problem, and suggest we break 'individuation' down into its component parts, and then just drop the word. Discussions of principles of individuations strike me as muddled. Wiggins and Lowe today. |
| 18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
| Full Idea: In the Identity of Indiscernibles, one speaks about properties, and the notion of a property is by no means clearly fixed and formalized in modern symbolic logic. | |
| From: C. Anthony Anderson (Identity and Existence in Logic [2014], 1.5) | |
| A reaction: The unclarity of 'property' is a bee in my philosophical bonnet, in speech, and in metaphysics, as well as in logic. It may well be the central problem in our attempts to understand the world in general terms. He cites intensional logic as promising. |
| 7346 | Jeremiah implied a link between weakness and goodness, and the evil of the state [Jeremiah, by Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Jeremiah was the first to perceive the possibility that powerlessness and goodness were somehow linked; ...he comes close to the notion that the state itself was inherently evil. | |
| From: report of Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
| A reaction: This looks like the first seeds of the anarchist idea. You abandon the state for something 'higher'. 'Perceive' rather begs the question of whether he is right. This is the full 'inversion of values' of Nietzsche. |
| 22370 | Big central government only exists as a focus for anger - not to act [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: The specter of big government is there to be blamed precisely for its failure to act as a centralising power, the anger directed at it much like the fury Thomas Hardy supposedly spat at God for not existing. | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 8) | |
| A reaction: The point is that the power resides with the leaders of capitalism, and central government is largely a side-show. Sounds somewhat true, and the politicians are largely unaware of their role. |
| 22368 | It is hard to imagine the end of capitalism [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: It is easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 1) | |
| A reaction: His book addresses the question of whether complacently accepting capitalism is the right attitude. I read it because I am complacently resigned to living with capitalism. If we started again, would capitalism be a rational choice? |
| 22369 | Are students consumers or products of education? [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: Are students the consumers of education, or its product? | |
| From: Mark Fisher (Capitalist Realism [2009], 6) | |
| A reaction: As a teacher I have been increasingly obliged to treat pupils as customers, meaning that my main task is to keep them happy. Admittedly, pupils who are interested are usually happy pupils, but as a main objective happiness seems wrong. |
| 22920 | Do I not fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord [Jeremiah] |
| Full Idea: Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do I not fill heaven and earth? | |
| From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:24), quoted by Robin Le Poidevin - Travels in Four Dimensions 03 'Where' | |
| A reaction: If the Lord is omnipresent, then He must be present in each one of us. But does the Lord interact with each of us? |
| 22089 | Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? [Jeremiah] |
| Full Idea: Am I a God afar off, and not a God close at hand? Do I not fill heaven and earth? | |
| From: Jeremiah (24: Book of Jeremiah [c.570 BCE], 23:23), quoted by Clare Carlisle - Kierkegaard: a guide for the perplexed 3 | |
| A reaction: I assume this was often quoted by eighteenth century divines, against the rise of deism. |