52 ideas
| 22121 | The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was the first scholastic to hold that the concept of being and other transcendentals were univocal, not only in application to substance and accidents, but even to God and creatures. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: So either it exists or it doesn't. No nonsense about 'subsisting'. Russell flirted with subsistence, but Quine agrees with Duns Scotus (and so do I). |
| 22122 | Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus said the primary object of the created intellect was being, rejecting Aquinas's Aristotelian view that it was limited to the quiddity of the sense particular, and Henry of Ghent's Augustinian view that it was God. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.205 | |
| A reaction: I suppose the 'primary object of the intellect' is the rationalist/empiricism disagreement. So (roughly) Aquinas was an empiricist, Duns Scotus was a rationalist, and Augustine was a transcendentalist? Augustine sounds like Spinoza. |
| 16660 | Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau] |
| Full Idea: Later standard theories said that a real distinction obtains between two things that can each exist without the other. For Scotus a real distinction requires only that one of the pair be able to exist without the other. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], V.5-6 n91) by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5 | |
| A reaction: His example is the similarity relation, which is independent of the whiteness on which it is based (since the other thing can become non-white). |
| 16648 | Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: Accidents are principles of acting and principles of cognizing substance, and are the per se objects of the senses. But it is ridiculous to say that something is a principle of acting (either real or intentional) and yet does not have any formal being. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.12.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.5 | |
| A reaction: Pasnau cites this as the key scholastic argument for accidental properties having some independent and real existence (as required for Transubstantiation). Rival views say accidents are just 'modes' of a thing's existence. Aquinas compromised. |
| 22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus was a realist on the issue of universals and one of the main adversaries of Ockham's programme of nominalism. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: The view of Scotus seems to be the minority view. It is hard to find thinkers who really believe that universals have an independent existence. My interest in Duns Scotus waned when I read this. How does he imagine universals? |
| 15386 | If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
| Full Idea: Scotus argued that if everything is singular, with no objective common feature, science would be impossible, as it proceeds from general concepts. General is the opposite of singular, so it would be inadequate to understand a singular reality. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns' | |
| A reaction: [compressed] It is a fact that if you generalise about 'tigers', you are glossing over the individuality of each singular tiger. That is OK for 'electron', if they really are identical, but our general predicates may be imposing identity on electrons. |
| 15387 | If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio] |
| Full Idea: Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns' | |
| A reaction: This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it. |
| 16632 | We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: What is it [that establishes distinctness of things]? It is, to be sure, that which is universally the reason for distinguishing one thing from another: namely, a contradiction…..If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2 | |
| A reaction: This is a remarkably intellectualist view of such things. John Wycliff, apparently, enquired about how animals were going to manage all this sort of thing. It should appeal to the modern logical approach to metaphysics. |
| 22127 | Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Rejecting the standard views that essences are individuated by either actual existence, quantity or matter, Scotus said that the principle of individuation is a further substantial difference added to the species - the so-called haecceitas or 'thisness'. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: [Scotus seldom referred to 'haecceitas'] I suppose essences have prior existence, but are too generic, so something must fix an essence as pertaining to this particular object. Is the haecceitas part of the essence, or of the particular? |
| 13094 | The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
| Full Idea: For Scotus, the haecceity of an individual was a positive non-quidditative entity which, together with a common nature from which it was formally distinct, played the role of the ultimate differentia, thus individuating the substance. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3 | |
| A reaction: Most thinkers seem to agree (with me) that this is a non-starter, an implausible postulate designed to fill a gap in a metaphysic that hasn't been properly worked out. Leibniz is the hero who faces the problem and works around it. |
| 16650 | 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: I believe that 'unity' is one of the more difficult words in philosophy, for there are in things many hidden (occultae) unities that are obscure to us. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Lectura [1298], I.17.2.4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 | |
| A reaction: Some examples would be nice. Do the Earth and the Moon form a unity, because of gravity? How ponders whether whiteness and a white man are unified. |
| 16770 | It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: It seems absurd …that there should be no difference between a whole that is one thing per se, and a whole that is one thing by aggregation, like a cloud or a heap. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], III.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.5 | |
| A reaction: Leibniz invented monads because he was driven crazy by the quest for 'true unity' in things. Objective unity may be bogus, but I suspect that imposing plausible unity on things is the only way we can grasp the world. |
| 16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: Substance ...is an ens per se. No part of a substance is an ens per se when it is part of a substance, because then it would be a particular thing, and one substance would be a particular thing from many things, which does not seem to be true. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (In Praed. [1300], 15.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1 | |
| A reaction: The tricky bit is 'when it is a part of a substance', meaning a substance must cease to be a substance when it is subsumed into some greater substance. Maybe. Drops of water? Molecules? Bricks? Cells? |
| 16626 | Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: No substance is understood in its own right, except in the most universal of concepts, namely of 'being'. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (In Metaphysics [1304], III n. 116), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 07.3 | |
| A reaction: This is a fairly standard scholastic pessimism about knowing anything about substance. The modern view suggests that actually scientists know 'substance' pretty well. |
| 16614 | Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: From matter and form comes one thing per se. This is not so for subject and accident. Matter and form are instrinsic causes of a composite being, but whiteness and a human being are not. Humans can exist without whiteness, so it is one thing per accidens. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Oxford Commentary on Sentences [1301], II.12.1.14), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 | |
| A reaction: This isn't much of a theory, but at least it is focusing on an interesting question, and the distinction between genuinely unified, and unified by chance. Compare a loving couple with siblings who hate each other. |
| 10919 | What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts? | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48) | |
| A reaction: This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer. |
| 22126 | Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus endorsed Avicenna's theory of the common nature, according to which the essences have an independence and priority to their existence as either universal in the mind or singular outside it. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: I occasionally meet this weird idea in modern discussions of essence (in Lowe?), and now see its origin. It makes little sense without a divine mind to support the independent essences. Scotus had to add a principle of individuation for essences. |
| 16768 | Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus] |
| Full Idea: If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being. | |
| From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.3 | |
| A reaction: This is the contrapositive of the indiscernibility of identicals, expressed in terms of what is true about a thing, rather than what properties pertain to it. |
| 2730 | Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Taking the proposition that gold is malleable to be necessary does not commit one to considering it analytic. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.116) |
| 2715 | Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The four basic kinds of belief are rooted in perception, memory, introspective consciousness, and reason. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], Intr.p.7) |
| 2735 | Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Could one have just a single belief? | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.198) |
| 22129 | Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus grounded certitude in the knowledge of self-evident propositions, induction, and awareness of our own state. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Induction looks like the weak link here. |
| 2736 | We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The possibility of making certain of what we already know suggests that knowing a proposition does not entail its being certain. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.220) |
| 22130 | Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus allocated to the intellect a direct, existential awareness of the intelligible object, called 'intuitive cognition', in contrast to abstractive knowledge, which seized the object independently of its presence to the intellect in actual existence. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: Presumably if you see a thing, shut your eyes and then know it, that is 'abstractive'. Scotus says open your eyes for proper knowledge. |
| 2721 | If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If you imagine subtracting a book's sensory properties one by one, what is left of it? | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.42) |
| 2722 | Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Where the sense-datum theory is an indirect realism, phenomenalism is a direct irrealism. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.43) |
| 22128 | Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus rejected Henry of Ghent's defence of Augustine's of knowledge by 'illumination', as leading to nothing but scepticism. ...After this, illumination never made a serious recovery. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 |
| 2728 | The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: I may well need experience to acquire the concepts needed for knowledge of the a priori, such as the concept of a colour. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.103) |
| 2727 | Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The proposition that nothing is red and green all over at once is not analytic, but it is rationally graspable, so it seems to be an a priori synthetic proposition. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.100) |
| 2717 | How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.20) |
| 2716 | To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The propositional belief which portrays what I see in front of me AS a field requires my having a concept of one. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.17) | |
| A reaction: To me this immediately invites the question of what a cow or horse experiences when they look at a familiar field. They know how to leave and enter it, and register its boundaries and qualities. Concepts? |
| 2719 | Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: A sense-datum theory might be called a representative realism because it conceives perception as a relation in which sense-data represent perceived external (hence real) objects to us. For Locke they were resemblances only of primary qualities. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.33) |
| 2720 | Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The sense-datum theory is mainly to explain hallucinations and illusions, though there might be other theories, such as the 'adverbial' theory. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.36) |
| 2718 | Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Simple perceiving gives rise to objectual perceiving (attaching concepts to the object), which gives rise to propositional perceiving. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], I p.23) |
| 2729 | Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Rationalists virtually always assert or imply that, in addition to knowledge of analytic truths, there is knowledge of synthetic a priori truths. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], IV p.105) |
| 2741 | The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: The crucial principles of justification are a priori. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], X p.311) |
| 2725 | To remember something is to know it [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Remembering something is so entails knowing that it is so. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.68) | |
| A reaction: Clearly I can say I "remember" x, but be wrong. Presumably we then say that I didn't really remember, which requires success, like "I know". It is true (as with "know") that as soon as I say that the something is false, I can't claim to remember it. |
| 2724 | I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If I can neither recall nor image Jane I can still remember her, for on seeing her I might recognise her, and might remember, and even recall, our last meeting. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], II p.66) | |
| A reaction: Hm. I can hardly claim to remember her if I have no concept of her, and don't recall our last meeting. If seeing her triggers recognition, I would say that I NOW remember her, but I didn't before. Memory is more conscious than Audi claims. |
| 2731 | Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: There are four possible kinds of epistemic chain: infinite and unanchored, circular and unanchored, anchored in a belief which is not knowledge, and anchored in a belief which is bedrock knowledge. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.183) | |
| A reaction: About right, though I don't think 'chain' is the right word for what is proposed if justification is to be coherent. The justifications float like lilies in the pond of reason, and a Self (Monet?) seems needed to assess the picture |
| 2739 | Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Internalists about justification tend to conceive of it as a matter of having a right to believe something. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.234) | |
| A reaction: I'm an internalist, but I don't understand this, unless it refers to the social aspect of justification. Can I grant myself internal rights? I can justify my belief to other people. |
| 2732 | Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: That 7+5=12 and that carrots are nourishing are mutually consistent, but do not exhibit coherence. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.192) | |
| A reaction: This shows how difficult it would be to define 'coherent'. Is 'carrots are nourishing' coherent with 'fish are nourishing'? Is the battle of Hastings coherent with the battle of Waterloo? |
| 2733 | It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: It is very difficult to specify when an explanatory relation generates enough coherence to create justification. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.193) | |
| A reaction: I take coherence to be the key concept in epistemology, and quite impossible to define. This is why the 'space of reasons' is a useful concept. It is a courtroom, in which each case is different. |
| 2734 | A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: A schizophrenic who thinks he is Napoleon, if he has a completely consistent story with enough interlocking details, may have a belief system that is superbly coherent. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VII p.194) | |
| A reaction: This is an exaggeration, but the fact is that one isolated lie is totally coherent, so coherence can only emerge when a system is large. Sense experience must be central to coherence. |
| 2738 | Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If someone consistently prophesied the winners of horse races, it appears that this man knows who will win the races, but surely he does not have justified beliefs as to who will win? | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.229) | |
| A reaction: This is where internalists and externalists (notably reliabilists) sharply part company. IF a reliable clairvoyant appeared, we would eventually accept them as a knower. But they DON'T appear, because knowledge needs justification! |
| 2740 | A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: If one favours a reliability theory of knowledge (which is externalist) the correspondence theory of truth seems the most appropriate. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.243) | |
| A reaction: Sounds right. Coherence implies some sort of internal assessment, whereas correspondence just needs to plugged into the facts. I like coherence justification and correspondence truth. |
| 2737 | 'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: Reliabilism cannot specify how reliable a process must be before it grounds knowledge, and it cannot specify what is reliable in the first place. 'Reliable' may become circular, and may mean 'justified'. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], VIII p.225) | |
| A reaction: The first time you ever read an instrument, or talk to a stranger, you have no indication of reliability. Circularity looks like a big problem. Knowledge must precede reliability? |
| 2726 | We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: We can have false beliefs, or some degree of ignorance, about our own mental lives. For example, about our own dispositions, such as not believing that we have a certain ignoble desire. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Epistemology: contemporary introduction [1998], III p.83) | |
| A reaction: This idea, that we don't know ourselves, has become a commonplace of recent philosophy, but I am unconvinced. Mostly we know only too well that we harbour a base desire, and we feel a creeping sense of shame. Total ignorance is very rare. |
| 22131 | The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Scotus said the will is a power for opposites, in the sense that even when actually willing one thing, it retains a real, active power to will the opposite. He detaches the idea of freedom from time and variability. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: In the sense that we can abandon an action when in the middle of it, this seems to be correct. Not just 'I could have done otherwise', but 'I don't have to be doing this'. This shows that the will has wide power, but not that it is 'free'. |
| 20064 | Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R] |
| Full Idea: An action for a reason is one that is, in a special way, under the control of reason. It is a response to, not a mere effect of, a reason. | |
| From: Robert Audi (Action, Intention and Reason [1992], p.177), quoted by Rowland Stout - Action 6 'Alien' | |
| A reaction: This modifies Davidson's 'reasons are causes'. Audi has a deviant causal chain which causes trouble for his idea, but Stout says he is right to focus on causal 'processes' (an Aristotelian idea) rather than causal 'chains'. |
| 20930 | The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J] |
| Full Idea: The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard is a different enquiry. | |
| From: John Austin (Lectures on Jurisprudence [1858], p.214), quoted by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Positivism' | |
| A reaction: It is impossible to contest this point, but the issue is whether there is nothing more to law than its written existence. |
| 22123 | The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus establishes God as first efficient cause, as ultimate final cause, and as most eminent being - his so-called 'triple primacy' - and says there is a unique nature within these primacies. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: This is the first stage of Duns Scotus's unusually complex argument for God's existence. Asserting the actual infinity of this unique being concludes his argument. |
| 22124 | We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
| Full Idea: Duns Scotus rejected the traditional argument that the infinity of God can be inferred from creation ex nihilo. | |
| From: report of John Duns Scotus (works [1301]) by Stephen D. Dumont - Duns Scotus p.206 | |
| A reaction: He accepted the infinity of God, however, but not for this reason. I don't know why he rejected it. I suppose the rejected claim is that something has to be infinite, and if it isn't the Cosmos then that leaves God? |