Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Austin, Stephen P. Stich and Jack Joslin

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


4 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Radical pragmatists abandon the notion of truth [Stich, by Lowe]
     Full Idea: Some radical pragmatists, such as Stich, are ready to abandon the notion of truth.
     From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.3 n18
     A reaction: Such a proposal strikes me as silly (unless the vacuum left by truth can be filled by something better than just the test of whether 'it works'). It currently strikes me that pragmatism has a sane wing (led by Peirce), and a mad wing.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Stich accepts eliminativism (labelled 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity [Stich, by Engel]
     Full Idea: Stich accepts a form of eliminativism (which he calls 'pragmatism') about rationality and normativity generally.
     From: report of Stephen P. Stich (The Fragmentation of Reason [1990]) by Pascal Engel - Truth §5.3
     A reaction: This seems to be the correct position for a Humean empiricist connectionist. Presumably he has some good reasons for eliminating rationality.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J]
     Full Idea: The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard is a different enquiry.
     From: John Austin (Lectures on Jurisprudence [1858], p.214), quoted by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Positivism'
     A reaction: It is impossible to contest this point, but the issue is whether there is nothing more to law than its written existence.
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
God can't have silly perfections, but how do we decide which ones are 'silly'? [Joslin]
     Full Idea: It is clear that God cannot have all conceivable perfections, because otherwise he would have absurd perfections (like being the perfect prawn sandwich), so a line must be drawn, and how are we to decide which perfections are appropriate and essential?
     From: Jack Joslin (talk [2006]), quoted by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is an excellent question for curbing the absurdities of those who want to load God with every good thing that can possibly be conceived. Is the God who is also a perfect prawn sandwich more perfect than the one who isn't?