Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Austin, Vincent C. Punzo and Ronald Dworkin

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7 ideas

24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Dworkin believed we should promote equality, to increase autonomy [Dworkin, by Kekes]
     Full Idea: Egalitarians believe that most often it is by promoting equality that autonomy is increased; this is the egalitarianism of such liberals as Ronald Dworkin.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by John Kekes - Against Liberalism 05.1
     A reaction: Not my idea of equality. The whole point is to ascribe reasonable equality to everyone, including those with a limited capacity for autonomy. Equality is a consequence of universal respect.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
We can treat people as equals, or actually treat them equally [Dworkin, by Grayling]
     Full Idea: Dworkin distinguishes between treating people as equals, that is, 'with equal concern and respect', and treating them equally. This latter can be unjust.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977]) by A.C. Grayling - The Good State 2
     A reaction: The big difference I see between them is that the first is mere words, and the second is actions. Cf. 'thoughts and prayers' after US school shootings. How about equal entitlements, all things being equal?
Treating people as equals is the one basic value of all plausible political theories [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: Dworkin suggests that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, which is equality - in the more abstract and fundamental sense of treating people 'as equals'.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (Taking Rights Seriously [1977], 179-83) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn)
     A reaction: I associate this idea with Kant (who says they are equal by virtue of their rationality), so that's a pretty influential idea. I would associate the main challenge to this with Nietzsche.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
The existence of law is one thing, its merits and demerits another [Austin,J]
     Full Idea: The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard is a different enquiry.
     From: John Austin (Lectures on Jurisprudence [1858], p.214), quoted by Jens Zimmermann - Hermeneutics: a very short introduction 6 'Positivism'
     A reaction: It is impossible to contest this point, but the issue is whether there is nothing more to law than its written existence.
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
If we assess what people would buy in an imaginary insurance market, our taxes could copy it [Dworkin, by Kymlicka]
     Full Idea: If we can make sense of a hypothetical insurance market, and find a determinate answer to the question of what insurance people would buy in it, then we could use the tax system to duplicate the results.
     From: report of Ronald Dworkin (A Matter of Principle [1985]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 2.4.b
     A reaction: This is a nice alternative from Dworkin to Rawls's 'veil of ignorance' approach.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Why do sexual relationships need permanence, if other relationships don't? [Punzo]
     Full Idea: What is the reason for demanding permanence in the relationship of sexual partners when we do not see such permanence as being importance to other human relationships?
     From: Vincent C. Punzo (Morality and Human Sexuality [1969], p.220)
     A reaction: The distinction may not be that simple. 'Loyalty' must certainly be mentioned. Friends can legitimately drift apart, but to desert a close friend at a time of great need might be as great a crime as adultery. When is loyalty particularly needed?
Does engaging in sexual intercourse really need no more thought than playing tennis? [Punzo]
     Full Idea: It seems strange for a man and a woman to give no more thought to the question of whether they should engage in sexual intercourse than to the question of whether they shoud play tennis.
     From: Vincent C. Punzo (Morality and Human Sexuality [1969], p.221)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a reasonable point, but times have moved on since 1969, and for plenty of people nowadays playing tennis is a bigger issue than having sex, because of the time, equipment and effort involved.