16 ideas
| 8011 | Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church [Luther, by MacIntyre] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle is a buffoon who has misled the Church. | |
| From: report of Martin Luther (talk [1525]) by Alasdair MacIntyre - A Short History of Ethics Ch.10 | |
| A reaction: Before he became famous, Luther was a university lecturer on Aristotle. This remark was a hundred years before philosophers began serious criticism of Aristotle. Presumably Protestants just stopped reading him. |
| 1403 | A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG] |
| Full Idea: A rational donkey faced with two totally identical piles of hay would be unable to decide which one to eat first, and would therefore starve to death | |
| From: report of Jean Buridan (talk [1338]) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
| A reaction: also De Caelo 295b32 (Idea 19740). |
| 6299 | Axioms are often affirmed simply because they produce results which have been accepted [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: Many axioms have been proposed, not on the grounds that they can be directly known, but rather because they produce a desired body of previously recognised results. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.5.1) | |
| A reaction: This is the perennial problem with axioms - whether we start from them, or whether we deduce them after the event. There is nothing wrong with that, just as we might infer the existence of quarks because of their results. |
| 6304 | Mathematical realism says that maths exists, is largely true, and is independent of proofs [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: Mathematical realism is the doctrine that mathematical objects exist, that much contemporary mathematics is true, and that the existence and truth in question is independent of our constructions, beliefs and proofs. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.12.9) | |
| A reaction: As thus defined, I would call myself a mathematical realist, but everyone must hesitate a little at the word 'exist' and ask, how does it exist? What is it 'made of'? To say that it exists in the way that patterns exist strikes me as very helpful. |
| 6300 | Mathematical constants and quantifiers only exist as locations within structures or patterns [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: In maths the primary subject-matter is not mathematical objects but structures in which they are arranged; our constants and quantifiers denote atoms, structureless points, or positions in structures; they have no identity outside a structure or pattern. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.1) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a very promising idea for the understanding of mathematics. All mathematicians acknowledge that the recognition of patterns is basic to the subject. Even animals recognise patterns. It is natural to invent a language of patterns. |
| 6303 | Sets are positions in patterns [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: On my view, sets are positions in certain patterns. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.5) | |
| A reaction: I have always found the ontology of a 'set' puzzling, because they seem to depend on prior reasons why something is a member of a given set, which cannot always be random. It is hard to explain sets without mentioning properties. |
| 6302 | Structuralism must explain why a triangle is a whole, and not a random set of points [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: An objection is that structuralism fails to explain why certain mathematical patterns are unified wholes while others are not; for instance, some think that an ontological account of mathematics must explain why a triangle is not a 'random' set of points. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.4) | |
| A reaction: This is an indication that we are not just saying that we recognise patterns in nature, but that we also 'see' various underlying characteristics of the patterns. The obvious suggestion is that we see meta-patterns. |
| 6295 | There are too many mathematical objects for them all to be mental or physical [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: If we take mathematics at its word, there are too many mathematical objects for it to be plausible that they are all mental or physical objects. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
| A reaction: No one, of course, has ever claimed that they are, but this is a good starting point for assessing the ontology of mathematics. We are going to need 'rules', which can deduce the multitudinous mathematical objects from a small ontology. |
| 6296 | Maths is pattern recognition and representation, and its truth and proofs are based on these [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: I argue that mathematical knowledge has its roots in pattern recognition and representation, and that manipulating representations of patterns provides the connection between the mathematical proof and mathematical truth. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], One.1) | |
| A reaction: The suggestion that patterns are at the basis of the ontology of mathematics is the most illuminating thought I have encountered in the area. It immediately opens up the possibility of maths being an entirely empirical subject. |
| 6301 | Congruence is the strongest relationship of patterns, equivalence comes next, and mutual occurrence is the weakest [Resnik] |
| Full Idea: Of the equivalence relationships which occur between patterns, congruence is the strongest, equivalence the next, and mutual occurrence the weakest. None of these is identity, which would require the same position. | |
| From: Michael D. Resnik (Maths as a Science of Patterns [1997], Three.10.3) | |
| A reaction: This gives some indication of how an account of mathematics as a science of patterns might be built up. Presumably the recognition of these 'degrees of strength' cannot be straightforward observation, but will need an a priori component? |
| 16678 | Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4 | |
| A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher. |
| 16793 | A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3 | |
| A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals? |
| 16726 | Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: The entire difficulty in this question is why through a knowledge of the primary tangible qualities we cannot come to a knowledge of flavors or odors, since these are their causes, since we often go from knowledge of causes to knowing their effects. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics [1344], I.28c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.2 | |
| A reaction: He is commenting on Idea 16725. Still a nice puzzle in the philosophy of mind. Will neuroscientists ever be able to infer to actual character of some quale, just from the structures of the neurons? |
| 16577 | Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science. |
| 16576 | Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan] |
| Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron. | |
| From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3 | |
| A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11. |
| 6609 | With respect to religion, reason is a blind whore [Luther] |
| Full Idea: With respect to the mysteries of the Christian religion, reason is a blind whore. | |
| From: Martin Luther (talk [1525]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2 | |
| A reaction: Reason is presumably a blind whore with respect to all impenetrable mysteries. Since the reason of Aquinas endorsed the mysteries of Christianity, the remark seems a bit strong, but it is appropriate if you think that only faith (in Christianity) matters. |