Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, PG and David S. Oderberg

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


239 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 3. Greek-English Lexicon
Agathon: good [PG]
     Full Idea: Agathon: good, the highest good
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 01)
Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness [PG]
     Full Idea: Aisthesis: perception, sensation, consciousness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 02)
Aitia / aition: cause, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Aitia / aition: cause, explanation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 03)
     A reaction: The consensus is that 'explanation' is the better translation, and hence that the famous Four Causes (in 'Physics') must really be understood as the Four Modes of Explanation. They then make far more sense.
Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will [PG]
     Full Idea: Akrasia: lack of control, weakness of will
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 04)
     A reaction: The whole Greek debate (and modern debate, I would say) makes much more sense if we stick to 'lack of control' as the translation, and forget about weakness of will - and certainly give up 'incontinence' as a translation.
Aletheia: truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Aletheia: truth
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 05)
Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance [PG]
     Full Idea: Anamnesis: recollection, remembrance
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 06)
     A reaction: This is used for Plato's doctrine that we recollect past lives.
Ananke: necessity [PG]
     Full Idea: Ananke: necessity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 07)
Antikeimenon: object [PG]
     Full Idea: Antikeimenon: object
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 08)
Apatheia: unemotional [PG]
     Full Idea: Apatheia: lack of involvement, unemotional
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 09)
Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite [PG]
     Full Idea: Apeiron: the unlimited, indefinite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 10)
     A reaction: Key term in the philosophy of Anaximander, the one unknowable underlying element.
Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction [PG]
     Full Idea: Aphairesis: taking away, abstraction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 11)
Apodeixis: demonstration [PG]
     Full Idea: Apodeixis: demonstration, proof
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 12)
Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly [PG]
     Full Idea: Aporia: puzzle, question, anomaly
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 13)
Arche: first principle, the basic [PG]
     Full Idea: Arché: first principle, the basic
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 14)
     A reaction: Interchangeable with 'aitia' by Aristotle. The first principle and the cause are almost identical.
Arete: virtue, excellence [PG]
     Full Idea: Areté: virtue, excellence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 15)
     A reaction: The word hovers between moral excellence and being good at what you do. Annas defends the older translation as 'virtue', rather than the modern 'excellence'.
Chronismos: separation [PG]
     Full Idea: Chronismos: separation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 16)
Diairesis: division [PG]
     Full Idea: Diairesis: division, distinction
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 17)
Dialectic: dialectic, discussion [PG]
     Full Idea: Dialectic: dialectic, discussion
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 18)
Dianoia: intellection [cf. Noesis] [PG]
     Full Idea: Dianoia: intellection, understanding [cf. Noesis]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 21)
Diaphora: difference [PG]
     Full Idea: Diaphora: difference
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 22)
Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice [PG]
     Full Idea: Dikaiosune: moral goodness, justice
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 23)
     A reaction: Usually translated as 'justice' in 'Republic', but it is a general term of moral approbation, not like the modern political and legal notion of 'justice'. 'Justice' actually seems to be bad translation.
Doxa: opinion, belief [PG]
     Full Idea: Doxa: opinion, belief, judgement
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 24)
Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity [PG]
     Full Idea: Dunamis: faculty, potentiality, capacity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 25)
Eidos: form, idea [PG]
     Full Idea: Eidos: form, idea
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 26)
     A reaction: In Plato it is the word best translated as 'Form' (Theory of...); in Aritotle's 'Categories' it designates the species, and in 'Metaphysics' it ends up naming the structural form of the species (and hence the essence) [Wedin p.120]
Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation [PG]
     Full Idea: Elenchos: elenchus, interrogation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 27)
Empeiron: experience [PG]
     Full Idea: Empeiron: experience
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 28)
Energeia: employment, actuality, power? [PG]
     Full Idea: Energeia: employment, actuality, power?
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 31)
Enkrateia: control [PG]
     Full Idea: Enkrateia: control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 32)
     A reaction: See 'akrasia', of which this is the opposite. The enkratic person is controlled.
Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end [PG]
     Full Idea: Entelecheia: entelechy, having an end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 33)
Epagoge: induction, explanation [PG]
     Full Idea: Epagoge: induction, explanation, leading on
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 34)
Episteme: knowledge, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Episteme: knowledge, understanding
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 35)
     A reaction: Note that 'episteme' can form a plural in Greek, but we can't say 'knowledges', so we have to say 'branches of knowledge', or 'sciences'.
Epithumia: appetite [PG]
     Full Idea: Epithumia: appetite
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 36)
Ergon: function [PG]
     Full Idea: Ergon: function, work
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 37)
Eristic: polemic, disputation [PG]
     Full Idea: Eristic: polemic, disputation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 38)
     A reaction: This is confrontational argument, rather than the subtle co-operative dialogue of dialectic. British law courts and the House of Commons are founded on eristic, rather than on dialectic. Could there be a dialectical elected assembly?
Eros: love [PG]
     Full Idea: Eros: love, desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 41)
Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment [PG]
     Full Idea: Eudaimonia: flourishing, happiness, fulfilment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 42)
     A reaction: Some people defend 'happiness' as the translation, but that seems to me wildly misleading, since eudaimonia is something like life going well, and certainly isn't a psychological state - and definitely not pleasure.
Genos: type, genus [PG]
     Full Idea: Genos: type, genus, kind
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 43)
Hexis: state, habit [PG]
     Full Idea: Hexis: state, habit
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 44)
Horismos: definition [PG]
     Full Idea: Horismos: definition
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 45)
Hule: matter [PG]
     Full Idea: Hule: matter
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 46)
     A reaction: The first half of the 'hylomorphism' of Aristotle. See 'morphe'!
Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing [cf. Tode ti] [PG]
     Full Idea: Hupokeimenon: subject, underlying thing, substratum [cf. Tode ti]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 47)
     A reaction: Literally 'that which lies under'. Latin version is 'substratum'. In Aristotle it is the problem, of explaining what lies under. It is not the theory that there is some entity called a 'substratum'.
Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility [PG]
     Full Idea: Kalos / kalon: beauty, fineness, nobility
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 48)
     A reaction: A revealing Greek word, which is not only our rather pure notion of 'beauty', but also seems to mean something like wow!, and (very suggestive, this) applies as much to actions as to objects.
Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially [PG]
     Full Idea: Kath' hauto: in virtue of itself, essentially
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 51)
Kinesis: movement, process [PG]
     Full Idea: Kinesis: movement, process, change
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 52)
Kosmos: order, universe [PG]
     Full Idea: Kosmos: order, universe
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 53)
Logos: reason, account, word [PG]
     Full Idea: Logos: reason, account, word
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 54)
Meson: the mean [PG]
     Full Idea: Meson: the mean
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 55)
     A reaction: This is not the 'average', and hence not some theoretical mid-point. I would call it the 'appropriate compromise', remembering that an extreme may be appropriate in certain circumstances.
Metechein: partaking, sharing [PG]
     Full Idea: Metechein: partaking, sharing
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 56)
     A reaction: The key word in Plato for the difficult question of the relationships between the Forms and the particulars. The latter 'partake' of the former. Hm. Compare modern 'instantiation', which strikes me as being equally problematic.
Mimesis: imitation, fine art [PG]
     Full Idea: Mimesis: imitation, fine art
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 57)
Morphe: form [PG]
     Full Idea: Morphe: form
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 58)
Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia] [PG]
     Full Idea: Noesis: intellection, rational thought [cf. Dianoia]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 59)
Nomos: convention, law, custom [PG]
     Full Idea: Nomos: convention, law, custom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 61)
Nous: intuition, intellect, understanding [PG]
     Full Idea: Nous: intuition, intellect
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 62)
     A reaction: There is a condensed discussion of 'nous' in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics B.19
Orexis: desire [PG]
     Full Idea: Orexis: desire
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 63)
Ousia: substance, (primary) being, [see 'Prote ousia'] [PG]
     Full Idea: Ousia: substance, (primary) being [see 'Prote ousia']
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 64)
     A reaction: It is based on the verb 'to be'. Latin therefore translated it as 'essentia' (esse: to be), and we have ended up translating it as 'essence', but this is wrong! 'Being' is the best translation, and 'substance' is OK. It is the problem, not the answer.
Pathos: emotion, affection, property [PG]
     Full Idea: Pathos: emotion, affection, property
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 65)
Phantasia: imagination [PG]
     Full Idea: Phantasia: imagination
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 66)
Philia: friendship [PG]
     Full Idea: Philia: friendship
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 67)
Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Philosophia: philosophy, love of wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 68)
     A reaction: The point of the word is its claim only to love wisdom, and not actually to be wise.
Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Phronesis: prudence, practical reason, common sense
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 71)
     A reaction: None of the experts use my own translation, which is 'common sense', but that seems to me to perfectly fit all of Aristotle's discussions of the word in 'Ethics'. 'Prudence' seems a daft translation in modern English.
Physis: nature [PG]
     Full Idea: Physis: nature
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 72)
Praxis: action, activity [PG]
     Full Idea: Praxis: action, activity
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 73)
Prote ousia: primary being [PG]
     Full Idea: Prote ousia: primary being
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 74)
     A reaction: The main topic of investigation in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'. 'Ousia' is the central problem of the text, NOT the answer to the problem.
Psuche: mind, soul, life [PG]
     Full Idea: Psuche: mind, soul, life
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 75)
     A reaction: The interesting thing about this is that we have tended to translate it as 'soul', but Aristotle says plants have it, and not merely conscious beings. It is something like the 'form' of a living thing, but then 'form' is a misleading translation too.
Sophia: wisdom [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophia: wisdom
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 76)
Sophrosune: moderation, self-control [PG]
     Full Idea: Sophrosune: moderation, self-control
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 77)
Stoicheia: elements [PG]
     Full Idea: Stoicheia: elements
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 78)
Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism [PG]
     Full Idea: Sullogismos: deduction, syllogism
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 81)
Techne: skill, practical knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: Techne: skill, practical knowledge
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 82)
Telos: purpose, end [PG]
     Full Idea: Telos: purpose, end
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 83)
Theoria: contemplation [PG]
     Full Idea: Theoria: contemplation
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 84)
Theos: god [PG]
     Full Idea: Theos: god
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 85)
Ti esti: what-something-is, essence [PG]
     Full Idea: Ti esti: the what-something-is, essence, whatness
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 86)
Timoria: vengeance, punishment [PG]
     Full Idea: Timoria: vengeance, punishment
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 87)
To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti en einai: essence, what-it-is-to-be
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 88)
     A reaction: This is Aristotle's main term for what we would now call the 'essence'. It is still not a theory of essence, merely an identification of the target. 'Form' is the nearest we get to his actual theory.
To ti estin: essence [PG]
     Full Idea: To ti estin: essence
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 91)
Tode ti: this-such, subject of predication [cf. hupokeimenon] [PG]
     Full Idea: Tode ti: this-something, subject of predication, thisness [cf. hupokeimenon]
     From: PG (Db (lexicon) [c.1001 BCE], 92)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / a. Ancient chronology
323 (roughly): Euclid wrote 'Elements', summarising all of geometry [PG]
     Full Idea: Euclid: In around 323 BCE Euclid wrote his 'Elements', summarising all of known geometry.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030])
1000 (roughly): Upanishads written (in Sanskrit); religious and philosophical texts [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1000 BCE the Upanishads were written, the most philosophical of ancient Hindu texts
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0001)
750 (roughly): the Book of Genesis written by Hebrew writers [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 750 BCE the Book of Genesis was written by an anonymous jewish writer
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0250)
586: eclipse of the sun on the coast of modern Turkey was predicted by Thales of Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: In 585 BCE there was an eclipse of the sun, which Thales of Miletus is said to have predicted
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0415)
570: Anaximander flourished in Miletus [PG]
     Full Idea: Anaximander: In around 570 BCE the philosopher and astronomer Anaximander flourished in Miletus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0430)
563: the Buddha born in northern India [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 563 BCE Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha, was born in northern India
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0437)
540: Lao Tzu wrote 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 540 BCE Lao Tzu wrote the 'Tao Te Ching', the basis of Taoism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0460)
529: Pythagoras created his secretive community at Croton in Sicily [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 529 BCE Pythagoras set up a community in Croton, with strict and secret rules and teachings
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0471)
500: Heraclitus flourishes at Ephesus, in modern Turkey [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 500 BCE Heraclitus flourished in the city of Ephesus in Ionia
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0500)
496: Confucius travels widely, persuading rulers to be more moral [PG]
     Full Idea: In 496 BCE Confucius began a period of wandering, to persuade rulers to be more moral
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0504)
472: Empedocles persuades his city (Acragas in Sicily) to become a democracy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 472 BCE Empedocles helped his city of Acragas change to democracy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0528)
450 (roughly): Parmenides and Zeno visit Athens from Italy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 450 BCE Parmenides and Zeno visited the festival in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0550)
445: Protagoras helps write laws for the new colony of Thurii [PG]
     Full Idea: In 443 BCE Protagoras helped write the laws for the new colony of Thurii
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0557)
436 (roughly): Anaxagoras is tried for impiety, and expelled from Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 436 BCE Anaxagoras was tried on a charge of impiety and expelled from Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0564)
427: Gorgias visited Athens as ambassador for Leontini [PG]
     Full Idea: In 427 BCE Gorgias of Leontini visited Athens as an ambassador for his city
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0573)
399: Socrates executed (with Plato absent through ill health) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 399 BCE Plato was unwell, and was not present at the death of Socrates
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0601)
387 (roughly): Plato returned to Athens, and founded the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 387 BCE Plato returned to Athens and founded his new school at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
387 (roughly): Aristippus the Elder founder a hedonist school at Cyrene [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 387 BCE a new school was founded at Cyrene by Aristippus the elder
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0613)
367: the teenaged Aristotle came to study at the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In 367 BCE the seventeen-year-old Aristotle came south to study at the Academy
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0633)
360 (roughly): Diogenes of Sinope lives in a barrel in central Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 360 BCE Diogenes of Sinope was living in a barrel in the Agora in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0640)
347: death of Plato [PG]
     Full Idea: In 347 BCE Plato died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0653)
343: Aristotle becomes tutor to 13 year old Alexander (the Great) [PG]
     Full Idea: In 343 BCE at Stagira Aristotle became personal tutor to the thirteen-year-old Alexander (the Great)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0657)
335: Arisotle founded his school at the Lyceum in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 335 BCE Aristotle founded the Lyceum in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0665)
330 (roughly): Chuang Tzu wrote his Taoist book [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 330 BCE Chuang Tzu wrote a key work in the Taoist tradition
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0670)
322: Aristotle retired to Chalcis, and died there [PG]
     Full Idea: In 322 BCE Aristotle retired to Chalcis in Euboea, where he died
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0678)
307 (roughly): Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 307 BCE Epicurus founded his school at the Garden in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0693)
301 (roughly): Zeno of Citium founded Stoicism at the Stoa Poikile in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 301 BCE the Stoic school was founded by Zeno of Citium in the Stoa Poikile in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0699)
261: Cleanthes replaced Zeno as head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In 261 BCE Cleanthes took over from Zeno as head of the Stoa.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0739)
229 (roughly): Chrysippus replaced Cleanthes has head of the Stoa [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 229 BCE Chrysippus took over from Cleanthes as the head of the Stoic school
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0771)
157 (roughly): Carneades became head of the Academy [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 157 BCE Carneades took over as head of the Academy from Hegesinus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0843)
85: most philosophical activity moves to Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 85 BCE Athens went into philosophical decline, and leadership moved to Alexandria
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0915)
78: Cicero visited the stoic school on Rhodes [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 78 BCE Cicero visited the school of Posidonius in Rhodes.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0922)
60 (roughly): Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on epicureanism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 60 BCE Lucretius wrote his Latin poem on Epicureanism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 0940)
65: Seneca forced to commit suicide by Nero [PG]
     Full Idea: In 65 CE Seneca was forced to commit suicide by the Emperor Nero.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1065)
80: the discourses of the stoic Epictetus are written down [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 80 CE the 'Discourses' of the freed slave Epictetus were written down in Rome.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1080)
170 (roughly): Marcus Aurelius wrote his private stoic meditations [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 170 CE the Emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote his 'Meditations' for private reading.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1170)
-200 (roughly): Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books on scepticism [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 200 CE Sextus Empiricus wrote a series of books (which survive) defending scepticism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1200)
263: Porphyry began to study with Plotinus in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 263 CE Porphyry joined Plotinus' classes in Rome
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1263)
310: Christianity became the official religion of the Roman empire [PG]
     Full Idea: In 310 CE Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1310)
387: Ambrose converts Augustine to Christianity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 387 CE Augustine converted to Christianity in Milan, guided by St Ambrose
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1387)
523: Boethius imprisoned at Pavia, and begins to write [PG]
     Full Idea: In 523 CE Boethius was imprisoned in exile at Pavia, and wrote 'Consolations of Philosophy'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1523)
529: the emperor Justinian closes all the philosophy schools in Athens [PG]
     Full Idea: In 529 CE the Emperor Justinian closed all the philosophy schools in Athens
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1529)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 3. Earlier European Philosophy / a. Earlier European chronology
622 (roughly): Mohammed writes the Koran [PG]
     Full Idea: Mohammed: In about 622 CE Muhammed wrote the basic text of Islam, the Koran.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1622)
642: Arabs close the philosophy schools in Alexandria [PG]
     Full Idea: In 642 CE Alexandria was captured by the Arabs, and the philosophy schools were closed
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1642)
910 (roughly): Al-Farabi wrote Arabic commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfarabi: In around 910 CE Al-Farabi explained and expanded Aristotle for the Islamic world.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 1910)
1015 (roughly): Ibn Sina (Avicenna) writes a book on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1015 Avicenna produced his Platonised version of Aristotle in 'The Healing'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2015)
1090: Anselm publishes his proof of the existence of God [PG]
     Full Idea: Anselm: In about 1090 St Anselm of Canterbury publishes his Ontological Proof of God's existence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2090)
1115: Abelard is the chief logic teacher in Paris [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1115 Abelard became established as the chief logic teacher in Paris
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2115)
1166: Ibn Rushd (Averroes) wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1166 Averroes (Ibn Rushd), in Seville, wrote extensive commentaries on Aristotle
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2166)
1266: Aquinas began writing 'Summa Theologica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1266 Aquinas began writing his great theological work, the 'Summa Theologica'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2266)
1280: after his death, the teaching of Aquinas becomes official Dominican doctrine [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1280 Aquinas's teaching became the official theology of the Dominican order
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2280)
1328: William of Ockham decides the Pope is a heretic, and moves to Munich [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1328 William of Ockham decided the Pope was a heretic, and moved to Munich
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2328)
1347: the Church persecutes philosophical heresies [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1347 the Church began extensive persecution of unorthodox philosophical thought
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2347)
1470: Marsilio Ficino founds a Platonic Academy in Florence [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1470 Marsilio Ficino founded a Platonic Academy in Florence
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2470)
1513: Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1513 Machiavelli wrote 'The Prince', a tough view of political theory.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2513)
1543: Copernicus publishes his heliocentric view of the solar system [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1543 Nicholas Copernicus, a Polish monk, publishes his new theory of the solar system.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2543)
1580: Montaigne publishes his essays [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1580 Montaigne published a volume of his 'Essays'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2580)
1600: Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in Rome [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1600 Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome, largely for endorsing Copernicus
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2600)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / a. Later European chronology
1619: Descartes's famous day of meditation inside a stove [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1619 Descartes had a famous day of meditation in a heated stove at Ulm
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2619)
1620: Bacon publishes 'Novum Organum' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francis Bacon: In 1620 Bacon published his 'Novum Organon', urging the rise of experimental science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2620)
1633: Galileo convicted of heresy by the Inquisition [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1633 Galileo was condemned to life emprisonment for contradicting church teachings.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2633)
1641: Descartes publishes his 'Meditations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1641 Descartes published his well-known 'Meditations', complete with Objections and Replies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2641)
1650: death of Descartes, in Stockholm [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1650 Descartes died in Stockholm, after stressful work for Queen Christina
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2650)
1651: Hobbes publishes 'Leviathan' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1651 Hobbes published his great work on politics and contract morality, 'Leviathan'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2651)
1662: the Port Royal Logic is published [PG]
     Full Idea: Antoine Arnauld: In 1662 Arnauld and Nicole published their famous text, the 'Port-Royal Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2662)
1665: Spinoza writes his 'Ethics' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1665 the first draft of Spinoza's 'Ethics', his major work, was finished, and published posthumously
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2665)
1676: Leibniz settled as librarian to the Duke of Brunswick [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1676 Leibniz became librarian to the Duke of Brunswick, staying for the rest of his life
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2676)
1687: Newton publishes his 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1687 Newton published his 'Principia', containing his theory of gravity.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2687)
1690: Locke publishes his 'Essay' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1690 Locke published his 'Essay', his major work on empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2690)
1697: Bayle publishes his 'Dictionary' [PG]
     Full Idea: Pierre Bayle: In about 1697 Pierre Bayle published his 'Historical and Critical Dictionary'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2697)
1713: Berkeley publishes his 'Three Dialogues' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1713 Berkeley published a popular account of his empiricist idealism in 'Three Dialogues'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2713)
1734: Voltaire publishes his 'Philosophical Letters' [PG]
     Full Idea: Francois-Marie Voltaire: In 1734 Voltaire's 'Lettres Philosophiques' praised liberalism and empiricism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2734)
1739: Hume publishes his 'Treatise' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1739 Hume returned to Edinburgh and published his 'Treatise', but it sold very few copies
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2739)
1762: Rousseau publishes his 'Social Contract' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1762 Rousseau published his 'Social Contract', basing politics on the popular will
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2762)
1781: Kant publishes his 'Critique of Pure Reason' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1781 Kant published his first great work, the 'Critique of Pure Reason'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2781)
1785: Reid publishes his essays defending common sense [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1785 Thomas Reid, based in Glasgow, published essays defending common sense.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2785)
1798: the French Revolution [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1789 the French Revolution gave strong impetus to the anti-rational 'Romantic' movement
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2789)
1807: Hegel publishes his 'Phenomenology of Spirit' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1807 Hegel published his first major work, the 'Phenomenology of Spirit'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2807)
1818: Schopenhauer publishes his 'World as Will and Idea' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1818 Schopenhauer published 'The World as Will and Idea', his major work
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2818)
1840: Kierkegaard is writing extensively in Copenhagen [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1840 Kierkegaard lived a quiet life as a writer in Copenhagen
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2840)
1843: Mill publishes his 'System of Logic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1843 Mill published his 'System of Logic'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2843)
1848: Marx and Engels publis the Communist Manifesto [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1848 Marx and Engels published their 'Communist Manifesto'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2848)
1859: Darwin publishes his 'Origin of the Species' [PG]
     Full Idea: Charles Darwin: In 1859 Charles Darwin published his theory of natural selection in 'Origin of the Species'.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2859)
1861: Mill publishes 'Utilitarianism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1861 Mill published his book 'Utilitarianism'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2861)
1867: Marx begins publishing 'Das Kapital' [PG]
     Full Idea: Karl Marx: In 1867 Karl Marx began publishing his political work 'Das Kapital'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2867)
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / a. Modern philosophy chronology
1879: Peirce taught for five years at Johns Hopkins University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Peirce began five years of teaching at Johns Hopkins University
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1879: Frege invents predicate logic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1879 Frege published his 'Concept Script', which created predicate logic
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2879)
1892: Frege's essay 'Sense and Reference' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1892 Frege published his famous essay 'Sense and Reference' (Sinn und Bedeutung)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2882)
1884: Frege publishes his 'Foundations of Arithmetic' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1884 Frege published his 'Foundations of Arithmetic', the beginning of logicism
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2884)
1885: Nietzsche completed 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' [PG]
     Full Idea: In about 1885 Nietzsche completed his book 'Also Sprach Zarathustra'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2885)
1888: Dedekind publishes axioms for arithmetic [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1888 Dedekind created simple axioms for arithmetic (the Peano Axioms)
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2888)
1890: James published 'Principles of Psychology' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1890 James published his 'Principles of Psychology'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2890)
1895 (roughly): Freud developed theories of the unconscious [PG]
     Full Idea: In around 1895 Sigmund Freud developed his theories of the unconscious mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2895)
1900: Husserl began developing Phenomenology [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1900 Edmund Husserl began presenting his new philosophy of Phenomenology
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2900)
1903: Moore published 'Principia Ethica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1903 G.E. Moore published his 'Principia Ethica', attacking naturalistic ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2903)
1904: Dewey became professor at Columbia University [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2904)
1908: Zermelo publishes axioms for set theory [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1908 Zermelo published an axiomatisation of the new set theory
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2908)
1910: Russell and Whitehead begin publishing 'Principia Mathematica' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1910 Russell began publication of 'Principia Mathematica', with Whitehead
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2910)
1912: Russell meets Wittgenstein in Cambridge [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1912 Russell met Wittgenstein at Cambridge
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2912)
1921: Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1921 Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2921)
1927: Heidegger's 'Being and Time' published [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1927 Heidegger's major work, 'Being and Time', was published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2927)
1930: Frank Ramsey dies at 27 [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1930 Frank Ramsey died at the age of 27.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2930)
1931: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems [PG]
     Full Idea: Kurt Gödel: In 1931 the mathematician Kurt Gödel publishes his Incompleteness Theorems.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2931)
1933: Tarski's theory of truth [PG]
     Full Idea: Alfred Tarski: In 1933 Alfred Tarski wrote a famous paper presenting a semantic theory of truth.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2933)
1942: Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1942 Camus published 'The Myth of Sisyphus', exploring suicide and the absurd
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2942)
1943: Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1943 Jean-Paul Sartre published his major work, 'Being and Nothingness'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2943)
1945: Merleau-Ponty's 'Phenomenology of Perception' [PG]
     Full Idea: Maurice Merleau-Ponty: In 1945 Maurice Merleau-Pont published 'The Phenomenology of Perception'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2945)
1947: Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1947 Carnap published 'Meaning and Necessity'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2947)
1950: Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1950 Willard Quine published 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', attacking analytic truth
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2950)
1953: Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1953 Wittgenstein's posthumous work 'Philosophical Investigations' is published
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2953)
1956: Place proposed mind-brain identity [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1956 U.T. Place proposed that the mind is identical to the brain
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2956)
1962: Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1962 Thomas Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' questioned the authority of science
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2962)
1967: Putnam proposed functionalism of the mind [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1967 Putname proposed the functionalist view of the mind
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2967)
1971: Rawls's 'A Theory of Justice' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1971 John Rawls published his famous defence of liberalism in 'A Theory of Justice'
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2971)
1972: Kripke publishes 'Naming and Necessity' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1972 Saul Kripke's 'Naming and Necessity' revised theories about language and reality
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2972)
1975: Singer publishes 'Animal Rights' [PG]
     Full Idea: Peter Singer: In 1975 Peter Singer's 'Animal Rights' turned the attention of philosophers to applied ethics.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1975: Putnam published his Twin Earth example [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1975 Putnam published 'The Meaning of 'Meaning'', containing his Twin Earth example
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2975)
1986: David Lewis publishes 'On the Plurality of Worlds' [PG]
     Full Idea: In 1986 David Lewis published 'On the Plurality of Worlds', about possible worlds.
     From: PG (Db (chronology) [2030], 2986)
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Note that "is" can assert existence, or predication, or identity, or classification [PG]
     Full Idea: There are four uses of the word "is" in English: as existence ('he is at home'), as predication ('he is tall'), as identity ('he is the man I saw'), and as classification ('he is British').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: This seems a nice instance of the sort of point made by analytical philosophy, which can lead to horrible confusion in other breeds of philosophy when it is overlooked.
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
     Full Idea: A rational donkey faced with two totally identical piles of hay would be unable to decide which one to eat first, and would therefore starve to death
     From: report of Jean Buridan (talk [1338]) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: also De Caelo 295b32 (Idea 19740).
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The standard classification holds that 'animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.5)
     A reaction: My understanding of 'difference' would take it down to the level of the individual, so the question is - which did Aristotle believe in. Not all commentators agree with Oderberg, and Wedin thinks the individual substance is paramount.
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: To define something just means to set forth its limits in such a way that one can distinguish it from all other things of a different kind. To distinguish it from all other things of the same kind belongs to the theory of 'individuation'.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: I take Aristotle to have included individuation as part of his understanding of definition. Are tigers a kind, or are fierce tigers a kind, and is my tiger one-of-a-kind?
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
Fallacies are errors in reasoning, 'formal' if a clear rule is breached, and 'informal' if more general [PG]
     Full Idea: Fallacies are errors in reasoning, labelled as 'formal' if a clear rule has been breached, and 'informal' if some less precise error has been made.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Presumably there can be a grey area between the two.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Question-begging assumes the proposition which is being challenged [PG]
     Full Idea: To beg the question is to take for granted in your argument that very proposition which is being challenged
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: An undoubted fallacy, and a simple failure to engage in the rational enterprise. I suppose one might give a reason for something, under the mistaken apprehension that it didn't beg the question; analysis of logical form is then needed.
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 6. Fallacy of Division
What is true of a set is also true of its members [PG]
     Full Idea: The fallacy of division is the claim that what is true of a set must therefore be true of its members.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Clearly a fallacy, but if you only accept sets which are rational, then there is always a reason why a particular is a member of a set, and you can infer facts about particulars from the nature of the set
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
The Ad Hominem Fallacy criticises the speaker rather than the argument [PG]
     Full Idea: The Ad Hominem Fallacy is to criticise the person proposing an argument rather than the argument itself, as when you say "You would say that", or "Your behaviour contradicts what you just said".
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Nietzsche is very keen on ad hominem arguments, and cheerfully insults great philosophers, but then he doesn't believe there is such a thing as 'pure argument', and he is a relativist.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimal theories of truth avoid ontological commitment to such things as 'facts' or 'reality' [PG]
     Full Idea: Minimalist theories of truth are those which involve minimum ontological commitment, avoiding references to 'reality' or 'facts' or 'what works', preferring to refer to formal relationships within language.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: Personally I am suspicious of minimal theories, which seem to be designed by and for anti-realists. They seem too focused on language, when animals can obviously formulate correct propositions. I'm quite happy with the 'facts', even if that is vague.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Monty Hall Dilemma: do you abandon your preference after Monty eliminates one of the rivals? [PG]
     Full Idea: The Monty Hall Dilemma: Three boxes, one with a big prize; pick one to open. Monty Hall then opens one of the other two, which is empty. You may, if you wish, switch from your box to the other unopened box. Should you?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: The other two boxes, as a pair, are more likely contain the prize than your box. Monty Hall has eliminated one of them for you, so you should choose the other one. Your intuition that the two remaining boxes are equal is incorrect!
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian account of numbers is that their existence depends on the existence of things that are not numbers, ..since numbers are abstractions from the existence of things.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.2)
     A reaction: This is the deeply unfashionable view to which I am attached. The problem is the status of transfinite, complex etc numbers. They look like fictions to me.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Being is heterogeneous: there is substantial being, accidental being, complete being, incomplete being, necessary being, contingent being, possible being, absolute being, relative being, intrinsic being, extrinsic being, and so on.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 5.3)
     A reaction: Dependent being? Oderberg is giving the modern scholastic view. Personally I take 'being' to be univocal, even if it can be qualified in all sorts of ways. I don't believe we actually have any grasp at all of different ways to exist.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.5)
     A reaction: I take this to be a conclusive objection to claims for any such thing to be abstract. See, for example, Dummett's claim that the Equator is an abstract object.
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: We need a theory of essence to help us distinguish between the powers that do and do not belong to the essence of a thing.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)
     A reaction: I take this to be a very good reason for searching for the essence of things, though the need to distinguish does not guarantee that there really is something to distinguish. Maybe powers just come and go. A power is essential in you but not in me?
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The demise of 'substance' was wholly due to mistaken notions, mainly from the empiricists, by which it was conceived either as an unknowable featureless substratum, or as dispensable in favour of some or other bundle theory.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.4)
     A reaction: There seems to be a view that the notion of substance is essential to explaining how we understand the world. I am inclined to think that if we accept the notion of essence we can totally dispense with the notion of substance.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
     Full Idea: If magnitude were removed from matter by divine power, it would still have parts distinct from one another, but they would not be positioned either outside one another or inside one another, because position would be removed.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.8 f. 11va), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 14.4
     A reaction: This shows why Quantity is such an important category for scholastic philosopher.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
     Full Idea: Real essences are objectively real, they concern being, they are knowable, they are definable, and they are classifiable.
     From: report of David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4) by PG - Db (ideas)
     A reaction: This is a lovely summary (spread over two pages) of what essentialism is all about. It might be added that they are about unity and identity. The fact that they are intrinsically classifiable seems to mislead some people into a confused view.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Nominalism is consistent with belief in individual essences, but real essentialism postulates essences as universals (quiddities). Nominalists are nearly always empiricists, though the converse may not be the case.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: This is where I part company with Oderberg. I want to argue that the nominalist/individualist view is more in tune with what Aristotle believed (though he spotted a dilemma here). Only individual essences explain individual behaviour.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Real essentialism, more than any other ontological theory, stresses and seeks to explain the unity of objects.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3)
     A reaction: A key piece in the jigsaw I am beginning to assemble. If explanation is the aim, and essence the key to explanation, then explaining unity is the part of it that connects with other metaphysics, about identity and so on. 'Units' breed numbers.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Essence is not reducible to explanatory relations, ...and fundamentally the role of essence is not explanatory but constitutive.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Effectively, this asserts essence as part of 'pure' metaphysics, but I like impure metaphysics, as the best explanation of the things we can know. Hence we can speculate about constitution only by means of explanation. Constitution is active.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: A substance is constituted by its essence, and properties are a species of accident. No property of a thing is part of a thing's essence, though properties flow from the essence.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 7.2)
     A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this. How can you know of something which has no properties? I'm wondering if the whole notion of a 'property' should be eliminated from good metaphysics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Why not do away with talk of essences and replace it with talk of powers pure and simple, or reduce essences to collections of powers? But then what unites the powers, and could a power be lost, and is there entailment between the powers?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 6.3)
     A reaction: [He cites Bennett and Hacker 2003 for this view] The point would seem to be that in addition to the powers, there are also identity and unity and kind-membership to be explained. Oderberg says the powers flow from the essence.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Less properly, one thing is said to be numerically the same as another according to the continuity of distinct parts, one in succession after another. In this way the Seine is said to be the same river after a thousand years.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.10, f. 13vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 29.3
     A reaction: This is a rather good solution to the difficulty of the looser non-transitive notion of a thing being 'the same'. The Ship of Theseus endures (in the simple case) as long as you remember to replace each departing plank. Must some parts be originals?
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: That is, if two things must have identical properties because they are the same thing, this is because those properties are essential to the thing. Otherwise two things could be the same, even though one of them lacked a non-identifying property.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The fundamental thesis of real essentialism is that every finite material body has a twofold composition, being a compound of act and potency. ...Reality can take on new kinds of existence because there is a principle of potentiality inherent in reality.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 4.1)
     A reaction: I take from this remark that the 'powers' discussed by Molnar and other scientific essentialists is roughly the same as 'potentiality' identified by Aristotle.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Everything has a probability, something will happen, and probabilities add up [PG]
     Full Idea: The three Kolgorov axioms of probability: the probability of an event is a non-negative real number; it is certain that one of the 'elementary events' will occur; and the unity of probabilities is the sum of probability of parts ('additivity').
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: [My attempt to verbalise them; they are normally expressed in terms of set theory]. Got this from a talk handout, and Wikipedia.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Any realist theory of possible worlds will be circular in its attempt to illuminate modality, for there has to be some criterion of what counts as a possible world.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: Seems right. At the very least, if we are going to rule out contradictory worlds as impossible (and is there a more obvious criterion?), we already need to understand 'impossible' in order to state that rule.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The necessity of identity carries the appearance of triviality, because it is the eviscerated contemporary essentialist form of a foundational real essentialist truth to the effect that every object has its own nature.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: I like this. Writers like Mackie and Forbes have to put the 'trivial' aspects of essence to one side, without ever seeing why there is such a problem. Real substantial essences have necessity of identity as a side-effect.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The rigid designator approach to essentialism has essentialist assumptions. ..The necessity of identity is built into the very conception of a rigid designator,..and Leibniz's Law is presupposed...and necessity of origin presupposes sufficiency of origin.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.1)
     A reaction: [compressed. He cites Salmon 1981:196 for the last point] This sounds right. You feel happy to 'rigidly designate' something precisely because you think there is something definite and stable which can be designated.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
If reality is just what we perceive, we would have no need for a sixth sense [PG]
     Full Idea: Reality must be more than merely what we perceive, because a sixth sense would enhance our current knowledge, and a seventh, and so on.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If my team is losing 3-1, I have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals for a draw [PG]
     Full Idea: If my football team is losing 3-1, I seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge that they need two goals to achieve a draw
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
     Full Idea: The entire difficulty in this question is why through a knowledge of the primary tangible qualities we cannot come to a knowledge of flavors or odors, since these are their causes, since we often go from knowledge of causes to knowing their effects.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics [1344], I.28c), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 22.2
     A reaction: He is commenting on Idea 16725. Still a nice puzzle in the philosophy of mind. Will neuroscientists ever be able to infer to actual character of some quale, just from the structures of the neurons?
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Inductions are not demonstrations, because they do not conclude on account of their form, since it is not possible to make an induction from all cases.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
     A reaction: Thus showing that demonstration really is meant to be as conclusive as a mathematical proof, and that Aristotle seems to think such a thing is possible in physical science.
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
     Full Idea: Induction should be regarded as a principle of natural science. For otherwise you could not prove that every fire is hot, that all rhubarb is purgative of bile, that every magnet attracts iron.
     From: Jean Buridan (Questions on Aristotle's Physics [1346], I.15 f. 18vb), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 02.3
     A reaction: He is basing this on Aristotle, and refers to 'Physics' 190a33-b11.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might say that a molluscs's brain events that register pain ARE of the same type as humans, given that being 'of the same type' is a fairly flexible concept.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: But this reduces 'of the same type' to such vagueness that it may become vacuous. You would be left with token-token identity, where the mental event is just identical to some brain event, with its 'type' being irrelevant.
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]
     Full Idea: To defend type-type identity against the multiple realisability objection, we might (also) say that while a frog's brain events for fear are functionally identical to a human's (it runs away), that doesn't mean they are phenomenally identical.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: I take this to be the key reply to the multiple realisability problem. If a frog flees from a loud noise, it is 'frightened' in a functional sense, but that still leaves the question 'What's it like to be a frightened frog?', which may differ from humans.
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
Utilitarianism seems to justify the discreet murder of unhappy people [PG]
     Full Idea: If I discreetly murdered a gloomy and solitary tramp who was upsetting people in my village, if is hard to see how utilitarianism could demonstrate that I had done something wrong.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: In the traditional terminology, function follows essence. Essence just is the principle from which flows the characteristic behaviour of a thing.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 2.1)
     A reaction: Hence essence must be identified if the behaviour is to be explained, and a successful identification of essence is the terminus of our explanations. But the essences must go down to the micro-level. Explain non-characteristic behaviour?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: Even if there were no multiplicity in unity - only a Parmenidean 'block' - still the question would arise as to what gave the amorphous lump its unity; by virtue of what would it be one rather than many?
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 3.1)
     A reaction: Which is prior, division or unification? If it was divided, he would ask what divided it. One of them must be primitive, so why not unity? If one big Unity is primitive, why could not lots of unities be primitive? Etc.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: It is incorrect to hold that the job of the real essentialist just is the job of the scientist.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.3)
     A reaction: Presumably scientific essentialism, while being firmly a branch of metaphysics, is meant to clarify the activities of science, and thereby be of some practical use. You can't beat knowing what it is you are trying to do.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
     Full Idea: The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken.
     From: David S. Oderberg (Real Essentialism [2007], 1.4)
     A reaction: Oderberg's point is that essence doesn't just occur at the bottom of the hierarchy of kinds, but can exist on a macro-level, and need not be a concealed structure, as we see in the essence of a pile of stones.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 2. Life
Life is Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth (MRS NERG) [PG]
     Full Idea: The biologists' acronym for the necessary conditions of life is MRS NERG: that is, Movement, Respiration, Sensation, Nutrition, Excretion, Reproduction, Growth.
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
     A reaction: How strictly necessary are each of these is a point for discussion. A notorious problem case is fire, which (at a stretch) may pass all seven tests.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
An omniscient being couldn't know it was omniscient, as that requires information from beyond its scope of knowledge [PG]
     Full Idea: God seems to be in the paradoxical situation that He may be omniscient, but can never know that He is, because that involves knowing that there is nothing outside his scope of knowledge (e.g. another God)
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])
How could God know there wasn't an unknown force controlling his 'free' will? [PG]
     Full Idea: How could God be certain that he has free will (if He has), if He couldn't be sure that there wasn't an unknown force controlling his will?
     From: PG (Db (ideas) [2031])