35 ideas
| 17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Classification pervades any descriptive use of language whatever. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: This is because, as Aristotle well knew, language consists almost entirely of universals (apart from the proper names). Language just is classification. |
| 17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The most important desideratum of a classificatory scheme is that assigning an object to a particular classification tell us as much as possible about that object. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], Ch 1) | |
| A reaction: We should probably say that the aim is a successful explanation, rather than a heap of information. If we are totally baffled by a particular type of object, it is presumably important to group the instances together, to focus the bafflement. |
| 17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The importance of natural kinds for explanation does not depend on a doctrine of essences. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 3) | |
| A reaction: He suggest as the alternative that laws do the explaining, employing natural kinds. He allows that individual essences might be explanatory. |
| 17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Contradicting one of the main points of essentialism, there is no reason in principle why a species should not survive the demise of its current genetic mechanisms (some other species coherence gradually taking over). | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: I would say that this meant that the species had a new essence, because I don't take what is essential to be the same as what is necessary. The new genetics would replace the old as the basic explanation of the species. |
| 17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: It is widely agreed among biologists that no essential property can be found to demarcate species, so that if an essential property is necessary for a natural kind, species are not natural kinds. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: This uses 'essential' to mean 'necessary', but I would use 'essential' to mean 'deeply explanatory'. Biological species are, nevertheless, dubious members of an ontological system. Vegetables are the problem. |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: Where the idealist says that to be (i.e. to exist) is to be perceived, the phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This is a nice phenomenalist slogan to add to Mill's well known one (Idea 3583). Expressed in this form, it looks false to me. What about neutrinoes? They weren't at all perceivable until recently. Maybe some physical stuff can never be perceived. |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: Linguistic phenomenalism argues that it is possible to remove all talk of physical objects from our speech with no loss of meaning. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I find this proposal unappealing. My basic objection is that I cannot understand why anyone would refuse to even contemplate the question of WHY I am having a given group of consistent experiences, of (say) a table kind. |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: The problem with taking sense-data as basic is that some data can appear indeterminate. If we can't discern the colour of someone's eyes, or the number of sides of a complex figure, are we to say that there is no fact about those things? | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: I like that. How many electrons are there in the sun? Such things cannot just be reduced to talk of sense-data, as there is obviously a vast gap between the data and the facts. As usual, ontology and epistemology must be kept separate. |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: All the primary qualities lend themselves readily to mathematical or geometric description. ...but it seems that secondary qualities are less amenable to being represented mathematically. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: As a believer in the primary/secondary distinction, I welcome this point. This is either evidence for the external reality of primary qualities, or an interesting observation about maths. Do we make the primary/secondary distinction because we do maths? |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: An object cannot lack shape, size, position or motion and remain an object. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.4) | |
| A reaction: This points towards the essentialist view (see Idea 5453). This does raise the question of whether an object could lose its colour with impugnity, or the quality of sound that it makes when struck. |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| Full Idea: My beliefs could be well justified in coherentist terms, while not accurately representing the world, and my system of beliefs could be completely free-floating. | |
| From: Cardinal/Hayward/Jones (Epistemology [2004], Ch.3) | |
| A reaction: This nicely encapsulates to correspondence objection to coherence theory. One thing missing from the coherence account is that beliefs aren't chosen for their coherence, but are mostly unthinkingly triggered by experiences. |
| 17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Determinism is the metaphysical underlay of the possibility of prediction. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Not convinced. There might be micro-indeterminacies which iron out into macro-regularities. |
| 17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: It is surely the absence of experiences like the one Putnam describes that makes it reasonable to attach to molecular structure at least most of the importance that Putnam ascribes to it. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: That is, whenever we experience water-like stuff, it always turns out to have the same molecular structure. Twin Earth is a nice thought experiment, except that XZY is virtually inconceivable. |
| 7352 | Jesus said learning was unnecessary, and only the spirit of the Law was needed [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Jesus was a learned Jew who said that learning was not necessary, who took the spirit and not the letter as the essence of the Law. | |
| From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
| A reaction: This seems to me the perfect opposite of Socrates's intellectualism, offering the essence of morality as 'purity of heart', rather than careful thought about virtue or principles. On the whole I am with Socrates, but the idea is interesting. |
| 6289 | Love your enemies [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Love your enemies. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.44 | |
| A reaction: The germ of this idea had been around for several hundred years, but this very forceful statement is perhaps Jesus' most distinctive contribution to moral thought. It has the same clarion call as the Stoic demand for pure virtue. What about deserving? |
| 6292 | Love thy neighbour as thyself [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Love thy neighbour as thyself. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.19 | |
| A reaction: It would be stronger and better to say 'Love your neighbour, even if you don't love yourself'. Self-loathing and vicious hatred often go together. For once Jesus does not attach an instant heavenly reward to obedience of the command. |
| 5356 | Treat others as you would have them treat you [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, so ye even so to them: for this is the law and the prophets. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 07.12 | |
| A reaction: A problem which probably didn't occur to Jesus and the prophets is that of masochists. Personally I like buying philosophy books, but most people have no such desire. The Rule needs restricting to the basics of pleasure and pain. |
| 6286 | Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.07 | |
| A reaction: This appears to be a straightforward application of social contract morality, with God playing the role of Hobbes' absolute monarch. It highlights the uncomfortable fact at the heart of Christian morality, that the motivation for altruism is selfish. |
| 6290 | Except ye become as little children, ye shall not enter heaven [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 18.03 | |
| A reaction: The appeal of such purity of heart is undeniable, but essentially I dislike this remark. It is the opponent of education, reason, autonomy, responsibility, democracy and maturity. It confirms the view that religion is the opium of the people. |
| 6287 | If you lust after a woman, you have committed adultery [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Whosoever look on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.28 | |
| A reaction: Compare Democritus, Idea 503. Literally this idea seems absurd, but it is also at the heart of Greek virtue theory. Aristotle (Idea 34) defines virtue as an activity 'of the soul', not an action in the world. Excellence has become purity of soul. |
| 6285 | Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.05 | |
| A reaction: If they are truly meek, why would they want to inherit the earth? This is the classic statement of Nietzsche's 'inversion of values', where the qualities of a good slave are elevated above those of the greatest human beings. |
| 6288 | Don't resist evil, but turn the other cheek [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Ye have heard it said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth; But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil, but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 05.38-9 | |
| A reaction: Compare Socrates, Idea 346. The viciousness of many Hollywood movies is that they set up a character as thoroughly evil so that we can have the pleasure of watching him pulverised. On the whole, Jesus gives bad advice. 'Doormats' in game theory. |
| 6293 | It is almost impossible for the rich to go to heaven [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.24 | |
| A reaction: Aristotle and others (Margaret Thatcher) have observed that you cannot practise charity if you are poor. Jesus implies that the human race should remain in poverty. No wonder autocratic medieval rulers taught Christianity to peasants. Cf. Matt 25.30. |
| 17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The phylogenetic conception of classification reflects the facts of evolutionary history. Cladism insists that every taxonomic distinction should reflect an evolutionary event of lineage bifurcation. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: Devitt attacks cladism nicely. It rules out species change without bifurcation, and it insists on species change even in a line which remains unchanged after a split. |
| 17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: A kind, being an abstract object, cannot do anything, including evolve. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: Maybe. We might have an extensional view of the kind, so that 'gold' is the set of extant gold atoms. But possible gold atoms are also gold, and defunct ones too. Virtually every word in English is abtract if you think about it long enough. |
| 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The question of which natural kind a thing belongs to ....can be answered only in relation to some specification of the goal underlying the intent to classify the object. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], Intro) | |
| A reaction: I don't think I believe this. The situation is complex, and our intents are relevant, but to find an intent which no longer classifies tigers into the same category is wilful silliness. |
| 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The richest source of illustrations is the vegetable kingdom, where specific differences tend to be much less clear than among animals, and considerable developmental plasticity is the rule. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Just as the idea that laws of nature are mathematical suits physics, but founders on biology, so natural kinds founder in an area of biology to which we pay less attention. He cites prickly pears and lilies. I'm thinking oranges, satsumas etc. |
| 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Even if we claim that it is really isotopes not atoms that are the natural kinds (thus divorcing chemistry from ordinary language), atoms are said to differ with respect to such features as energy levels of the electrons. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: So we can't just pick out the features of one atom, and say that is the essence. Essence always involves some selection. I say the essence arises from the explanation of the atom's behaviour. |
| 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: To the extent that the occupants of a particular niche do not coincide with the members of a particular genealogical line, a possibility widely acknowledged to occur, ecologists must favour a method of classification lacking genealogical grounding. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: Zoo keepers probably classify by cages, or which zoo owns what, but that doesn't mean that they reject genealogy. Don't assume ecologists are rejecting any underlying classification that differs from theirs. Compare classification by economists. |
| 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: It would be a severe culinary misfortune if no distinction were drawn between garlic and onions, a distinction that is not reflected in scientific taxonomy. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: Not every persuasive. We distinguish some cows from others because they taste better, but no one thinks that is a serious way in which to classify cows. |
| 17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: The claim that whales are not fish is a debatable one | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 1) | |
| A reaction: A very nice challenge to an almost unquestioned orthodoxy. |
| 17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Species are, by definition, the lowest-level classificatory unit, or basal taxonomic unit, for biological organisms. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) | |
| A reaction: I think this is the 'infima species' for Aristotelians. What about 'male' and 'female' in each species? |
| 17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |
| Full Idea: Species are what the theory of evolution is centrally about. | |
| From: John Dupré (The Disorder of Things [1993], 2) |
| 6291 | No one is good except God [Jesus] |
| Full Idea: Why callest thou me good? There is none good but one, that is, God. | |
| From: Jesus (reports [c.32]), quoted by St Matthew - 01: Gospel of St Matthew 19.17 | |
| A reaction: This remark raises the problem that if God is good, there must be some separate moral standard by which he can be judged good. What is that standard? It is related to the problem of whether Plato's Form of the Beautiful is itself beautiful. |
| 7351 | Jesus turned the ideas of Hillel into a theology reduced to its moral elements [Jesus, by Johnson,P] |
| Full Idea: Jesus was a member of the school of Hillel the Elder, and may have sat under him. He repeated some of the sayings of Hillel, ...and turned his ideas into a moral theology, stripping the law of all but its moral and ethical elements. | |
| From: report of Jesus (reports [c.32]) by Paul Johnson - The History of the Jews Pt II | |
| A reaction: The crucial move, it seems to me, is to strip Judaism of its complexity, and reduce it to very simple moral maxims, which means that ordinary illiterate people no longer need priests to understand and follow it. Jesus was, above all, a great teacher. |