42 ideas
7822 | A neo-Stoic movement began in the late sixteenth century [Lipsius, by Grayling] |
Full Idea: A neo-Stoic movement began at the end of the sixteenth century, under the inspiration of the Dutch scholar Justus Lipsius. | |
From: report of Justus Lipsius (works [1584]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.5 | |
A reaction: I would take this to be just as much a movement against Christianity as the interest in the less theistic Epicurus. They wanted the virtues of Christianity without the theological trappings. |
15169 | Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Metaphysics, for the conventionalist, is not a matter of trying to see deeply into the structure of mind-independent reality, but of trying to clarify the way we actually speak and think, and perhaps negotiating ways of doing this to our best advantage. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Note that he is still allowing space for 'revisionary' as well as for 'descriptive' metaphysics. I can't wholly accept this, as I really do think we can have some deep insights into reality, but Sidelle is articulating a large part of the truth. |
15164 | We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Judgments of necessity seem always to be based on thought experiments and appeals to what we can imagine. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: That is, the denial of this thing seems inconceivable. I would say that they are also based on coherence. The idea that we can think without imagination is nonsense. |
15180 | There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Metaphysically, nothing in the actual world seems to be a candidate for determining what is necessarily the case. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I file this under 'Dispositions' to show what is at stake in the debate about dispositional and categorical properties. I take a commitment to dispositions to be a commitment to modal facts about the actual world. |
15184 | Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Even if the causal theory of reference proper does not presuppose essentialism, it does presuppose essentialism if it is to be an account of reference to modally extended entities. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) |
15172 | Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: It is clear, of course, that if there are true essential predications, then they express necessary properties. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I would certainly want to ask whether essences have to be analysed as properties, and also (more boldly) whether there might not be contingent essences. |
15181 | Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The property of being a deepest explanatory feature is a nonmodal property: it's an actual property. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I don't accept the existence of properties of the form 'being-F'. The possibility of securing a door may be the deepest explanatory feature of a lock. [To be fair to Sidelle, see context - just for once!] Dispositions are actual. |
15173 | That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The necessity to water of whatever is found out to be the water's microstructure is given by convention, and is not something which is discovered. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: A powerful point. It shows the authority of science that we accept the microstructure as the essence. The essences of statues and people are definitely not their microstructures. One H2O molecule isn't water. Why not? Macro-properties count too! |
15185 | We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Independent of conventions, no definite sense can be given to the notion of 'the same stuff as this'. So reference-fixing must include some principle of individuation to determine the aspects of sameness for the identity referred to. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: Is he really saying that we don't understand 'same stuff as this'? Surely animals can manage that, and they are not famous for their conventions. Sidelle has fallen into the sortalist trap, I think. |
15175 | Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: In the evaluation of de dicto modal statements, whether some possible state of affairs is relevant to its truth does not depend on the identity of its objects, as in 'Necessarily, the President of the USA is male'. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is a more clear-cut and easy to grasp criterion than most that are on offer. |
15032 | Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider] |
Full Idea: Sidelle defends conventionalism against a posteriori necessities by 'factoring' a necessary a posteriori truth into an analytic component and a nonmodal component. The modal force then comes from the analytic part, and the a posteriority from the other. | |
From: report of Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989]) by Theodore Sider - Writing the Book of the World 12.8 | |
A reaction: [I note that Sidelle refers, it seems, to the nonmodal component as a 'deep explanatory feature', which is exactly what I take an essence to be]. |
15179 | To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: What we need to know, in order to know what is empirically necessary, is some empirical fact plus our conventions that tell us which truths are necessary given which empirical facts. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I take this attack on a posteriori necessities to be the most persuasive part of Sidelle's case, but you can't just put all of our truths down to convention. There are stabilities in the world, as well as in our conventions. |
15171 | The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The necessary a posteriori crudely divides into two groups - (synthetic) identity statements (between rigid designators), and statements of essential properties. The latter is either statements of property identity, or of the essences of natural kinds. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: He cites Kripke's examples (Hesperus,Cicero,Truman,water,gold), and divides them into the two groups. Helpful. |
15167 | Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: In the traditional empiricist picture, we go about modal enquiry by trying to see whether we can imagine a situation in which it would be correct to assert the negation of a proposed necessary truth. Thus we can find out the limits of our concepts. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) |
15177 | Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Contradictoriness is the boundary both of what is possible and also of what is imaginable. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: Of course we may see contradictions where there are none, and fail to grasp real hidden contradictions, so the two do not coincide in the practice. I think I would say it is 'a' boundary, not 'the' boundary. |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: It is not merely the modal facts that result from our conventions, but the individuals and kinds that are modally involved. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: I am beginning to find Sidelle's views very sympathetic - going over to the Dark Side, I'm afraid. But conventions won't work at all if they don't correspond closely to reality. |
15174 | A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: For a term to be rigid, it is said there must be real transworld identity prior to our use of the rigid term, ..but this may only be because we have conventional principles for individuating across worlds. 'Let's call him Fred' - perhaps explicitly rigid. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This seems right. An example might be a comic book character, who retains a perfect identity in all the comics, with no scars, weight change, or ageing. |
15183 | 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: 'Dthat' is Kaplan's indexical operator; it operates on a given singular term, φ, and makes it into a rigid designator of whatever φ designates in the original context. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.6 n11) | |
A reaction: I like this idea a lot, because it strikes me that referring to something rigidly is a clear step beyond referring to it in actuality. I refer to 'whoever turns up each week', but that is hardly rigid. The germ of 2-D semantics is here. |
15165 | A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The a priori method yields a priori knowledge, and the objects of this knowledge are not facts about the world, but analytic truths. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: Are we not allowed any insights at all into how the world must be, independent of how we happen to conceptualise it? |
15168 | That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: If water is essentially H2O, this is going to have something to do with our intentions in using 'water'. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This very simple point looks to be correct, and raises very important questions about the whole Twin Earth thing. When new discoveries are made, words shift their meanings. We're not quite sure what 'jade' means any more. |
15166 | Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The causal theory of reference appears to give us a way to get at an object while leaving it undetermined what its essence or necessary features might be. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This pinpoints why the direct/causal theory of reference seems to open the doors to scientific essentialism. Sidelle, of course, opposes the whole programme. |
15182 | Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: The phenomenon of overlapping entities requires that if our reference is to be determinate (as determinate as it is), then there must be analytic principles of individuation. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: His point is that there is something inescapably conventional about the way in which our reference works. It isn't just some bald realist baptism. |
23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
Full Idea: Men's propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.245), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism | |
A reaction: This attitude is dismissed by Kekes, with some justification, as naïve optimism. What could be Rawls's grounds for making such a claim? It couldn't be the facts of human history. |
15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
Full Idea: Rawls defends the thesis of the priority of the right over the good. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.7:100 | |
A reaction: It depends whether you are talking about actions, or about states of affairs. I don't see how any state of affairs can be preferred to the good one. It may be that the highest duty of action is to do what is right, rather than to achieve what is good. |
4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
Full Idea: Rawls's theory is an elaboration of a simple idea: a fair system of arrangements is one that the parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5 | |
A reaction: The essence of modern Kantian contractualism. It is an appealing principle for building a rational world, but I hear Nietzsche turning in his grave. |
21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion? | |
From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10 | |
A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution? |
3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
Full Idea: Rawls claims that utilitarianism applies to the problem of many interests a method appropriate for one individual. A single person may accept disadvantages in exchange for benefits, but in society other people get the benefits. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.74,104) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |
21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
Full Idea: Rawls rejected the cosmopolitan extension of his theory because he thought it failed to respect the political autonomy of 'peoples', which was his term of art for societies or political communities. | |
From: report of John Rawls (The Law of Peoples [1999], p.115-8) by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 09 | |
A reaction: Interesting that you might well start with the concept of 'a people', prior to some sort of social contract, but end up with rather alarming conflicts or indifference between rival peoples. Why should my people help in the famine next door? |
3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Why does what it is rational to agree to in Rawls' 'Original Position' determine what is right? | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
Full Idea: The original position is presented by Rawls as modelling the sense in which citizens are to be understood as free and equal. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 3 'Strikes' | |
A reaction: In other words, Rawls's philosophy is not a demonstration of why we should be liberals, but a guidebook for how liberals should go about organising society. |
18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. ...Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the rest of a fair agreement or bargain. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §03) | |
A reaction: A famous idea. It tries to impose a Kantian impartiality onto the assessment of political principles. It is a beautifully simple idea, and saying that such impartiality never occurs is no objection to it. Think of a planet far far away. |
18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
Full Idea: All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §46) | |
A reaction: In the wholehearted capitalism of the 21st century this sounds like cloud-cuckoo land. As an 'initial position' (just as in the 'Republic') the clean slate brings out some interesting principles. Actual politics takes vested interests as axiomatic. |
21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason. | |
From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02 | |
A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'. |
20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Rawls objects to utilitarianism because it fails to take seriously the separateness of persons (because there is no overall person to enjoy the overall happiness). But Nozick thinks Rawls does not take the separateness of persons seriously enough. | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick' | |
A reaction: In this sense, Nozick seems to fit our picture of a liberal more closely than Rawls does. I think they both exaggerate the separateness of persons, based on a false concept of human nature. |
9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
Full Idea: Rawls's account of justice works only with widely accepted intuitions of fairness and relies at no point on controversial positions in ethics. The fruit of this modesty is a pious commentary on conventional moral beliefs. | |
From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 3.6 | |
A reaction: Presumably this is the thought which provoked Nozick to lob his grenade on the subject. It resembles the charges of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche against Kant, that he was just dressing up conventional morality. Are 'controversial' ethics good? |
23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The fact of pluralism means that the hope of political community must be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive conception of the good. | |
From: John Rawls (The Idea of Overlapping Consensus [1987]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
A reaction: A moderate pluralism might be manageable, but strong, diverse and dogmatic beliefs among sub-groups probably make it impossible. |
20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
Full Idea: First Principle [Liberty]: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 46) | |
A reaction: This is the result of consensus after the initial ignorant position of assessment. It is characteristic of liberalism. I'm struggling to think of a disagreement. |
21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
Full Idea: Rawls saw four difficulties for justice in the social contract approach: future generations; justice across national boundaries; fair treatment of people with disabilities; and moral issues involving non-human animals. | |
From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Martha Nussbaum - Creating Capabilities 4 | |
A reaction: These are all classic examples of groups who do not have sufficient power to negotiate contracts. |
21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
Full Idea: The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 17) | |
A reaction: Lovely quotation. There is no point in railing against the given, and that includes what is given by history, as well as what is given by nature. It comes down to intervening, in history and in nature. How much intervention will individuals tolerate? |
23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
Full Idea: When a country's right to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe. | |
From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.379), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 14 | |
A reaction: This is Rawls opposing the idea that combatants are moral equals. The restraints are, of course, moral. In practice aggressors are usually the worst behaved. |
15178 | Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle] |
Full Idea: Is there anything in the procedures of scientists that could reveal to them that water is necessarily H2O or that gold necessarily has atomic number 79. | |
From: Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: This is Leibniz's is view, that empirical evidence can never reveal necessities. Given that we know some necessities, you have an argument for rationalism. |