60 ideas
| 3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
| Full Idea: Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by Simon Blackburn - Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy p.280 |
| 15943 | Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann] |
| Full Idea: Von Neumann's Limitation of Size axiom is not self-evident, and he himself admitted that it seemed too strong. | |
| From: comment on John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VII.1 |
| 3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
| Full Idea: Von Neumann suggested that functions be pressed into service to replace sets. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by José A. Benardete - Metaphysics: the logical approach Ch.23 |
| 13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
| Full Idea: Von Neumann's decision was to start with the ordinals and to treat cardinals as a special sort of ordinal. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by William D. Hart - The Evolution of Logic 3 | |
| A reaction: [see Hart 73-74 for an explication of this] |
| 22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
| Full Idea: At age twenty, Von Neumann devised the formal definition of ordinal numbers that is used today: an ordinal number is the set of all smaller ordinal numbers. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (works [1935]) by William Poundstone - Prisoner's Dilemma 02 'Sturm' | |
| A reaction: I take this to be an example of an impredicative definition (not predicating something new), because it uses 'ordinal number' in the definition of ordinal number. I'm guessing the null set gets us started. |
| 12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
| Full Idea: In Von Neumann's definition an ordinal is a transitive set in which all of the elements are transitive. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Alain Badiou - Briefings on Existence 11 |
| 18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
| Full Idea: For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than Zermelo's successor, which is {n}). | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n8 |
| 18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
| Full Idea: Von Neumann's version of the natural numbers is in fact preferred because it carries over directly to the transfinite ordinals. | |
| From: comment on John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.2 n9 |
| 15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
| Full Idea: Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors. ...He had shown how to introduce ordinal numbers as sets, making it possible to use them without leaving the domain of sets. | |
| From: report of John von Neumann (On the Introduction of Transfinite Numbers [1923]) by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite V.3 |
| 13672 | All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann] |
| Full Idea: There is no axiom system for mathematics, geometry, and so forth that does not presuppose set theory. | |
| From: John von Neumann (An Axiomatization of Set Theory [1925]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 8.2 | |
| A reaction: Von Neumann was doubting whether set theory could have axioms, and hence the whole project is doomed, and we face relativism about such things. His ally was Skolem in this. |
| 20589 | Maybe a person's true self is their second-order desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: A second-order desire is a desire about what kind of desires you want to have. ....Some philosophers have argued that we should associate a person's second-order desires with her 'true self'. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 2 'What is') | |
| A reaction: Presumably the buck stops at these second-order desires, though we might request an account of their origin. 'What sort of person do I want to be?' looks like a third-order question. I don't even want to be a saint. Self is nothing to do with desires? |
| 23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: Men's propensity to injustice is not a permanent aspect of community life. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.245), quoted by John Kekes - Against Liberalism | |
| A reaction: This attitude is dismissed by Kekes, with some justification, as naïve optimism. What could be Rawls's grounds for making such a claim? It couldn't be the facts of human history. |
| 15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
| Full Idea: Rawls defends the thesis of the priority of the right over the good. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by James Gordon Finlayson - Habermas Ch.7:100 | |
| A reaction: It depends whether you are talking about actions, or about states of affairs. I don't see how any state of affairs can be preferred to the good one. It may be that the highest duty of action is to do what is right, rather than to achieve what is good. |
| 4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: Rawls's theory is an elaboration of a simple idea: a fair system of arrangements is one that the parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: The essence of modern Kantian contractualism. It is an appealing principle for building a rational world, but I hear Nietzsche turning in his grave. |
| 21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: To check whether we are following public reason we might ask: how would our argument strike us presented in the form of a supreme court opinion? | |
| From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.254), quoted by Michael J. Sandel - Justice: What's the right thing to do? 10 | |
| A reaction: A very nice practical implementation of Kantian universalisability. How would your opinion sound if it were written into a constitution? |
| 3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Rawls claims that utilitarianism applies to the problem of many interests a method appropriate for one individual. A single person may accept disadvantages in exchange for benefits, but in society other people get the benefits. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.74,104) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
| 20583 | If maximising pleasure needs measurement, so does fulfilling desires [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Just as hedonists need a way to compare pleasures, so desire fulfilment theorists need a way to compare the fulfilment of desires. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Is happiness') | |
| A reaction: A nice point. We picture desire fulfilment as just ticking it off when it is achieved, but if your desire is for a really nice house, the achievement of that can be pretty vague. |
| 20584 | Desire satisfaction as the ideal is confused, because we desire what we judge to be good [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Critics of desire satisfaction theory argue that it gets things backward. We desire things because we already think they are good in some way. Desire theory puts it the other way round. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Is happiness') | |
| A reaction: Not persuasive. It looks to me as if skiing is a spendid pastime, but I have no desire to do it. More exercise would even be a good for me, but I don't desire that either. Indeed, right now I desire more cake, which is very naughty. |
| 22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
| Full Idea: Rawls has suggested that we should maximise the general happiness only if we do so in a fair way. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (Justice as fairness: Political not Metaphysical [1958]) by J.J.C. Smart - Outline of a System of Utilitarianism 6 | |
| A reaction: Rawls is usually seen as an opponent of utilitarianism, but if we allow a few supplementary rules we can improve the theory. After all, it has a meta-rule that 'everybody counts as one'. What other supplementary values can there be? Honesty? |
| 21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
| Full Idea: Rawls rejected the cosmopolitan extension of his theory because he thought it failed to respect the political autonomy of 'peoples', which was his term of art for societies or political communities. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (The Law of Peoples [1999], p.115-8) by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 09 | |
| A reaction: Interesting that you might well start with the concept of 'a people', prior to some sort of social contract, but end up with rather alarming conflicts or indifference between rival peoples. Why should my people help in the famine next door? |
| 20598 | In a democracy, which 'people' are included in the decision process? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: In any democratic state, who are 'the people' who get to rule themselves? That is, who gets to participate in the public decision process, and who is excluded? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is') | |
| A reaction: In the modern world this may be clear-cut when a democracy gets started, but people move around so much more that every democracy is faced with new types of residents. Then there is age, criminality, mental health... |
| 20614 | People often have greater attachment to ethnic or tribal groups than to the state [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Some states have a number of different ethnic or tribal groups. Often these attachments are much stronger than the attachment people feel towards the state. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Membership') | |
| A reaction: In Britain I fine people torn between attachments to the UK and to England or Wales or Scotland or NI. Attachments to football clubs are much stronger than most patriotism. Or attachment to a particular locality. Does it matter? |
| 3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
| Full Idea: Why does what it is rational to agree to in Rawls' 'Original Position' determine what is right? | |
| From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Thomas Nagel - Equality §7 |
| 20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
| Full Idea: The original position is presented by Rawls as modelling the sense in which citizens are to be understood as free and equal. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 3 'Strikes' | |
| A reaction: In other words, Rawls's philosophy is not a demonstration of why we should be liberals, but a guidebook for how liberals should go about organising society. |
| 20596 | For global justice, adopt rules without knowing which country you will inhabit [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Imagine a new original position where we adopted rules for global justice without knowing which country we would inhabit. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Cosmopolitan') | |
| A reaction: Nice question. North Korea!! Rawls says it is only within a nation, because there is a co-operative enterprise going on. That is, I presume, that the choosers involved are a 'people'. See Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' for an alternative. |
| 18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. ...Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the rest of a fair agreement or bargain. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §03) | |
| A reaction: A famous idea. It tries to impose a Kantian impartiality onto the assessment of political principles. It is a beautifully simple idea, and saying that such impartiality never occurs is no objection to it. Think of a planet far far away. |
| 20593 | The veil of ignorance ensures both fairness and unanimity [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: The veil of ignorance ensures that the original position is fair, but it also guarantees that agreement will be unanimous (which would be impossible if each person insisted that justice should match her own conception). | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 4 'Original') | |
| A reaction: Not clear about this. If I choose very cautiously, but others choose very riskily, and they win, why I should I fall in with their unanimity? That can only be if we agree to be unanimous in backing the result. Like a democratic election? |
| 18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: All social primary goods - liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favoured. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], §46) | |
| A reaction: In the wholehearted capitalism of the 21st century this sounds like cloud-cuckoo land. As an 'initial position' (just as in the 'Republic') the clean slate brings out some interesting principles. Actual politics takes vested interests as axiomatic. |
| 20608 | Unjust institutions may be seen as just; are they legitimate if just but seen as unjust? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Legitimacy and perceived legitimacy do not always go together: people can believe that their institutions are just, but they may be wrong. Is the reverse also possible? Can institutions be legitimate if people believe they are not? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What are') | |
| A reaction: Nice thoughts. An institution cannot be just merely because it is seen that way (if someone gets away with rigging an election). If they are just but seen as unjust, I presume they are legitimate (which is objective), but disfunctional. |
| 21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: Exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in light of principles and ideals acceptable to reason. | |
| From: John Rawls (Political Liberalism [1993], p.217), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 02 | |
| A reaction: This is not the actual endorsement of Rousseau, or the tacit endorsement of Locke (by living there), but adds a Kantian appeal to a rational consensus, on which rational people should converge. Very Enlightenment. 'Hypothetical consent'. |
| 20597 | If winning elections depends on wealth, we have plutocracy instead of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: If we let people's influence on election outcomes depend on their wealth, then we don't have a democracy any more. We have a plutocracy, where the people who have all the wealth have all the political power too. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: [see Michael Walzer on 'complex equality'] This is startling true in the United States, but still somewhat true elsewhere. Being wealthy enough to control the media is the key in modern democracies. |
| 20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
| Full Idea: Rawls objects to utilitarianism because it fails to take seriously the separateness of persons (because there is no overall person to enjoy the overall happiness). But Nozick thinks Rawls does not take the separateness of persons seriously enough. | |
| From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Adam Swift - Political Philosophy (3rd ed) 1 'Nozick' | |
| A reaction: In this sense, Nozick seems to fit our picture of a liberal more closely than Rawls does. I think they both exaggerate the separateness of persons, based on a false concept of human nature. |
| 20606 | Epistemic theories defend democracy as more likely to produce the right answer [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: According to epistemic theories of democracy, democratic outcomes are justified because they are more likely to be true or right than the choice of the individual. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Do the people') | |
| A reaction: Bear in mind Condorcet's proof that this claim is only correct if individuals have a better than 50% chance of being right, which may be so on obvious things, but is implausible for decisions like going to war. |
| 20600 | Which areas of public concern should be decided democratically, and which not? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Are there areas which are excluded from democratic decision making? Or should all issues of public concern be decided through a democratic process? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is') | |
| A reaction: Crucially, are we discussing direct democracy, or representative democracy? In Britain all major decisions are made by the cabinet. Our representatives appoint leaders, who then appoint the decision makers. Judiciary is non-democratic. |
| 20609 | If several losing groups would win if they combine, a runoff seems called for [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: It is possible that the people who supported several losing candidates might have joined forces and had a majority. For that reason, many countries have a runoff election. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Does democracy') | |
| A reaction: The problem is that there is no rationale as to who stands in an election. If their views are evenly spread, the first result seems OK. If there are five left-wingers and one right-winger, a runoff seems to be produce a more just result. |
| 20605 | Rights as interests (unlike rights as autonomy) supports mandatory voting [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: If rights concern people's interests, that might support mandatory voting, but if rights rely on protecting autonomy that might oppose it. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest') | |
| A reaction: I approach it from the other end, and am inclined to support mandatory voting, which suggests I am more concerned about interests than about autonomy. |
| 20599 | How should democratic votes be aggregated? Can some person's votes count for more? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: A major question for democracy is how are the contributions of different people aggregated into a collective decision? Must votes have equal weight and consideration, or is it permissible for different people's votes to count differently? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'What is') | |
| A reaction: Mill hoped that wise and knowledgeable people would have a strong influence over the others, but we have recently moved into the post-truth era, where we are swamped by bogus facts. Does that strengthen the case for elite voting? |
| 20601 | Discussion before voting should be an essential part of democracy [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: According to advocates of deliberative democracy, people should have an opportunity to talk and reason with one another before votes are cast. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Who gets') | |
| A reaction: This is now done on Facebook and Twitter, but no one thinks that is sufficient. We will never again persuade most people to actually meet up and discuss issues. |
| 9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
| Full Idea: Rawls's account of justice works only with widely accepted intuitions of fairness and relies at no point on controversial positions in ethics. The fruit of this modesty is a pious commentary on conventional moral beliefs. | |
| From: comment on John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by John Gray - Straw Dogs 3.6 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is the thought which provoked Nozick to lob his grenade on the subject. It resembles the charges of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche against Kant, that he was just dressing up conventional morality. Are 'controversial' ethics good? |
| 20613 | We have obligations to our family, even though we didn't choose its members [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Many of our most important obligations are things we did not consent to. If you think you have obligations to your family, did you choose to have them as family members? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Gratitude') | |
| A reaction: A question that gets close to the heart of the communitarian ideal, I think. We choose to have children, and we bring them up, but even then we don't choose who our children are. |
| 23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: The fact of pluralism means that the hope of political community must be abandoned, if by such a community we mean a political society united in affirming a general and comprehensive conception of the good. | |
| From: John Rawls (The Idea of Overlapping Consensus [1987]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Community 'legitimacy' | |
| A reaction: A moderate pluralism might be manageable, but strong, diverse and dogmatic beliefs among sub-groups probably make it impossible. |
| 20586 | Free speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Oliver Wendell Holmes (in 1919) noted that freedom of speech does not include the right to shout 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Conflict') | |
| A reaction: The point here is that such irresponsible free speech does not even require legislation, and there is probably already some law under which the perpetrator could be prosecuted. |
| 20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: First Principle [Liberty]: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 46) | |
| A reaction: This is the result of consensus after the initial ignorant position of assessment. It is characteristic of liberalism. I'm struggling to think of a disagreement. |
| 20587 | Most people want equality because they want a flourishing life [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: If we want equality so much, we find that it is often because they think of equality as a prerequisite for a certain kind of flourishing life. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 1 'Happiness') | |
| A reaction: Most writers seem to agree that we don't want equality for its own sake. In what respects do we want to be equal? Why not equal in hair colour? Hence it looks as if equality drops out. I would aim to derive it from the social virtue of respect. |
| 20591 | If there is no suffering, wealth inequalities don't matter much [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: It is hard to get worked up over wealth inequalities if no one is suffering from them! | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 3 'Deprivation') | |
| A reaction: The more the poorer group resent the inequality, the more they suffer. When is resenting huge inequalities in wealth justified? It depends how the big wealth was obtained. |
| 20602 | Some rights are 'claims' that other people should act in a certain way [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: A 'claim right' is one in which the person asserting the right makes a claim on others to act or not act in a certain way. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Claim') | |
| A reaction: There seems to be a crucial distinction between rights which entail obligations on some individual or institution, and those which don't. Contracts (including employment contracts) generate duties on the parties. |
| 20604 | Choice theory says protecting individual autonomy is basic (but needs to cover infants and animals) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Choice theorists hold that rights protect our rights to make autonomous judgements, because our basic right to autonomy must be protected, The theory has a problem with people unable to exercise autonomy (such as infants and animals). | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest') | |
| A reaction: The problem of infants and animals looks like a decisive objection to me. We obviously don't protect dangerous or hostile autonomous judgements, and it is not clear why protecting stupid autonomy should be basic. |
| 20603 | One theory (fairly utilitarian) says rights protect interests (but it needs to cover trivial interests) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Interest theorists hold that rights serve to protect people's important interests. This is closely allied with utilitarian values. The theory has difficulty accounting for relatively trivial interests (like owning a lemonade you bought). | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Interest') | |
| A reaction: This sounds more plausible than choice theory (Idea 20604). It is obvious that infants must have rights. The lemonade problem seems to demand some sort of rule utilitarianism. Sidgwick looks promising. Rights can also be moral claims. |
| 20607 | Having a right does not entail further rights needed to implement it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Possession of a right (such as self-defence) does not always imply that one has additional rights to whatever they need (such as a handgun) in order to exercise the first right. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Is there') | |
| A reaction: The right to life entails a right to food (but not to a banquet), so it is a stronger right than self-defence. I have no obligation to let you defend yourself against me, but I may have an obligation to feed you if you are starving. (Distinction here?) |
| 21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
| Full Idea: Rawls saw four difficulties for justice in the social contract approach: future generations; justice across national boundaries; fair treatment of people with disabilities; and moral issues involving non-human animals. | |
| From: report of John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972]) by Martha Nussbaum - Creating Capabilities 4 | |
| A reaction: These are all classic examples of groups who do not have sufficient power to negotiate contracts. |
| 21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], 17) | |
| A reaction: Lovely quotation. There is no point in railing against the given, and that includes what is given by history, as well as what is given by nature. It comes down to intervening, in history and in nature. How much intervention will individuals tolerate? |
| 20612 | If being subject to the law resembles a promise, we are morally obliged to obey it [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: One of the more common reasons people will give for having a moral obligation to obey the law is consent. ...It rests on the intuitively appealing idea of an analogy with a promise. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'Consent') | |
| A reaction: [They cite Locke and Jefferson] In Locke's case it has to be a 'tacit' promise, which is more realistic. In real life we have problems with people who 'said' they would do something. They are often accused of promising, when they didn't. |
| 20611 | If others must obey laws that we like, we must obey laws that they like? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: If we expect others to obey the laws we think just, do we have an obligation to obey the laws that other people think just? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 6 'What should') | |
| A reaction: Depends whether you have to be consistent about everything. I'm picky about which laws I obey, but I'm not going to tell you that, in case you get the same idea. Free riders. |
| 20610 | Instead of against natural law, we might assess unjust laws against the values of the culture [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Do we need natural law theory in order to make sense of the idea that laws can be unjust? Perhaps not: we might consider whether laws are consistent with the values of the culture or society where they apply. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 5 'Unjust') | |
| A reaction: So were the wicked laws passed by the Nazis consistent with 1930s German culture? Impossible to say. |
| 20617 | How should the punishment fit the crime (for stealing chickens?) [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: One criticism of the retributive theory of punishment is that it is hard to know how to fit the punishment to the crime. What punishment should correspond to stealing chickens? | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 7 'Rationales') | |
| A reaction: The ancient world was more keen on restitution for such crimes, which makes much better sense. Buy them some chickens, plus twenty percent. |
| 20615 | Just wars: resist aggression, done on just cause, proportionate, last resort, not futile, legal [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Classical just war theory: resist aggression; just cause must be the real reason; must be proportionate; last resort; not futile; made by a nation's authority. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'Ius ad') | |
| A reaction: [My squashed summary of Tuckness and Wolf] A very helpful list, from Cicero, Augustine and Aquinas. So where is the sticking point for pacifists? Presumably it is never the last resort, and aggression should not answer aggression. |
| 23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
| Full Idea: When a country's right to war is questionable and uncertain, the constraints on the means it can use are all the more severe. | |
| From: John Rawls (A Theory of Justice [1972], p.379), quoted by Michael Walzer - Just and Unjust Wars 14 | |
| A reaction: This is Rawls opposing the idea that combatants are moral equals. The restraints are, of course, moral. In practice aggressors are usually the worst behaved. |
| 20616 | During wars: proportional force, fair targets, fair weapons, safe prisoners, no reprisals [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: Classical just war theory during a war: force must be proportional; only legitimate targets; avoid prohibited weapons; safety for prisoners of war; no reprisals. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'In the conduct') | |
| A reaction: What of massacre if a besieged city refuses to surrender? It was commonplace, and sometimes the only way to achieve victory. What if the enemy breaks all the rules? Nice rules though. At the heart of civilisation. |
| 20620 | If minority views are accepted in debate, then religious views must be accepted [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: It is unfair to exclude religious arguments from the public square because they are not accepted by everyone, unless other views that are not accepted by everyone are also excluded. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 9 'fairly') | |
| A reaction: Raises the obvious problems of a huge group in the grips of a fairly crazy view, and a tiny group (e.g. specialist scientists) in possession of a correct view. You can't just assess it on the size of the group. You can be wrong but reasonable. |
| 20619 | Is abortion the ending of a life, or a decision not to start one? [Tuckness/Wolf] |
| Full Idea: One group may consider abortion as a decision to end a life, while another may regard it as the decision not to start one. | |
| From: Tuckness,A/Wolf,C (This is Political Philosophy [2017], 8 'Hard I') | |
| A reaction: An early foetus is 'life', but is it 'a life'? Is a blade of grass 'a life'? Is a cell in a body 'a life'? |