Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for José Ortega y Gassett, J.R. Mayer and Arnauld / Nicole

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9 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett]
     Full Idea: Being consists not in what it is already, but in what it is not yet, a being that consists in not-yet-being. Everything else in the world is what it is….Man is the entity that makes himself….He has to determine what he is going to be.
     From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.112,201-2), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 4 'Problem'
     A reaction: [p.112 and 201-2] This seems to be Ortega y Gasset's spin on Heidegger's concept, by adding a temporal dimension to it.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
We can rise by degrees through abstraction, with higher levels representing more things [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: I can start with a triangle, and rise by degrees to all straight-lined figures and to extension itself. The lower degree will include the higher degree. Since the higher degree is less determinate, it can represent more things.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] This attempts to explain the generalising ability of abstraction cited in Idea 10501. If you take a complex object and eliminate features one by one, it can only 'represent' more particulars; it could hardly represent fewer.
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
We can only know the exterior world via our ideas [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: We can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation of ideas in us.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], p.63), quoted by J. Alberto Coffa - The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap 1 'Conc'
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Forms make things distinct and explain the properties, by pure form, or arrangement of parts [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The form is what renders a thing such and distinguishes it from others, whether it is a being really distinct from the matter, according to the Schools, or whether it is only the arrangement of the parts. By this form one must explain its properties.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], III.18 p240), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 27.6
     A reaction: If we ask 'what explains the properties of this thing' it is hard to avoid coming up with something that might be called the 'form'. Note that they allow either substantial or corpuscularian forms. It is hard to disagree with the idea.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
We know by abstraction because we only understand composite things a part at a time [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: The mind cannot perfectly understand things that are even slightly composite unless it considers them a part at a time. ...This is generally called knowing by abstraction. (..the human body, for example).
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: This adds the interesting thought that the mind is forced to abstract, rather than abstraction being a luxury extra feature. Knowledge through analysis is knowledge by abstraction. Also a nice linking of abstraction to epistemology.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
A triangle diagram is about all triangles, if some features are ignored [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: If I draw an equilateral triangle on a piece of paper, ..I shall have an idea of only a single triangle. But if I ignore all the particular circumstances and focus on the three equal lines, I will be able to represent all equilateral triangles.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: [compressed] They observed that we grasp composites through their parts, and now that we can grasp generalisations through particulars, both achieved by the psychological act of abstraction, thus showing its epistemological power.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
No one denies that a line has width, but we can just attend to its length [Arnauld,A/Nicole,P]
     Full Idea: Geometers by no means assume that there are lines without width or surfaces without depth. They only think it is possible to consider the length without paying attention to the width. We can measure the length of a path without its width.
     From: Arnauld / Nicole (Logic (Port-Royal Art of Thinking) [1662], I.5)
     A reaction: A nice example which makes the point indubitable. The modern 'rigorous' account of abstraction that starts with Frege seems to require more than one object, in order to derive abstractions like direction or number. Path widths are not comparatives.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett]
     Full Idea: Man lives in view of the past. Man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is history. Expressed differently: what nature is to things, history is to man.
     From: José Ortega y Gassett (Toward a Philosophy of History [1941], p.217), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Situated'
     A reaction: Makes explicit the existentialist denial of human nature. The foundation of ethics can only be total freedom, to choose both yourself and your actions. What is inescapable is the social and culture contexts. What is the role of the 'history'?
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity isn't a force, because it produces effects without diminishing [Mayer]
     Full Idea: If gravity be called a force, a cause is supposed which produces effects without itself diminishing, and incorrect conceptions of the causal connexions of things are thereby fostered.
     From: J.R. Mayer (Remarks on the forces of inorganic Nature [1842], p.199), quoted by Brian Ellis - Scientific Essentialism 8.03
     A reaction: This seems like a brilliant prelude to the proposal that gravity is actually the 'curvature' of space (whatever that is!).