58 ideas
| 22338 | An unexamined life can be virtuous [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: An unexamined life can be virtuous. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: Nice. A firm rejection of the intellectualist view of virtue, to which most Greeks subscribed. Jesus would have liked this one. |
| 5300 | Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §XI) | |
| A reaction: The 'point' of what? Personally I am more with Aristotle - that the aim is to create a society in which we can all aspire to contemplate like gods. As an interim statement of aim, though, one must respect Marx. But was he a philosopher? |
| 22337 | Philosophy must keep returning to the beginning [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy has in a sense to keep trying to return to the beginning. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: This is a sign that philosophy is not like other subjects, and indicates that although the puzzles are not solved, they won't go away. Also that, unlike most other subjects, the pre-suppositions are not part of the subject. |
| 23563 | Philosophy moves continually between elaborate theories and the obvious facts [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: There is a two-way movement in philosophy, a movement towards the building of elaborate theories, and a move back again towards the consideration of simple and obvious facts. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: Nice. Without the theories there is no philosophy, but without continual reference back to the obvious facts the theories are worthless. |
| 5297 | Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question; man must prove the truth of his thinking in practice. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §II) | |
| A reaction: This would appear to be an assertion of the pragmatic view of truth well before Peirce. The obvious objections arise, such as whether falsehood (Plato's 'noble lie') might not have equal practical success, and whether truth might be disastrous. |
| 10197 | An immanent universal is wholly present in more than one place [Zimmerman,DW] |
| Full Idea: An immanent universal will routinely be 'at some distance from itself', in the sense that it is wholly present in more than one place. | |
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |
| A reaction: This is the Aristotelian view, which sounds distinctly implausible in this formulation. Though I suppose redness is wholly present in a tomato, in the way that fourness is wholly present in the Horsemen of the Apocalypse. How many rednesses are there? |
| 10198 | If only two indiscernible electrons exist, future differences must still be possible [Zimmerman,DW] |
| Full Idea: If nothing existed except two electrons, which are indiscernible, it remains possible that differences will emerge later. Even if this universe has eternal symmetry, such differences are still logically, metaphysically, physically and causally possible. | |
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.306) | |
| A reaction: The question then is whether the two electrons have hidden properties that make differences possible. Zimmerman assumes that 'laws' of an indeterministic kind will do the job. I doubt that. Can differences be discerned after the event? |
| 10199 | Discernible differences at different times may just be in counterparts [Zimmerman,DW] |
| Full Idea: Possible differences which may later become discernible could be treated as differences in a counterpart, which is similar to, but not identical with, the original object. | |
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory [1997], p.307) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This is a reply to Idea 10198, which implies that two things could never be indiscernible over time, because of their different possibilities. One must then decide issues about rigid designation and counterparts. |
| 22591 | We know perfection when we see what is imperfect [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: We know of perfection as we look upon what is imperfect. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals [1992], 13) | |
| A reaction: This is in the context of a discussion of the ontological argument for God's existence, but I seize on it as a nice expression of the idealisation capacity of our minds. The alternative is that perfection is innate idea, since we aren't seeing it. |
| 22598 | The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt] |
| Full Idea: Instead of focusing on the individual, Marxism suggested that the authentic self was at the social level in the form of class. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846]) by Ian Dunt - How to be a Liberal 6 | |
| A reaction: [not sure of the best source in Marx] This idea is expressed here by a defender of liberal individualism. Dunt persuasively attacks any concept of the self as part of some group, rather than as being an individual. |
| 22709 | We should first decide what are the great works of art, with aesthetic theory following from that [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Our aesthetic must stand to be judged by great works of art which we know to be such independently. …So let us start by saying that Shakespeare is the greatest of all artists, and let our aesthetic be the philosophical justification of this judgement. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.205) | |
| A reaction: She offers this view in specific contradiction of Tolstoy, which says we should first have a theory, and then judge accordingly. I take Murdoch to be entirely right, but it means that our aesthetic theory will shift over time. |
| 22341 | Literature is the most important aspect of culture, because it teaches understanding of living [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], i) | |
| A reaction: It is significant that literature belongs more clearly to a nation or community than does most music or painting. You learn about Russians from their literature, but not much from their music. |
| 22715 | Great art proves the absurdity of art for art's sake [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The work of the great artists shows up 'art-for-art's-sake' as a flimsy frivolous doctrine. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
| A reaction: She keeps referring to tragedy (as the greatest art), but it is hard to see how we learn love and morality from a great pot or a great abstract painting. Wilde makes the doctrine frivolous, but I think it contains a degree of truth. Music. |
| 22714 | Because art is love, it improves us morally [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: It is of course a fact that if art is love then art improves us morally, but this is, as it were, accidental. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.218) | |
| A reaction: Is an enhancement of one's love necessarily a moral improvement? Love is a fine feeling, but how does it motivate? Has no wickedness ever been perpetrated in the name of love? 'All's fair in love and war'. |
| 22347 | Appreciating beauty in art or nature opens up the good life, by restricting selfishness [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only the easiest available spiritual exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it checks selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: Not keen on 'spiritual' exercises, but I very much like 'seeing the real' as a promotion of the good life. The hard bit is to know what reality you are seeing in a work of art. [p.84] Her example is the sudden sight of a hovering kestrel. |
| 22712 | Art and morals are essentially the same, and are both identical with love [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Art and morals are (with certain provisos) one. Their essence is the same. The essence of both of them is love. Love is the perception of individuals. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
| A reaction: The idea that art, morals and love are all just a single thing seems unhelpful. What about satire? What about duty without love? What about pure abstract painting? What about Stravinsky's highly formal view of his music? |
| 5298 | The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual; in its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VI) | |
| A reaction: This is a key Marxist doctrine, and the central difference from Aristotle. Personally I am more with Aristotle, but the truth obviously lies somewhere in between. Man must be a 'social being', or there wouldn't be any social relations. |
| 23874 | Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Marx saw that social groups manufacture moralities for their own use, so their activity is placed outside the reach of evil. Thus the first articles of soldiers and businessmen is to deny that it is possible to do evil while waging war or doing business. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.146 | |
| A reaction: This is especially true of the modern reverence for 'market forces'. It is a key debate in the ethics of warfare - compare Walzer and McMahon. A striking thought, obviously containing a lot of truth. |
| 22339 | Love is a central concept in morals [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Love is a central concept in morals. ....[p.30] The central concept of morality is 'the individual' thought of as knowable by love, thought of in the light of the command 'Be ye therefore perfect'. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: This seems to be a critique of the chillier aspects of utilitarianism and Kantian duty. Love doesn't seem essential to Aristotle's concept of virtue either, and Murdoch's tradition seems to be Christian. I'm undecided about this idea. |
| 22348 | Ordinary human love is good evidence of transcendent goodness [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Is not ordinary human love ...striking evidence of a transcendental principle of good? | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: Sorry to be mean, but I would say not. Love is tied up with sexual desire, and with family and tribal loyalty, and can be observed in quite humble animals. (Love, I should quickly add, is a very good thing indeed. Really). |
| 22713 | Love is realising something other than oneself is real [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Love is the extremely difficult realisation that something other than oneself is real. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sublime and the Good [1959], p.215) | |
| A reaction: I suspect that this is a necessary condition for love, but not the thing itself. The realisation she describes may not be love. You would attain her realisation if you shared a prison cell with a terrifying psychopath. |
| 22343 | If I attend properly I will have no choices [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: If I attend properly I will have no choices, and this is the ultimate condition to be aimed at. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: I take it this is an expression of what we now call Particularism. It is not just that every moral situation is subtly morally different, but that the particulars of the situation will lead directly to moral choices (in a 'healthy' agent). |
| 22349 | Art trains us in the love of virtue [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The enjoyment of art is a training in the love of virtue. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: Very Aristotelian to talk of 'training'. Unfortunately it is children who have the greatest need for training, but most art is aimed at mature adults. Can you be too old to be trained by art, even if you enjoy it? |
| 22340 | It is hard to learn goodness from others, because their virtues are part of their personal history [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: It is the historical, individual, nature of the virtues as actually exemplified which makes it difficult to learn goodness from another person. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: A penetrating remark, which strikes me as true. When confronted with a virtuous person you might want to acquire their virtue, just as you might want them to teach you algebra, but their virtues are too bound up with their individuality. |
| 22350 | Only trivial virtues can be possessed on their own [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: It would be impossible to have only one virtue, unless it were a very trivial one such as thrift. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: A nicely nuanced commitment to the unity of virtue. You might exhibit courage alone in a brute animal way, but the sort of courage we all admire is part of more extended virtues. |
| 22346 | Moral reflection and experience gradually reveals unity in the moral world [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Reflection rightly tends to unify the moral world, and increasing moral sophistication reveals increasing unity. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: As an example she suggests asking what is the best type of courage. Connections to other virtues will emerge. That is a persuasive example. We all have strong views on what type of courage is the most admirable. |
| 20765 | Man is a brave naked will, separate from a background of values and realities [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: Existentialists no longer see man against a background of values, of realities, which transcend him. We picture man as a brave naked will. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (Against Dryness: a polemical sketch [1983], p.46), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 7 'Subjectivism' | |
| A reaction: It is one thing to deny the values, and another to deny the realities. This piece is a 'polemic', and reads more like an exhortation than a truth. Many of us are, at best, cowardly naked wills. |
| 22342 | Kantian existentialists care greatly for reasons for action, whereas Surrealists care nothing [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: What may be called the Kantian wing and the Surrealist wing of existentialism may be distinguished by the degree of their interest in reasons for action, which diminishes to nothing at the Surrealist end. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: Presumably for all existentialists moral decisions are the most important aspect of life, since they define what you are, but the Surrealist wing seem to be nihilists about that, so they barely count as existentialists. For them life is sleepwalking. |
| 22351 | Only a philosopher might think choices create values [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by his choices. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], III) | |
| A reaction: This looks like a swipe at Nietzsche, more than anyone. Sartre and co talk less about values, other than authenticity. Philosophy can definitely be corrupting. |
| 22001 | The real will of the cooperative will replace the 'will of the people' [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Under collective property, the so called will of the people disappears in order to make way for the real will of the cooperative. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Grundrisse [1876], p.563), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 10 | |
| A reaction: [from an 1874 note on Bakunin's 'Statism and Anarchy'] So how do you settle on the 'real' will of a cooperative? The travesty is when a ruling elite decide that, without consultation. An institution is needed. This is still a social contract. |
| 21991 | The middle class gain freedom through property, but workers can only free all of humanity [Marx, by Singer] |
| Full Idea: Where the middle class can win freedom for themselves on the basis of rights to property - thus excluding others from their freedom - the working class have nothing but their title as human beings. They only liberate themselves by liberating humanity. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844]) by Peter Singer - Marx 4 | |
| A reaction: Individual workers might gain freedom via education, marriage, or entrepreneurship, or by opting for total simplicity of life, but in general Marx seems to be right about this. But we must ask what sort of 'freedom' is needed. |
| 21990 | Theory is as much a part of a revolution as material force is [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844], Intro p.69), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 4 | |
| A reaction: A huge problem, I think, is that every theory (even conservatism) has to be simplified in a democracy if it is to grip the imagination of the majority. My current hatred is labels in political philosophy. They give us a cartoon view of the world. |
| 22971 | In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Between the capitalist and communist society lies the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: This hugely influential idea was catastrophic for the twentieth century, because the leaders of the proletarian dictatorship adored and abused the power, and wouldn't give it up for some feeble next stage. |
| 18662 | Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The liberal right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man; it is the right to this separation. | |
| From: Karl Marx (works [1860]), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 7.2.a | |
| A reaction: [quoted from an anthology] It is interesting that liberal freedom is the right NOT to be involved in politics, and even not to vote in elections. Home counties England (high hedges etc) is the embodiment of the freedom not to be involved in society. |
| 23372 | Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The [liberal] right of man to freedom is not based on the union of man with man, but on the separation of man from man. It is the right to this separation. | |
| From: Karl Marx (works [1860], p.53), quoted by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (2nd edn) 7 | |
| A reaction: [in collection ed.McLelland p.53] That nicely encapsulates the debate. Modern liberal thinkers regret the loss of community, but people in authoritarian communities yearn for separation. You can have too much 'union'! |
| 20576 | Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala] |
| Full Idea: The early writings of Marx anticipate the communitarian critique of liberalism. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: [Oksala says modern writers seem to prefer this to the hardcore later Marx, which is presumably too 'scientific'. He says 'Capital Vol 1' is Marx's most important work] |
| 21989 | Man is dominated by money, which is the essence of his alienation [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Money is the alienated essence of man's labour and life, and this alien essence dominates him as he worships it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844], p.60), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 3 | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is inherit in the very nature of money, rather than in the wickedness of capitalists who control it. But money is not inherently alienting for the rich, or for the comfortable bourgeoisie (is it?). |
| 22000 | From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx] |
| Full Idea: From each according to his ability, to each according to his need. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875]), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
| A reaction: Singer says this was not original to Marx, and he placed little emphasis on it. The obvious capitalist response is to ask how you will motivate someone who has huge abilities but few needs. It implies huge inequalities of altruism. |
| 23862 | By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx] |
| Full Idea: When Marx inverted Hegel's dialectic of history, by substituting matter for mind as the motive, he attributed to matter the essence of mind, an unceasing aspiration towards the best - which was in keeping with the general current of capitalist thought. | |
| From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Reflections on Liberty and Social Oppression p.43 | |
| A reaction: [compressed] A rather nice debating point! Marx seems to share the universal nineteenth century belief in unremitting progress. Without that, it is impossible to believe that a revolution will necessarily improve anything. |
| 21999 | False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer] |
| Full Idea: False consciousness involves failing to see things as they really are. It comes about because a society's superstructure can conceal the real basis of the society. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Peter Singer - Marx 9 | |
| A reaction: That seems a poor label, probably revealing a Hegelian background. It seems a matter of knowledge rather than consciousness. Can a whole mind be in a state of error? |
| 23875 | Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx] |
| Full Idea: Marx posits on the one hand that force alone governs social relations to the exclusion of anything else, and on the other hand that one day the weak, while remaining weak, will nevertheless be stronger. He believed in miracles. | |
| From: comment on Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p.149 | |
| A reaction: This is close to the obvious contradiction if the working classes despise the middle classes (the dreaded 'bourgeoisie') while their only aspiration is to be like them. It is hard to custom design a new class to which they could both aspire. |
| 21995 | Must production determine superstructure, or could it be the other way round? [Singer on Marx] |
| Full Idea: Once the 'interaction' between the superstructure and the productive forces is admitted, is it still possible to maintain that production determines the superstructure, rather than the other way round? | |
| From: comment on Karl Marx (Capital Vol. 1 [1867]) by Peter Singer - Marx 7 | |
| A reaction: It is much harder to defend historical determinism if Singer is right about this. Modern capitalism won't admit of the sort of simple distinctions that mark was looking for. |
| 18653 | Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka] |
| Full Idea: Marx rejected the idea of equal rights, not because he was not a friend to the idea of treating people as equals, but precisely because he thought rights failed to live up to that ideal. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Will Kymlicka - Contemporary Political Philosophy (1st edn) 5.1 | |
| A reaction: Presumably because the power to award 'rights' goes to the highest bidder. If equality is to be enshrined in law, it is a bit difficult to see how else to manage it. |
| 20577 | Even decently paid workers still have their produce bought with money stolen from them [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Even if the workers are paid a fair wage, the whole thing still remains the age-old activity of the conqueror, who buys commodities from the conquered with the money has has stolen from them, | |
| From: Karl Marx (Capital Vol. 1 [1867], p.728), quoted by Johanna Oksala - Political Philosophy: all that matters Ch.8 | |
| A reaction: [Penguin edition cited] The word 'stolen' is obviously dubious here. 'Exploitation' is a much more accurate word. One might talk of 'blackmail' or 'extortion' rather than theft. |
| 22969 | People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can only work with their permission. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], I) | |
| A reaction: In a world of vast multinationals, the person giving the permission to work is nearly always dependent on some higher level permission. In any sort of society people can only work with the consensus of other people. |
| 21996 | Freedom only comes when labour is no longer necessary [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Capital Vol. 3 [1873], p.496), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 8 | |
| A reaction: This is a bit discouraging fo idealistic dreamers. Modern political thought needs an ecological dimension to this problem. If society always needs a fair degree of labour, there must be a way to maximise freedom in that context. |
| 22970 | Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed on society into one completely subordinate to it. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: The intermediate stage is dictatorship of the proletariat (presumably exercised by the communist leadership). No twentieth century marxist state ever got near the freedom which Marx was seeking. A liberal society might achieve it! |
| 21994 | The handmill gives feudalism, the steam mill capitalism [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill society with the industrial capitalist. | |
| From: Karl Marx (The Poverty of Philosophy [1847], p.202), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 7 | |
| A reaction: If technology dictates social structure, then feudalism is still with us, in low-tech industries. What if the steam mill had been invented in 1300? |
| 20958 | Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: In Marx's view the essential factor in capitalism is that the encroachment of the commodity form into society fundamentally changes the world. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 6 'Historical' | |
| A reaction: The main point is that people and their labour become commodities. Haven't animals always been treated as commodities? Clearly slave were commodities, long before capitalism. Capitalism universalises it? |
| 23876 | The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil] |
| Full Idea: Marx discovered a formula impossible to surpass when he said that the essence of capitalism lies in the subordination of subject to object, of man to thing. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Simone Weil - Fragments: London 1943 p,155 | |
| A reaction: I find this rather too vague to be a penetrating observation. I would suggest the obliteration of cooperation and community, in favour of competition. Winners and losers. |
| 20960 | Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie] |
| Full Idea: Marx did not disapprove per se of capitalism. New divisions of labour and forms of ownership could transform individuals in modern societies, creating a more humane world with the means capitalism had liberated from feudalism. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (works [1860]) by Andrew Bowie - Introduction to German Philosophy 11 'Metaphysics' | |
| A reaction: I'm guessing this might be early Marx, which has less to say about the 'scientific' inevitably of deep change, and the necessity for revolution. Nowadays we tinker with humane changes at the poorer end, while the rich run rampant. |
| 22972 | Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' is just the toleration of all possible kinds of religious unfreedom of conscience, and the workers' party should endeavour to liberate the conscience from the witchery of religion. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Critique of the Gotha Program [1875], IV) | |
| A reaction: We see this in modern 'faith' schools in the UK, which do not seem to be required to live up to the standards of freedom of belief expected in the rest of a liberal society. |
| 20519 | Marxists say liberal rights are confrontational, and liberal equality is a sham [Marx, by Wolff,J] |
| Full Idea: For Marx liberal rights are egoistic rights of separation: they encourage each individual to view others as limitations to his or her freedom. ....Liberals set up a sham community of 'equal' citizens. | |
| From: report of Karl Marx (On the Jewish Question [1844]) by Jonathan Wolff - An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) 4 'Marxist' | |
| A reaction: The point is that equality in law does not ensure equal treatment in daily life. I suppose a liberal right can be seen as an opt-out clause for some aspect of society. |
| 14610 | Neither 'moving spotlight' nor 'growing block' views explain why we care what is present or past [Zimmerman,DW] |
| Full Idea: Neither the 'moving spotlight' nor the 'growing block' view of A-theory time can explain why we care so much about whether things (such as a headache) are present or past. | |
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 3) | |
| A reaction: He goes on the defend Presentism as the best version of the A-series view. You can't deny that the past is more of a 'truthmaker' than the future, so it seems to have a firmer ontological status. Deeply weird. |
| 14608 | A-theorists, unlike B-theorists, believe some sort of objective distinction between past, present and future [Zimmerman,DW] |
| Full Idea: To be an A-theorist is to believe in some sort of objective distinction between what is present and past and future. ..To be a B-theorist is to deny the objectivity of our talk about past, present and future. | |
| From: Dean W. Zimmerman (The Privileged Present: A-Theory [2008], 2) | |
| A reaction: The A/B distinction originates with McTaggart. All my intuitions side with the A-theory, certainly to the extent that the present seems to be objectively privileged in some way (despite special relativity). |
| 22345 | Moral philosophy needs a central concept with all the traditional attributes of God [Murdoch] |
| Full Idea: God was (or is) a single perfect transcendent non-representable and necessarily real object of attention. ....Moral philosophy should attempt to retain a central concept which has all these characteristics. | |
| From: Iris Murdoch (The Sovereignty of Good [1970], II) | |
| A reaction: This is a combination of middle Platonism (which sees the Form of the Good as the mind of God) and G.E. Moore's indefinable ideal of goodness. Murdoch connects this suggestion with the centrality of love in moral philosophy. I disagree. |
| 7128 | Religion is the opium of the people, and real happiness requires its abolition [Marx] |
| Full Idea: Religion is the opium of the people. The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is required for their real happiness. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right [1844], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Not being religious myself, I have some sympathy with this ringing clarion-call. However, while opium satisfies an artificial and superficial need, religion certainly seems to speak to something deeper and more central in people. |
| 5299 | Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx] |
| Full Idea: The "religious sentiment" (discussed by Feuerbach) is itself a social product. | |
| From: Karl Marx (Theses on Feuerbach [1846], §VII) | |
| A reaction: Recent brain research has identified a part of the brain which is only active during religious thought and experience. It is easy to produce cynical political accounts of religion, but in its time it was also quite a good scientific account of nature. |