Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Kurt Vonnegut, Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) and W Wimsatt/W Beardsley

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence [Avicenna]
     Full Idea: Understanding begins with the notion of being and essence.
     From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 1/6), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.91
     A reaction: I think I might put it that wisdom is only really possible for people who aim to grasp being and essence in some way. I see no prospect of understanding 'being', and even essences may be forever just beyond our grasp.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
The simple's whatness is its very self [Avicenna]
     Full Idea: The simple's whatness is its very self.
     From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 5.5), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence) p.103
     A reaction: Aquinas endorses this Aristotelian view in Idea 11208.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness [Avicenna]
     Full Idea: The ultimate material of things has the unity of total formlessness.
     From: Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022], 11/12.14), quoted by Thomas Aquinas - De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)
     A reaction: This remark is not invalidated by developments in modern particle physics.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Avicenna's 'indifference of essence' says the essence of certain things can become universal or singular, according to whether it is entertained by the mind (as a universal) or concretely exemplified as a singular thing. One essence can exist in two ways.
     From: report of Avicenna (Abu Ibn Sina) (Commentary on the Metaphysics [1022]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'Sources'
     A reaction: This would appear to be a form of nominalism, since in the concrete external world we only have particulars, and it is our mode of thinking (by abstraction?) that generates the universal aspect. I think this is probably right.
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Out of more than a hundred planets, Earth is the only one with the idea of free will [Vonnegut]
     Full Idea: I wouldn’t have any idea what was meant by ‘free will'. I’ve visited thirty-one inhabited planets in the universe, and studied reports on one hundred more. Only on Earth is there any talk of free will.
     From: Kurt Vonnegut (Slaughterhouse Five [1969], Ch.4)
     A reaction: Spoken by the ambassador from the planet Tralfamadore. Possibly the greatest put down of a philosophical idea since Diogenes responded to Plato's definition of a man. I think free will is a non-idea. It is non-sensical, and doesn't exist.
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Intentions either succeed or fail, so external evidence for them is always irrelevant [Wimsatt/Beardsley, by Davies,S]
     Full Idea: Wimsatt and Beardsley claimed that either the intention succeeded, so one does not need to look outside the work for its meaning, or the intention failed, so external evidence does not help.
     From: report of W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946]) by Stephen Davies - The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed) 5.3
     A reaction: Actually, the external evidence may tell you much more clearly and accurately what the intention was than the work itself does. The best example may be the title of the work, which is presumably outside the work.
The author's intentions are irrelevant to the judgement of a work's success [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The design or intention of the author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: This famous proposal may have been misunderstood. Note that it is a comment about judging the work, not about understanding it. The idea allows for a work being much more successful than the author's humble intentions (e.g. Pepys).
Poetry, unlike messages, can be successful without communicating intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: Poetry differs from practical messages, which are successful if and only if we correctly infer the intention.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: I am not convinced by this claim. It is plausible that a work does much more than it intends (Astaire said he danced "to make a buck"), but it is rather odd to rate very highly a work of which you have missed the point.
The thoughts of a poem should be imputed to the dramatic speaker, and hardly at all to the poet [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: We ought to impute the thoughts and attitudes of the poem immediately to the dramatic speaker, and if to the author at all, only by an act of biographical inference.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §I)
     A reaction: Wrong. If in Browning's "My Last Duchess" (say), we only inferred the mind of the speaker (and his Duchess), and took no interest in Browning's view of things, we would miss the point. We might end up respecting the Duke, which would be daft.
The intentional fallacy is a romantic one [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The intentional fallacy is a romantic one.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §II)
     A reaction: Wrong. Even with those most famous of anonymous artists, the architects and carvers of medieval cathedrals, without some discernment of the purpose you won't get it. The Taj Mahal is a love letter, not a potential ice cream parlour.
Biography can reveal meanings and dramatic character, as well as possible intentions [Wimsatt/Beardsley]
     Full Idea: The use of biographical evidence need not involve intentionalism, because while it may be evidence of what the author intended, it may also be evidence of the meaning of his words and the dramatic character of his utterance.
     From: W Wimsatt/W Beardsley (The Intentional Fallacy [1946], §IV)
     A reaction: I am very keen to penetrate the author's intentions, but I have always be doubtful about the use of biography as a means to achieve this. Most of the effort to infer intentions must come from a study of the work itself, not introductions, letters etc.