Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for La Mettrie, Franz Brentano and Karl Leonhard Reinhold

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12 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold]
     Full Idea: In consciousness the subject distinguishes the representation from the subject and object, and relates it to both.
     From: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (Foundations of Philosophical Knowledge [1791], p.78), quoted by Terry Pinkard - German Philosophy 1760-1860 04
     A reaction: This is a reminder that twentieth century analytic discussions of perception were largely recapitulating late Enlightenment German philosophy. This is a very good definition of sense-data. I can think about my representations. Reinhold was a realist.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
All mental phenomena contain an object [Brentano]
     Full Idea: Every mental phenomenon contains something as object within itself.
     From: Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874], p. 88), quoted by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.21
     A reaction: This gives rise to the slogan that 'intentionality is the mark of the mental', which notoriously seems to miss out the phenomenal aspect of mental life. We note now, though, that even emotions have objects.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey]
     Full Idea: Brentano's thesis is that all mental phenomena are intentional i.e. representational. Support for this view is that assimilating phenomenal experience to attitudes we explain the essential unity of the mind.
     From: report of Franz Brentano (Psychology from an empirical standpoint [1874]) by Georges Rey - Contemporary Philosophy of Mind 11.5
     A reaction: Unifying intentionality and qualia in a single theory looks like a good move, but which one has priority? Evolutionary theory says priority goes to whatever produces behaviour. My intuition is that qualia are more basic - in tiny insects, say.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15)
     A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6)
     A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem.
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26)
     A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist.
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39)
     A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly.
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33)
     A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food.
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34)
     A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747])
     A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie.
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13)
     A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]
     Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks.
     From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747])
     A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this.