40 ideas
| 19079 | For idealists reality is like a collection of beliefs, so truths and truthmakers are not distinct [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Idealists do not believe that there is an ontological distinction between beliefs and what makes beliefs true. From their perspective, reality is something like a collection of beliefs. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.1) | |
| A reaction: This doesn't seem to me to wholly reject truthmakers, since beliefs can still be truthmakers for one another. This is something like Davidson's view, that only beliefs can justify other beliefs. |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| Full Idea: I think knowledge and truth are a matter of correspondence to facts, despite all the energy spent showing the naïveté of this view. The connections of our ideas in our heads correspond to relations in the outside world. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: Yes. Modern books offer the difficulties of defining 'correspondence', and finding an independent account of 'facts', as conclusive objections, but I say a brain is a truth machine, and it had better be useful. Indefinability doesn't nullify concepts. |
| 19076 | Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set'). | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large? |
| 19077 | Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small. |
| 19078 | Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1) | |
| A reaction: One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon. |
| 19084 | Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: It must be remembered that coherentists do not believe that the truth of a proposition consists in coherence with an arbitrarily chosen set of propositions; the coherence is with a set of beliefs, or a set of propositions held to be true. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: This is a very good response to critics who cite bizarre sets of beliefs which happen to have internal coherence. You have to ask why they are not actually believed, and the answer must be that the coherence is not extensive enough. |
| 19083 | How do you identify the best coherence set; and aren't there truths which don't cohere? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: The two main objections to the coherence theory of truth are that there is no way to identify the 'specified set' of propositions without contradiction, ...and that some propositions are true which cohere with no set of beliefs. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1/2) | |
| A reaction: The point of the first is that you need a prior knowledge of truth to say which of two sets is the better one. The second one is thinking of long-lost tiny details from the past, which seem to be true without evidence. A huge set might beat the first one. |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Unlike deflationary theories, the coherence and correspondence theories both hold that truth is a property of propositions that can be analyzed in terms of the sorts of truth-conditions propositions have, and the relation propositions stand in to them. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is presumably because deflationary theories reject the external relations of a proposition as a feature of its truth. This evidently leaves them in need of a theory of meaning, which may be fairly minimal. Horwich would be an example. |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The truth of "a=b" doesn't require much of 'a' and 'b' other than that there is a single thing to which they both refer. They needn't be interdefinable, or have supervenient properties. In this sense, identity is a very weak relation. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. This is seeing the epistemological aspects of identity. Ontologically, identity must invoke Leibniz's Law, and is the ultimately powerful 'relation'. A given student, and the cause of a crop circle, may APPEAR to be quite different. |
| 12155 | Statements of 'relative identity' are really statements of resemblance [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Statements of 'relative' identity are not identity statements at all, but what I would prefer to call 'statements of resemblance' or 'common property staztements'. | |
| From: John Perry (The Same F [1970], n12) | |
| A reaction: This seems like a neat way to sweep the problem from our sight. There remains a nervous metaphysical problem, though, because something seems to be identical when we spot a resemblance. Even two shades of red have something identical in them. |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Using possible worlds to model truth-conditions of statements has led to considerable clarity about the logic of modality. Attempts to use the system for epistemic purposes, however, have been plagued by problems. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably what lurks behind this is a distinction between what is logically or naturally possible, and what appears to be possible from the perspective of a conscious mind. Is there a possible world in which I can fly? |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Possible worlds can be thought of as indices for models of the language in question, or as concrete realities (David Lewis), or as abstract ways the world might be (Robert Stalnaker), or in various other ways. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: I strongly favour the Stalnaker route here. Reducing great metaphysics to mere language I find abhorrent, and I suspect that Lewis was trapped by his commitment to strong empiricism. We must embrace abstractions into our ontology. |
| 12149 | Indexicals are a problem for beliefs being just subject-proposition relations [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The essential indexical is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity. | |
| From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: My immediate reaction would be that it depends on how you conceive of 'propositions'. If they are objective, you have a problem. I take them to be subjective events in brains, and the indexical meaning to be evident within the proposition. |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| Full Idea: We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §2.4) | |
| A reaction: A small and obvious, but important, point. Mental causation isn't just thoughts leading to physical happenings. Here Perry means that events can be designed to cause thoughts, such as a threatening letter. Not much room for epiphenomenalism here. |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The brain state will involve certain parts of the brain, whereas my feeling of pain seems to be located in my hand insofar as it has a bodily location. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems important to me. The brain is a ventriloquist. Perry implies that pain is quasi-disembodied, but it isn't, it is just experienced as IN the hand. Perhaps it is in the hand? Cutting the nerves loses contact with the pain. |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| Full Idea: It seems quite plausible to me that many animals have experiences without knowing about them. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.1) | |
| A reaction: I agree, which makes us acknowledge levels of consciousness, which probably applies to human experience as well. The simplest idea is to distinguish between experiences which involve concepts, and those which don't. Animals sometimes appear surprised. |
| 7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15) | |
| A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity. |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Epiphenomenalism is usually considered to be a form of dualism, but if we define it as the doctrine that conscious events are effects but not causes, it appears to be consistent with physicalism. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.2) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. The theory was invented to put mind outside physics, and make the closure of physics possible. However, being capable of causing things seems to be a necessary condition for physical objects. An effect in one domain is a cause in another. |
| 7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6) | |
| A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem. |
| 23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26) | |
| A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist. |
| 7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39) | |
| A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly. |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Advocates of the mind-body identity theory typically claimed that identity between particular mental states and brain states was contingent, until Kripke argued persuasively that identity is always necessary. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: Kripke wanted to argue against the identity theory, but what he seems to have done is reformulate it into a much more powerful version (involving necessary identity). |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The physicalist should not retreat to causal supervenience but should stick with identity. This means we will have to accept that a Martian and I (when in pain) are not in the same phenomenal state. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §4.3) | |
| A reaction: We naturally presume that frogs feel pain as we do, but many different phenomenal states could lead to the same behavioural end. Only an unpleasant feeling is required. A foul smell would do. Frogs could function with inverted qualia, too. |
| 7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33) | |
| A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food. |
| 16391 | Indexical thoughts are about themselves, and ascribe properties to themselves [Perry, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Perry's newer token-reflexive framework says indexical thoughts have token-reflexive content, that is, thoughts that are about themselves and ascribe properties to themselves. …They relate not to the subject, but to the occurrence of a thought. | |
| From: report of John Perry (Reference and Reflexivity [2001]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 18.1 | |
| A reaction: [There seem to be four indexical theories: this one, Recanati's, the earlier Kaplan-Perry one, and Lewis's] Is Perry thinking of second-level thoughts? 'I'm bored' has the content 'boredom' plus 'felt in here'? How does 'I'm bored' refer to 'I'm bored'? |
| 7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34) | |
| A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines. |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Although we classify ideas by content for many purposes, we do not individuate them by content. The content of an idea can change. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2) | |
| A reaction: As the compiler of this database, I find this very appealing. The mind works exactly like a database. I have a 'file' (Perry's word) marked "London", the content of which undergoes continual change. I am a database management system. |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| Full Idea: In possible-worlds semantics, expressions have intensions, which are functions from possible worlds to appropriate extensions (names to individuals, n-place predicates to n-tuples, and sentences to truth values, built from parts). | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. Perry distinguishes 'referential' (or 'subject matter') content, which is prior to the link to extensions - a link which creates 'reflexive' content. He is keen that they should not become confused. True knowledge is 'situated'. |
| 19074 | Are truth-condtions other propositions (coherence) or features of the world (correspondence)? [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: For the coherence theory of truth, the truth conditions of propositions consist in other propositions. The correspondence theory, in contrast, states that the truth conditions of propositions are ... objective features of the world. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], Intro) | |
| A reaction: It is obviously rather important for your truth-conditions theory of meaning that you are clear about your theory of truth. A correspondence theory is evidently taken for granted, even in possible worlds versions. |
| 19082 | Coherence truth suggests truth-condtions are assertion-conditions, which need knowledge of justification [Young,JO] |
| Full Idea: Coherence theorists can argue that the truth conditions of a proposition are those under which speakers tend to assert it, ...and that speakers can only make a practice of asserting a proposition under conditions they can recognise as justifying it. | |
| From: James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §2.2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] This sounds rather verificationist, and hence wrong, since if you then asserted anything for which you didn't know the justification, that would remove its truth, and thus make it meaningless. |
| 12151 | If we replace 'I' in sentences about me, they are different beliefs and explanations of behaviour [Perry] |
| Full Idea: If I leave a trail of sugar, and realise 'that I am making a mess', ...when we replace the word 'I' with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behaviour, or an attribution of the same belief, so it is an 'essential indexical'. | |
| From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: [compressed] A famous observation of Perry's, which leads him to challenge traditional accounts of belief and of propositions. I don't think I see a problem, if we have a thoroughly non-linguistic account of essentially unambiguous propositions. |
| 18412 | Indexicals individuate certain belief states, helping in explanation and prediction [Perry] |
| Full Idea: We use sentences with indexicals or relativized propositions to individuate belief states, for the purposes of classifying believers in ways useful for explanation and prediction. | |
| From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Obvious') | |
| A reaction: He goes on to apparently connect this with some sort of moral integrity involved in 'owning up' to the fact that the person in question is you (who has spilled the sugar etc.). |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The proposition expressed by a sentence can be thought of as a set of possible worlds, the worlds for which its intension delivers truth. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §8.1) | |
| A reaction: It has always struck me as important to hang on to the concept of a 'proposition' (over and above sentences). This idea gives a metaphysics for the concept, and the 'language of thought' offers appropriate brain structures. A neat picture. |
| 12150 | Indexicals reveal big problems with the traditional idea of a proposition [Perry] |
| Full Idea: The problem of the essential indexical reveals that something is badly wrong with the traditional doctrine of propositions. | |
| From: John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979], 'Prob') | |
| A reaction: See the reaction to 12149. The traditional view of propositions, or at least Russell's view, seems to be that they are same as facts, which strikes me as daft. I take propositions to be brain events, probably expressed in mentalese. |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |
| Full Idea: Although there is seldom a sharp analytic/synthetic distinction to be drawn in the case of our concepts, there are clearly things that are more and less central. | |
| From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §3.2) | |
| A reaction: Most Americans seem enslaved to Quine on this one, so it is nice to see the obvious being stated for once. Human thought is an organic offshoot of the natural world. To think it is all arbitrary and changeable is human arrogance. |
| 7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
| A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie. |
| 15203 | Tense is essential for thought and action [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: Tense plays a crucial role in thought and action. | |
| From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
| A reaction: This is important, because much of our metaphysics is dominated by a detached 'scientific' description of reality, which is given a rather passive character. If processes take centre stage, which they should, then our own processes are part of it. |
| 15204 | Actual tensed sentences cannot be tenseless, because they can cite their own context [Perry, by Le Poidevin] |
| Full Idea: In the new tenseless theory, no tensed token sentence can be equivalent to a tenseless token, because the former, unlike the latter, draws attention to the context in which it is tokened. | |
| From: report of John Perry (The Problem of the Essential Indexical [1979]) by Robin Le Poidevin - Past, Present and Future of Debate about Tense 3 a | |
| A reaction: So the problem about indexicals was worrying fans of the tenseless B-series view of time (and so it should). I'm inclined to translate sentences containing indexicals into their actual propositions, which tend to avoid them. 'Time/person of utterance'. |
| 7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13) | |
| A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals. |
| 7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |
| Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks. | |
| From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
| A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this. |