17 ideas
1507 | We don't have time for infinite quantity, but we do for infinite divisibility, because time is also divisible [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Although it is impossible to make contact in a finite time with things that are infinite in quantity, it is possible to do so with things that are infinitely divisible, since the time itself is also infinite in this way. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A25) by Aristotle - Physics 233a21 |
5109 | The fast runner must always reach the point from which the slower runner started [Zeno of Elea, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Zeno's so-called 'Achilles' claims that the slowest runner will never be caught by the fastest runner, because the one behind has first to reach the point from which the one in front started, and so the slower one is bound always to be in front. | |
From: report of Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 239b14 | |
A reaction: The point is that the slower runner will always have moved on when the faster runner catches up with the starting point. We must understand how humble the early Greeks felt when they confronted arguments like this. It was like a divine revelation. |
1512 | Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Zeno is wrong in arguing that the tiniest fragment of millet makes a sound; there is no reason why the fragment should be able to move in any amount of time the air which the whole bushel moved as it fell. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A29) by Aristotle - Physics 250a16 |
1508 | Zeno's arrow paradox depends on the assumption that time is composed of nows [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: Zeno's third argument claims that a moving arrow is still. Here the conclusion depends on assuming that time is composed of nows; if this assumption is not granted, the argument fails. | |
From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A27?) by Aristotle - Physics 239b5 |
7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The imagination alone perceives; it forms an idea of all objects, with the words and figures that characterise them; thus the imagination is the soul, because it plays all its roles. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.15) | |
A reaction: This is not just a big claim for the importance of imagination, in strong opposition to Descartes's rather dismissive view (Idea 1399), but also appears to be the germ of an interesting theory about the nature of personal identity. |
7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The soul and body fall asleep together. The soul slowly becomes paralysed, together with all the body's muscles. They can no longer hold up the weight of the head, while the soul can no longer bear the burden of thought. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.6) | |
A reaction: A very nice observation, to place alongside other evidence such as drunkenness and blushing. Personally I find it hard to see why anyone ever believed dualism. You don't need modern brain scans and brain lesion research to see the problem. |
23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: All the soul's faculties depend so much on the specific organisation of the brain and of the whole body that they are clearly nothing but that organisation. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.26) | |
A reaction: An interesting idea because it suggests that La Mettrie is a functionalist, rather than simply a reductive physicalist. |
7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: Let us conclude boldly that man is a machine and that there is in the whole universe only one diversely modified substance. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.39) | |
A reaction: What courage it must have taken to write what now seems a perfectly acceptable and normal view. One day there should be a collective monument to Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, La Mettrie and Hume, who thought so boldly. |
7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: Thought is only a capacity to feel, and the rational soul is only the sensitive soul applied to the contemplation of ideas and to reasoning. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.33) | |
A reaction: What a very nice idea. La Mettrie wants to bring us closer to animals. Because we can pursue a train of rational thought, it does not follow that we have a faculty called 'rationality'. A dog can follow a clever series of clues that lead to food. |
7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: If wonderful machines like Huygens's planetary clock can be made, it would take even more cogs and springs to make a speaking machine, which can no longer be considered impossible, particularly at the hands of a new Prometheus. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.34) | |
A reaction: Compare Descartes in Idea 3614. The idea of artificial intelligence does not arise with the advent of computers; it follows naturally from the materialist view of the mind, along with a bit of ambition to build complex machines. |
21650 | No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber] |
Full Idea: For Paul Pietroski no expression in natural language is semantically referential. ....Reference to objects occurs not at the level of semantics, but at the level of thought or utterance. | |
From: report of Paul M. Pietroski (Events and Semantic Architecture [2004]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.2 | |
A reaction: Love this. It has always struck me that reference is what speakers do. Try taking any supposedly referential description and sticking 'so-called' in front of it. That seems to leave you with the reference even though you have denied the description. |
454 | If there are many things they must have a finite number, but there must be endless things between them [Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: It things are many, they can't be more or less than they are, so they must be finite, but also there must be endless things between each thing, so they must be infinite. | |
From: Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B3), quoted by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 140.29 |
7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The sun was not made in order to heat the earth and all its inhabitants - whom it sometimes burns - any more than the rain was created in order to grow seeds - which it often spoils. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
A reaction: This denial of Aristotelian (and divine) teleology is as much part of the movement against religion, as are concerns about natural evil, and about the weakness of arguments for God's existence. These facts were obvious long before La Mettrie. |
455 | That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not [Zeno of Elea] |
Full Idea: That which moves, moves neither in the place in which it is, nor in that in which it is not. | |
From: Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B4), quoted by (who?) - where? |
1511 | If everything is in a place, what is the place in? Place doesn't exist [Zeno of Elea, by Simplicius] |
Full Idea: If there is a place it will be in something, because everything that exists is in something. But what is in something is in a place. Therefore the place will be in a place, and so on ad infinitum. Therefore, there is no such thing as place. | |
From: report of Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], B3) by Simplicius - On Aristotle's 'Physics' 9.562.3 |
7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: From animals to man there is no abrupt transition. What was man before he invented words and learnt languages? An animal of a particular species, with much less natural instinct than the others. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747], p.13) | |
A reaction: This shows how strongly the evolutionary idea was in the air, a century before Darwin proposed a mechanism for it. This thought is the beginning of a very new view of man, and also of a very new view of animals. |
7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |
Full Idea: The soul is merely a vain term of which we have no idea and which a good mind should use only to refer to that part of us which thinks. | |
From: Julien Offray de La Mettrie (Machine Man [1747]) | |
A reaction: I have always found the concept of the soul particularly baffling. It seems that it is only believed in to make immortality possible, with no other purpose to the belief, let alone evidence. I suspect that Descartes agreed with La Mettrie on this. |