25 ideas
22820 | Early Romantics sought a plurality of systems, in a quest for freedom [Hösle] |
Full Idea: It was an early Romantic idea that there is necessarily a plurality of systems in which individuality is expressed; for a complete system would destroy freedom. | |
From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 7) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why you are free because you are locked into system that differs from that of other people. True freedom seems to be either no system, or continually remaking one's own system. Why is such freedom valuable? Freedom v truth? |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The main objection to the axiom of choice was that it had to be given by some law or definition, but since sets are arbitrary this seems irrelevant. Formalists consider it meaningless, but set-theorists consider it as true, and practically obvious. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One can distinguish at least two quite different senses of logic: as an instrument of demonstration, and perhaps as an instrument for the characterization of structures. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: This is trying to capture the proof-theory and semantic aspects, but merely 'characterizing' something sounds like a rather feeble aspiration for the semantic side of things. Isn't it to do with truth, rather than just rule-following? |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Elementary logic cannot characterize the usual mathematical structures, but seems to be distinguished by its completeness. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The expressive power of second-order logic is too great to admit a proof procedure, but is adequate to express set-theoretical statements, and open questions such as the continuum hypothesis or the existence of big cardinals are easily stated. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions, of any number of arguments, are definable from (say) 'not' and 'and'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §0) | |
A reaction: The point of 'say' is that it can be got down to two connectives, and these are just the usual preferred pair. |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The symbols ∀ and ∃ may, to start with, be regarded as extrapolations of the truth functional connectives ∧ ('and') and ∨ ('or') to infinite domains. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §5) |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
Full Idea: One might add to one's logic an 'uncountable quantifier', or a 'Chang quantifier', or a 'two-argument quantifier', or 'Shelah's quantifier', or 'branching quantifiers'. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §3) | |
A reaction: [compressed - just listed for reference, if you collect quantifiers, like collecting butterflies] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Skolem deduced from the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem that 'the absolutist conceptions of Cantor's theory' are 'illusory'. I think it is clear that this conclusion would not follow even if elementary logic were in some sense the true logic, as Skolem assumed. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §7) | |
A reaction: [Tharp cites Skolem 1962 p.47] Kit Fine refers to accepters of this scepticism about the arithmetic of infinities as 'Skolemites'. |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The Löwenheim-Skolem property seems to be undesirable, in that it states a limitation concerning the distinctions the logic is capable of making, such as saying there are uncountably many reals ('Skolem's Paradox'). | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure, since there is little point in proving formulas which may turn out to be false under some interpretation. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Putting completeness and compactness together, one has axiomatizability. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §1) |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: In general, if completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: I.e. the theory is not effectively enumerable. |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
Full Idea: It is strange that compactness is often ignored in discussions of philosophy of logic, since the most important theories have infinitely many axioms. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: An example of infinite axioms is the induction schema in first-order Peano Arithmetic. |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
Full Idea: The compactness condition seems to state some weakness of the logic (as if it were futile to add infinitely many hypotheses). To look at it another way, formalizations of (say) arithmetic will admit of non-standard models. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
Full Idea: A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
Full Idea: Despite completeness, the mere existence of an effective enumeration of the valid formulas will not, by itself, provide knowledge. For example, one might be able to prove that there is an effective enumeration, without being able to specify one. | |
From: Leslie H. Tharp (Which Logic is the Right Logic? [1975], §2) | |
A reaction: The point is that completeness is supposed to ensure knowledge (of what is valid but unprovable), and completeness entails effective enumerability, but more than the latter is needed to do the key job. |
8122 | True works of art transmit completely new feelings [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: Only that is a true work of art which transmits fresh feelings not previously experienced by man. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.9) | |
A reaction: I think a great composer will probably not have any new feelings at all, but will discover new expressions which contain feelings by which even they are surprised (e.g. the Tristan chord). |
8121 | Art is when one man uses external signs to hand on his feelings to another man [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: Art is a human activity in which one man consciously by means of external signs, hands on to others feelings he has lived through, and other are infected by those feelings, and also experience them. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Such definitions always work better for some art forms than for others. This may fit 'Anna Karenin' quite well, but probably not Bach's 'Art of Fugue'. Writing obscenities on someone's front door would fit this definition. |
8124 | The highest feelings of mankind can only be transmitted by art [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: The highest feelings to which mankind has attained can only be transmitted from man to man by art. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: We are much more nervous these days of talking about 'highest' feelings. Tolstoy obviously considers religion to be an ingredient of the highest feelings, but that prevents us from judging them purely as feelings. Music is the place to rank feelings. |
8123 | The purpose of art is to help mankind to evolve better, more socially beneficial feelings [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: The evolution of feeling proceeds by means of art - feelings less kind and less necessary for the well-being of mankind being replaced by others kinder and more needful for that end. That is the purpose of art. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: Underneath his superficially expressivist view of art, Tolstoy is really an old-fashioned moralist about it, like Dr Johnson. This is the moralism of the great age of the nineteenth century novel (which was, er, the greatest age of the novel!). |
22710 | People estimate art according to their moral values [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: The estimation of the value of art …depends on men's perception of the meaning of life; depends on what they hold to be the good and evil of life. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898]), quoted by Iris Murdoch - The Sublime and the Good p.206 | |
A reaction: [No ref given] This is put to the test by the insightful depiction of wickedness. We condemn the wickedness and admire the insight. Every reading of a novel is a moral journey, though I'm not sure how the true psychopath reads a novel. |
8125 | The upper classes put beauty first, and thus freed themselves from morality [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: The people of the upper class, more and more frequently encountering the contradictions between beauty and goodness, put the ideal of beauty first, thus freeing themselves from the demands of morality. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: The rich are a great deal freer to pursue the demands of beauty than are the poor. They also have a tradition of 'immorality' (such as duels and adultery) which was in place long before they discovered art. |
8064 | We separate the concept of beauty from goodness, unlike the ancients [Tolstoy] |
Full Idea: The ancients had not that conception of beauty separated from goodness which forms the basis and aim of aesthetics in our time. | |
From: Leo Tolstoy (What is Art? [1898], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: This is written at around the time of the Aesthetic Movement, but Tolstoy's own novels are intensely moral. This separation makes abstract painting possible. |
22819 | In the 18th century history came to be seen as progressive, rather than cyclical [Hösle] |
Full Idea: The turning point in the history of the philosophy of history occurs in the eighteenth century, when the ancient cyclical model of Vico is superseded by the idea of progress. | |
From: Vittorio Hösle (A Short History of German Philosophy [2013], 6) | |
A reaction: He says that Hegel merely inherited this progressive view, rather than creating it. I'm not sure how widely held the cyclical view was. I don't recognise it in Shakespeare. Science and technology must have suggested progress. |