Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lloyd Morgan, Carl Hoefer and Seymour Lipschutz

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3 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
Equivalence relations are reflexive, symmetric and transitive, and classify similar objects [Lipschutz]
     Full Idea: A relation R on a non-empty set S is an equivalence relation if it is reflexive (for each member a, aRa), symmetric (if aRb, then bRa), and transitive (aRb and bRc, so aRc). It tries to classify objects that are in some way 'alike'.
     From: Seymour Lipschutz (Set Theory and related topics (2nd ed) [1998], 3.9)
     A reaction: So this is an attempt to formalise the common sense notion of seeing that two things have something in common. Presumably a 'way' of being alike is going to be a property or a part
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Life has a new supervenient relation, which alters its underlying physical events [Morgan,L]
     Full Idea: When some new kind of relatedness is supervenient (say at the level of life), the way in which the physical events which are involved run their course is different in virtue of its presence.
     From: Lloyd Morgan (Emergent Evolution [1923], pp.15-16), quoted by Terence Horgan - From Supervenience to Superdupervenience 1
     A reaction: This is a clear assertion of 'downward causation' at the first introduction of 'supervenience', supporting 'emergentism' about life and mind. That is, the newly-emerged feature has new causal powers that affect the physical system from outside. Wrong!
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
General Relativity allows substantivalism about space-time - that it has independent properties [Hoefer]
     Full Idea: General Relativity describes space-time in a way that allows it to exist with determinate properties not reducible to the properties and relations of its material contents. Hence nearly all physicists and philosophers writing on GR are substantivalists.
     From: Carl Hoefer (The Metaphysics of Space-Time Substantivalism [1996], p.5), quoted by Barbara Vetter - Potentiality 7.3
     A reaction: I'm encouraged by this, as I instinctly favour substantivalism. Imagine removing all the objects from space-time, one by one. What happens as you approach the end of the task? Once they are removed, can they be replaced?