38 ideas
7973 | There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: There is no longer anything on which there is nothing to say. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 17) | |
A reaction: Compare Ideas 2937 and 6870. I'm not sure whether Baudrillard is referring to the limits of philosophy, or merely to social taboos. I like Ansell Pearson's view: we should attempt to discuss what appears to be undiscussable. |
6841 | Some continental philosophers are relativists - Baudrillard, for example [Baudrillard, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: There are philosophers in the continental tradition who are relativists - Baudrillard, for example. | |
From: report of Jean Baudrillard (works [1976]) by Simon Critchley - Interview with Baggini and Stangroom p.192 | |
A reaction: This remark is in the context of Critchley denying that most continental philosophers are relativists. |
7975 | The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The task of philosophy is to unmask the illusion of objective reality - a trap that is, in a sense, laid for us by nature. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 40) | |
A reaction: There is a vast gap between this and the Lockean view (Idea 7653) that philosophers are there to help reveal reality, probably via science. I retain the Enlightenment faith that there is a reality to be found. Baudrillard must be taken seriously, though. |
7986 | Drunken boat pilots are less likely to collide than clearly focused ones [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Two boats on Lake Constance in dense fog are in less danger of colliding if their pilots are drunk than if they are attempting to master the situation. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.196) | |
A reaction: Charming, but I think empirical research would prove it false. At least rational pilots know to keep to the right (?) when a shape looms through the fog. I prefer rational pilots, but then I am one of those sad people who admires the Enlightenment. |
7982 | Instead of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis, they now cancel out, and the conflict is levelled [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Gone is the dialectic, the play of thesis and antithesis resolving itself in synthesis. The opposing terms now cancel each other out in a levelling of all conflict. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.129) | |
A reaction: This is from someone who approved of 9/11 (p.137 of this text), and seemed to welcome conflict. His idea, which has plausibility, is that the modern media have become a great warm bath that calmly absorbs every abrasive thrown into it. |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
A reaction: This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms? |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
A reaction: His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear. |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Not to the mathematician, but to the psychologist, belongs the task of explaining why ...we are averse to so-called contradictory systems in which the negative as well as the positive of certain propositions are valid. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.79) | |
A reaction: Was the turning point of Graham Priest's life the day he read this sentence? I don't agree. I take the principle of non-contradiction to be a highly generalised observation of how the world works (and Russell agrees with me). |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: From the intuitionist standpoint the dogma of the universal validity of the principle of excluded third in mathematics can only be considered as a phenomenon of history of civilization, like the rationality of pi or rotation of the sky about the earth. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2 | |
A reaction: [Brouwer 1952:510-11] |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Brouwer made the rather extraordinary claim that mathematics is a mental activity which uses no language. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1 | |
A reaction: Since I take language to have far less of a role in thought than is commonly believed, I don't think this idea is absurd. I would say that we don't use language much when we are talking! |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In his early writing, Brouwer took a real number to be a Cauchy sequence determined by a rule. Later he augmented rule-governed sequences with free-choice sequences, but even then the attitude is that Cauchy sequences are potential, not actual infinities. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.6 | |
A reaction: This is the 'constructivist' view of numbers, as espoused by intuitionists like Brouwer. |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: A large part of the natural laws introduced by science treat only of the mutual relations between the results of counting and measuring. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.77) | |
A reaction: His point, I take it, is that the higher reaches of numbers have lost touch with the original point of the system. I now see the whole issue as just depending on conventions about the agreed extension of the word 'number'. |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Brouwer regards as somehow 'wicked' the idea that mathematics can be applied to a non-mental subject matter, the physical world, and that it might develop in response to the needs which that application reveals. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1 | |
A reaction: The idea is that mathematics only concerns creations of the human mind. It presumably has no more application than, say, noughts-and-crosses. |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist recognises only the existence of denumerable sets. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80) | |
A reaction: That takes you up to omega, but not beyond, presumably because it then loses sight of the original intuition of 'bare two-oneness' (Idea 12453). I sympathise, but the word 'number' has shifted its meaning a lot these days. |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Neo-intuitionism sees the falling apart of moments, reunited while remaining separated in time, as the fundamental phenomenon of human intellect, passing by abstracting to mathematical thinking, the intuition of bare two-oneness. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80) | |
A reaction: [compressed] A famous and somewhat obscure idea. He goes on to say that this creates one and two, and all the finite ordinals. |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Mathematics rigorously treated from the point of view of deducing theorems exclusively by means of introspective construction, is called intuitionistic mathematics. It deviates from classical mathematics, which believes in unknown truths. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics [1948]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 1.2 | |
A reaction: Clearly intuitionist mathematics is a close cousin of logical positivism and the verification principle. This view would be anathema to Frege, because it is psychological. Personally I believe in the existence of unknown truths, big time! |
7974 | Without God we faced reality: what do we face without reality? [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The eclipse of God left us up against reality. Where will the eclipse of reality leave us? | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004]) | |
A reaction: Baudrillard's distinctive view is that modern culture is thwarting all our attempts to grasp reality, which itself becomes a fiction. The answer is that you are left in the position of the ancient sceptics. Sextus Empiricus (see) is the saviour. |
7987 | Nothing is true, but everything is exact [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Someone said: everything is true, nothing is exact. I would say the opposite: nothing is true, everything is exact. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.210) | |
A reaction: In analytical terminology, this appears to say that vagueness is ontological, not epistemological, agreeing with Williamson and others. To say that 'nothing is true', though, just strikes me as silly. What does Baudrillard mean by 'true'? |
8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
Full Idea: True statements about the necessary properties of things need not be necessarily true. The well-known example is that the number of planets (9) is necessarily an odd number. The necessity is de re, but not de dicto. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Nat.Internal') | |
A reaction: This would be a matter of the scope (the placing of the brackets) of the 'necessarily' operator in a formula. The quick course in modal logic should eradicate errors of this kind in your budding philosopher. |
8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
A reaction: This is why I do not think animals 'know' anything, though they seem to have lots of true beliefs about their immediate situation. |
8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
Full Idea: When we ask whether a belief is justified, we want to know whether it is all right to believe it. The question we must ask is 'when is it permissible (epistemically) to believe P?'. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |
A reaction: Nice to see someone trying to get the question clear. The question clearly points to the fact that there must at least be some sort of social aspect to criteria of justification. I can't cheerfully follow my intuitions if everyone else laughs at them. |
8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Epistemologists have noted that logical entailments do not always constitute reasons. P may entail Q without the connection between P and Q being at all obvious. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
A reaction: Graham Priest and others try to develop 'relevance logic' to deal with this. This would deny the peculiar classical claim that everything is entailed by a falsehood. A belief looks promising if it entails lots of truths about the world. |
8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Epistemic norms are to be understood in terms of procedural knowledge involving internalized rules for reasoning. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |
A reaction: He offers analogies with bicycly riding, but the simple fact that something is internalized doesn't make it a norm. Some mention of truth is needed, equivalent to 'don't crash the bike'. |
8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
Full Idea: When one makes a perceptual judgement on the basis of a perceptual state, I want to say that the perceptual state itself is one's reason. ..Reason are always reasons for beliefs, but the reasons themselves need not be beliefs. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Dir.Realism') | |
A reaction: A crucial issue. I think I prefer the view of Davidson, in Ideas 8801 and 8804. Three options: a pure perception counts as a reason, or perceptions involve some conceptual content, or you only acquire a reason when a proposition is formulated. |
8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
Full Idea: If we had to make explicit appeal to epistemic norms for justification (the 'intellectualist model') we would find ourselves in an infinite regress. The norms, their existence and their application would themselves have to be justified. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'How regulate?') | |
A reaction: This is counter to the 'space of reasons' picture, where everything is rationally assessed. There are regresses for both reasons and for experiences, when they are offered as justifications. |
8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Norm Externalism acknowledges that the content of our epistemic norms must be internalist, but employs external considerations in the selection of the norms themselves. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ep.Norms') | |
A reaction: It can't be right that you just set your own norms, so this must contain some truth. Equally, even the most hardened externalist can't deny that what goes on in the head of the person concerned must have some relevance. |
8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view in discussing epistemology. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
A reaction: Pollock's point, quite reasonably, is that the first-person aspect must precede any objective assessment of whether someone knows. External facts, such as unpublicised information, can undermine high quality internal justification. |
8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
Full Idea: External considerations of reliability could not be internalized. Consequently, it is in principle impossible for us to actually employ externalist norms. I take this to be a conclusive refutation of belief externalism. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Ref.of Extern') | |
A reaction: Not so fast. He earlier rejected the 'intellectualist model' (Idea 8813), so he doesn't think norms have to be fully conscious and open to criticism. So they could be innate, or the result of indoctrination (sorry, teaching), or just forgotten. |
7978 | There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: There is no need to involve the idea of free will to make choices about one's life. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 57) | |
A reaction: Someone who believed that free will was metaphysically possible, but that they themselves lacked it, might feel paralysed, defeated or fatalistic about their decision-making. But that would be like falsely believing you were fatally ill. |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The concern of mathematical intuitionists was that the use of certain forms of inference generates, not contradiction, but unjustified assertions. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the real origin of the verificationist idea in the theory of meaning. It is a hugely revolutionary idea - that ideas are not only ruled out of court by contradiction, but that there are other criteria which should also be met. |
7980 | In modern times, being useless is the essential aesthetic ingredient for an object [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Since the nineteenth century it has been art's claim that it is useless...so it is enough to elevate any object to uselessness to turn it into a work of art...and obsolete useless objects automatically acquire an aesthetic aura. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.111) | |
A reaction: Art is 'purposive without purpose' (Kant). An nice summary of the situation, and this seems to explain the role of Duchamp's famous urinal, up on the wall and rendered useless. The obvious rebellion, though, is Arts and Crafts. |
7983 | Good versus evil has been banefully reduced to happiness versus misfortune [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The ideal opposition between good and evil has been reduced to the idealogical oppositions between happiness and misfortune. The reduction of good to happiness is as baneful as that of evil to misfortune. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.139) | |
A reaction: A nice example is the use in the media of the word 'tragic' for every misfortune. See the debate over the translation of the Greek 'eudaimonia'. 'Happiness' seems the wrong translation, if it leads to comments like Baudrillard's. |
7981 | Whole populations are terrorist threats to authorities, who unite against them [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: One way or another, populations themselves are a terrorist threat to the authorities...and by extension, we can hypothesize a coalition of all governments against all populations. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.120) | |
A reaction: This may count as left-wing paranoia, but it is a striking thought, which plants an uneasy notion in the mind whenever we see two world leaders disappear behind closed doors for a chat. |
7976 | People like democracy because it means they can avoid power [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: If the people puts itself into the hands of the political class, it does so more to be rid of power than out of any desire for representation. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 54) | |
A reaction: Very nice. If we are all in the grips of some biological 'will to power', that needn't be power over huge numbers of other people, merely power over our immediate lives. It can be expressed by building a wall. |
7977 | Only in the last 200 years have people demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Individuality is a recent phenomenon. It is only over the last two centuries that the populations of the civilized countries have demanded the democratic privilege of being individuals. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 55) | |
A reaction: I think Aristotle's ethics and politics imply individuality, given that the only purpose of civic society seems to be to enable individuals to flourish and lead virtuous lives. Society is justified, for example, because it makes friendship possible. |
7979 | The arrival of the news media brought history to an end [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: The course of history came to an end with the entry on the scene of the news media. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p. 83) | |
A reaction: The sort of remark for which Baudrillard became famous. It strikes me as nonsense. The view the British people got of the Battle of Trafalgar was even more distorted than their picture of the Battle of El Alamein. We know what he means, though. |
7984 | Suicide is ascribed to depression, with the originality of the act of will ignored [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: Suicide is always ascribed to depressive motivations with no account taken of an originality of, an original will to commit, the act itself. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.153) | |
A reaction: Apparently research suggests that most suicides are clinically depressed, but even within the depression there is a startling act of will that goes beyond merely feeling bad. |
7985 | Pascal says secular life is acceptable, but more fun with the hypothesis of God [Baudrillard] |
Full Idea: What Pascal says, more or less, is that you can more or less content yourself with a secular existence and its advantages, but it's much more fun with the hypothesis of God. | |
From: Jean Baudrillard (The Intelligence of Evil [2004], p.155) | |
A reaction: Pascal will be a bit startled when he reads this, but it is a lovely way to present his idea. It suddenly sounds much more attractive. Life would be much more fun if we lived according to all sorts of startling beliefs. Relating your life to God is one. |