59 ideas
5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
Full Idea: Consistency is a modal notion: a set of propositions is consistent iff all the members of the set could be true together. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This shows why Kantian ethics, for example, needs a metaphysical underpinning. Maybe Kant should have believed in the reality of Leibnizian possible worlds? An account of reason requires an account of necessity and possibility. |
5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
Full Idea: First-order predicate language has four connectives, two quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names, and brackets. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Look up the reference for the details! The spirit of logic is seen in this basic framework, and the main interest is in the ontological commitment of the items on the list. The list is either known a priori, or it is merely conventional. |
5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
Full Idea: First-order predicate calculus is an extensional logic, while quantified modal logic is intensional (which has grave problems of interpretation, according to Quine). | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: The battle is over ontology. Quine wants the ontology to stick with the values of the variables (i.e. the items in the real world that are quantified over in the extension). The rival view arises from attempts to explain necessity and counterfactuals. |
12452 | Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Not to the mathematician, but to the psychologist, belongs the task of explaining why ...we are averse to so-called contradictory systems in which the negative as well as the positive of certain propositions are valid. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.79) | |
A reaction: Was the turning point of Graham Priest's life the day he read this sentence? I don't agree. I take the principle of non-contradiction to be a highly generalised observation of how the world works (and Russell agrees with me). |
15941 | For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: From the intuitionist standpoint the dogma of the universal validity of the principle of excluded third in mathematics can only be considered as a phenomenon of history of civilization, like the rationality of pi or rotation of the sky about the earth. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]), quoted by Shaughan Lavine - Understanding the Infinite VI.2 | |
A reaction: [Brouwer 1952:510-11] |
5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
Full Idea: Permitting quantification into predicate position and adding second-order variables leads to second-order logic. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Often expressed by saying that we now quantify over predicates and relations, rather than just objects. Depends on your metaphysical commitments. |
5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
Full Idea: In first-order predicate calculus validity is defined thus: an argument is valid iff every model that makes the premises of the argument true also makes the conclusion of the argument true. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: See Melia Ch. 2 for an explanation of a 'model'. Traditional views of validity tend to say that if the premises are true the conclusion has to be true (necessarily), but this introduces the modal term 'necessarily', which is controversial. |
18119 | Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Brouwer made the rather extraordinary claim that mathematics is a mental activity which uses no language. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1 | |
A reaction: Since I take language to have far less of a role in thought than is commonly believed, I don't think this idea is absurd. I would say that we don't use language much when we are talking! |
18247 | Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro] |
Full Idea: In his early writing, Brouwer took a real number to be a Cauchy sequence determined by a rule. Later he augmented rule-governed sequences with free-choice sequences, but even then the attitude is that Cauchy sequences are potential, not actual infinities. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (works [1930]) by Stewart Shapiro - Philosophy of Mathematics 6.6 | |
A reaction: This is the 'constructivist' view of numbers, as espoused by intuitionists like Brouwer. |
12451 | Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: A large part of the natural laws introduced by science treat only of the mutual relations between the results of counting and measuring. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.77) | |
A reaction: His point, I take it, is that the higher reaches of numbers have lost touch with the original point of the system. I now see the whole issue as just depending on conventions about the agreed extension of the word 'number'. |
18118 | Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock] |
Full Idea: Brouwer regards as somehow 'wicked' the idea that mathematics can be applied to a non-mental subject matter, the physical world, and that it might develop in response to the needs which that application reveals. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Mathematics, Science and Language [1928]) by David Bostock - Philosophy of Mathematics 7.1 | |
A reaction: The idea is that mathematics only concerns creations of the human mind. It presumably has no more application than, say, noughts-and-crosses. |
12454 | Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: The intuitionist recognises only the existence of denumerable sets. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80) | |
A reaction: That takes you up to omega, but not beyond, presumably because it then loses sight of the original intuition of 'bare two-oneness' (Idea 12453). I sympathise, but the word 'number' has shifted its meaning a lot these days. |
12453 | Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Neo-intuitionism sees the falling apart of moments, reunited while remaining separated in time, as the fundamental phenomenon of human intellect, passing by abstracting to mathematical thinking, the intuition of bare two-oneness. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912], p.80) | |
A reaction: [compressed] A famous and somewhat obscure idea. He goes on to say that this creates one and two, and all the finite ordinals. |
8728 | Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer] |
Full Idea: Mathematics rigorously treated from the point of view of deducing theorems exclusively by means of introspective construction, is called intuitionistic mathematics. It deviates from classical mathematics, which believes in unknown truths. | |
From: Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Consciousness, Philosophy and Mathematics [1948]), quoted by Stewart Shapiro - Thinking About Mathematics 1.2 | |
A reaction: Clearly intuitionist mathematics is a close cousin of logical positivism and the verification principle. This view would be anathema to Frege, because it is psychological. Personally I believe in the existence of unknown truths, big time! |
5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers think that any fact can be captured in a language containing only names and predicates. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: The problem case Melia is discussing is modal facts, such as 'x is possible'. It is hard to see how 'possible' could be an ordinary predicate, but then McGinn claims that 'existence' is, and that there are some predicates with unusual characters. |
5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
Full Idea: Some philosophers say that modal facts cannot be expressed either by name/predicate language, or by first-order predicate calculus, or even by second-order logic. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: If 'possible' were a predicate, none of this paraphernalia would be needed. If possible worlds are accepted, then the quantifiers of first-order predicate calculus will do the job. If neither of these will do, there seems to be a problem. |
5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
Full Idea: If the Identity of Indiscernibles is referring to qualitative properties, such as 'being red' or 'having mass', it is contentious; if it is referring to non-qualitative properties, such as 'member of set s' or 'brother of a', it is true but trivial. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.3 n 11) | |
A reaction: I would say 'false' rather than 'contentious'. No one has ever offered a way of distinguishing two electrons, but that doesn't mean there is just one (very busy) electron. The problem is that 'indiscernible' is only an epistemological concept. |
5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
Full Idea: We may have fairly firm beliefs as to whether or not P is necessary, but many of us find ourselves at a complete loss when wondering whether or not P is necessarily necessary. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: I think it is questions like this which are pushing philosophy back towards some sort of rationalism. See Idea 3651, for example. A regress of necessities would be mad, so necessity must be taken as self-evident (in itself, though maybe not to us). |
5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
Full Idea: In cases of 'de re' modality, it is a particular thing that has the property essentially or accidentally; where the modality attaches to the proposition, it is 'de dicto' - it is the whole truth that all bachelors are unmarried that is necessary. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: This seems to me one of the most important distinctions in metaphysics (as practised by analytical philosophers, who like distinctions). The first type leads off into the ontology, the second type veers towards epistemology. |
5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
Full Idea: Sometimes we want to count the ways in which something is possible, or say that there are many ways in which a certain thing is possible. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a basic fact about talk of 'possibility'. It is not an all-or-nothing property of a situation. There can be 'faint' possibilities of things. The proximity of some possible worlds, especially those sharing our natural laws, is one answer. |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
Full Idea: In modal logic the concepts of necessity and counterfactuals are not interdefinable, so the language needs two primitives to represent them, but with the machinery of possible worlds they are defined by what is the case in all worlds, or close worlds. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.1) | |
A reaction: If your motivation is to reduce ontology to the barest of minimums (which it was for David Lewis) then it is paradoxical that the existence of possible worlds may be the way to achieve it. I doubt, though, whether a commitment to their reality is needed. |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
Full Idea: The central idea in possible worlds semantics is that the modal operators are treated as quantifiers. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: It seems an essential requirement of metaphysics that an account be given of possibility and necessity, and it is also a good dream to keep the ontology simple. Commitment to possible worlds is the bizarre outcome of this dream. |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
Full Idea: It has proved difficult to justify possible worlds semantics without accepting possible worlds. Without a secure metaphysical underpinning, the results in logic are in danger of having nothing more than a formal significance. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This makes nicely clear why Lewis's controversial modal realism has to be taken seriously. It appears that the key problem is truth, because that is needed to define validity, but you can't have truth without some sort of metaphysics. |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
Full Idea: One can be a realist about possible worlds without adopting Lewis's extreme views; they might be abstract or mathematical entities; they might be sets of propositions or maximal uninstantiated properties; they might be like books or pictures. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: My intuition is that once you go down the road of realism about possible worlds, Lewis's full concrete realism looks at least as attractive as any of these options. You can discuss the 'average man' in an economic theory without realism. |
5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
Full Idea: Propositions are true at possible worlds in much the same way as they are true at books: by being implied by the book. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: An intriguing way to introduce the view that possible worlds should be seen as like books. The truth-makers of propositions about the actual world are items in it, but the truth-makers in novels (say) are the conditions of the whole work as united. |
10117 | Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman] |
Full Idea: The concern of mathematical intuitionists was that the use of certain forms of inference generates, not contradiction, but unjustified assertions. | |
From: report of Luitzen E.J. Brouwer (Intuitionism and Formalism [1912]) by A.George / D.J.Velleman - Philosophies of Mathematics Ch.6 | |
A reaction: This seems to be the real origin of the verificationist idea in the theory of meaning. It is a hugely revolutionary idea - that ideas are not only ruled out of court by contradiction, but that there are other criteria which should also be met. |
5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
Full Idea: Many philosophers now concede that it is rational to accept a proposition not because we can directly verify it but because it is supported by considerations of simplicity, theoretical utility, explanatory power and/or intuitive plausibility. | |
From: Joseph Melia (Modality [2003], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: This suggests how the weakness of logical positivism may have led us to the concept of epistemic virtues (such as those listed), which are, of course, largely a matter of community consensus, just as the moral virtues are. |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc') | |
A reaction: Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional? |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions? | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending') | |
A reaction: Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers. |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: We need to distinguish between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality is what is best for each individual, on the assumption that everyone else will act the same way. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Hobbes') | |
A reaction: Wolff is surmising what lies behind Hobbes's Laws of Nature (which concern collective rationality). The Prisoner's Dilemma is the dramatisation of this distinction. I would making the teaching of the distinction compulsory in schools. |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro') | |
A reaction: The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't. |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic') | |
A reaction: I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient). |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: One thought is that consent to government is communicated via the ballot-box. In voting for the government we give it our consent. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic') | |
A reaction: Hm. This may be a strong positive reason why some people refuse to vote. We shouldn't load voting with such heavy commitments. It's just 'given the current situation, who will be temporarily in charge'. |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The general will demands the policy which is equally in everyone's interests. Thus we can think of the general will as the general interest. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Rousseau') | |
A reaction: That seems to assume that the people know what is in their interests. Rousseau's General Will mainly concerns who governs, and their mode of government, but not details of actual policy. |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge') | |
A reaction: I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them. |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative') | |
A reaction: [The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent. |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum). | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
A reaction: [my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net. |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism') | |
A reaction: Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it? |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Many anarchists have accepted the need for the authority of experts within society | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism') | |
A reaction: The status of experts may be the hottest topic in contemporary politics, given the contempt for experts shown by Trump, and by the Brexit campaign of 2016. It is a nice point that even anarchists can't duck the problem. |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: A utilitarian political philosophy would probably be a free market with a welfare state. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
A reaction: This is roughly how Britain became, after the welfare state was added to Millian liberalism. What's missing from this formula is some degree of control of the free market, to permit welfare. |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: We are very unlikely to be able to find an instrumental defence of democracy which also builds the values of freedom and equality into a feasible system. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc') | |
A reaction: I increasingly think that freedom is the most overrated political virtue (though it is certainly a virtue). Total freedom is ridiculous, but the aim of sacrificing many other social goods in order to maximise freedom also looks wrong. |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc') | |
A reaction: I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect. |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Greeks assumed democracy was consistent with slavery, Rousseau that it was consistent with sexual inequality, and Wollstonecraft that it was consistent with disenfranchisement of the poor. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Freedom') | |
A reaction: If you are allowed to restrict the franchise in some way, then a narrow oligarchy can qualify as a democracy, with half a dozen voters. |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: A democratic state has power only over the people who make up the electorate. Ruling over a subservient class, or territory, is claimed to be antithetical to the true ideals of democracy. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Intro') | |
A reaction: Is making trade deals very favourable to yourself (i.e. good capitalism) antithetical to democracy? |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: To avoid mixed-motivation voting, we must choose between one model of people voting in accordance with their preferences, and another of voting for their estimate of the common good. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting') | |
A reaction: Personally I always voted for the common good, and only slowly realised that most people were voting for their own interests. A rational society would at least bring this dichotomy into the open. Voting for self-interest isn't wicked. |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting') | |
A reaction: [compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter. |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Most of us can accept losing from time to time, but sometimes an entrenched majority will win vote after vote, leaving the minority group permanently outvoted and ignored. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Protecting') | |
A reaction: This is the key problem of the treatment of minorities in a democracy. Personally I have only once been on the winning side in voting for my MP, and he changed party a couple of years later. |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The price system is a way of signalling and transmitting information. The fact that the price of a good rises shows that the good is in short supply. And if prices rise in a sector because of increasing demand, then new producers rush in for the profits. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Free') | |
A reaction: [Woff is discussing Hayek] Why do we have a shortage of decent housing in the UK? Centralised economies lack this direct way of discovering where their efforts should be directed. |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison') | |
A reaction: [He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island. |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Critics say that the Difference Principle allows inequality of liberty ...and (more often) that liberty means we cannot impose any restriction on individual property holdings. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Nozick') | |
A reaction: The second objection is associated with Robert Nozick. The point is that you can implement the Difference Principle without restricting liberty. The standard right-wing objection of social welfare. |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments') | |
A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share. |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing') | |
A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them. |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory') | |
A reaction: In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life. |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care). | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
A reaction: I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list. |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: The theory of basic natural rights is problematic, because although the theory is rigorous and principled, the disadvantage is that we are left with nothing more fundamental to say in defence of these rights. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
A reaction: This is a nice point about anything which is treated as axiomatic - even Euclid's geometry. Presumably rights can only be justified by the needs of our shared human nature. |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have? | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty') | |
A reaction: He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture? |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: A utilitarian justification of property rights says allowing people to appropriate property, trade in it, and leave it to their descendants will encourage them to make the most productive use of their resources. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Locke') | |
A reaction: This obviously has a point, but equally justifies confiscation of land from people who are not making best use of it. In Sicily many landowners refused to allow the peasants to make any use at all of the land. |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending') | |
A reaction: I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets. |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |
Full Idea: Some laws have little grounding in morality. You may believe you have a moral obligation to stop at a red light at a deserted crossroads, but only because that is what the law tells you to do. | |
From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Goal') | |
A reaction: I would have thought such a law was wholly grounded in the morality of teamwork. It is the problem of rule utilitarianism, and also a problem about virtuous character. The puzzle is not the law, but the strict obedience to it. |