21 ideas
| 7876 | Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Materialists identify pain with the firing of nociceptive-specific neurons in the parietal cortex. Even so, Levine argues, we will still lack any explanation of why nociceptive-specific neurons yield pain. | |
| From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1 | |
| A reaction: [Proposed by Levine in 1983] I don't think we need to instantly go dualist when faced with this, but we may all eventually have to concede a bit of mysterianism. The explanation may be holistic (and hence hopelessly complex). |
| 7877 | Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau] |
| Full Idea: Levine says the explanatory gap is peculiar to phenomenal states. Once water has been identified with H2O, or temperature with mean kinetic energy, we do not continue to ask why H2O yields water, or why mean kinetic energy yields temperature. | |
| From: report of Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1 | |
| A reaction: Everything is mysterious if you think about if for long enough. What about a representational gap? Why do those neurons represent that tree (if the neurons aren't tree-shaped)? To understand qualia, we must understand the whole brain, I suspect. |
| 7878 | Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine] |
| Full Idea: We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science. | |
| From: comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1 | |
| A reaction: I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first. |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: This observation of Lukes is seen as important in the understanding of social power, but it is also significant for the understanding of the theory of action. Small racial slights by individuals can indicate institutional racism. |
| 20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
| Full Idea: In modern discussions, rather than look for intrinsic properties of objects, including aesthetic or formal properties, attention has turned to extrinsic or relational properties, notably of a social, historical, or 'institutional' nature. | |
| From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1) | |
| A reaction: Lots of modern branches of philosophy have made this move, which seems to me like a defeat. We want to know why things have the relations they do. Just mapping the relations is superficial Humeanism. |
| 20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
| Full Idea: In the early twentieth century there were numerous attempts at defining the essence art. Significant form, intuition, the expression of emotion, organic unity, and other notions, were offered to this end. | |
| From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 1) | |
| A reaction: As far as I can see the whole of aesthetics was demolished in one blow by Marcel Duchamp's urinal. Artists announce: we will tell you what art is; you should just sit and listen. Compare the invention of an anarchic sport. |
| 20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |
| Full Idea: The dualistic view of the arts holds that works of art come in two fundamentally different kinds: those that are abstract entities, i.e. types, and those that are physical objects (tokens). | |
| From: Lamargue,P/Olson,SH (Introductions to 'Aesthetics and the Phil of Art' [2004], Pt 2) | |
| A reaction: Paintings are the main reason for retaining physical objects. Strawson 1974 argues that paintings are only physical because we cannot yet perfectly reproduce them. I agree. Works of art are types, not tokens. |
| 22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Power is at its most effective when it is least observable. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: Kind of common sense, though his account has been very influential. We must be cautious about asserting the existence of powers which are massive but totally undetectable. |
| 22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: In the 1950s 'pluralism' was a common idea about power - that the concentration of power in America is not excessive because one group always balances the power of others. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Alan Wolfe's 2000 intro to C. Wright Mills] There must be something to this idea. In the UK we encourage the existence of an official opposition to the government for that reason. |
| 22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: A school teacher could, in extremis, bring in the army to control a wildly anarchic class of kids. You control kids by making them want to do what you want them to do. |
| 22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: The two-dimensional view of power is a major advance over the one-dimensional view. It incorporates the question of the control of the agenda in politics. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: So One-D is controlling what happens in conflicts, and Two-D is controlling the nature of the conflicts. If we keep digging we may come to the power which no one knows exists. |
| 22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: The one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, revealed by political participation. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.2) | |
| A reaction: It seems unbalanced to give this the pejorative label 'one-dimensional', as if it wasn't really power at all. Watching police beating demonstrators looks like real power to me. His point that power runs deeper is, of course, a good one. |
| 22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.3) | |
| A reaction: [He cites Schattschneider 1960] This is what Lukes calls the two-dimensional theory of power. The point is that students of power should observe what does not happen, as well as what does. |
| 22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: It is inadequate to insist that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: A simple example would be where they tricked you into thinking you couldn't vote in an election, or where the women didn't realise the men were paid more. Part of his third dimension of power. |
| 22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: I assume he is not referring to when I accidentally spill your beer. His point is, I think, that neither A nor B may be fully, or even partly, aware of what is going on. Presumably A can also exert power over B which is in B's interests. Dentists. |
| 22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Poulantzas (1968) defined his concept of power as the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.8) | |
| A reaction: Lukes offers this as an account of power in terms of structures, rather than of the actions of individuals. Lukes says that power must include the ability of the agent to act differently. Power must involve responsibility. Power is not fate. |
| 21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires? | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], p.27), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06 | |
| A reaction: This seems to be beyond dispute. When the operation is successful, those under your power not only do not need to be intimidated, but they don't even need to be guided. But if two people are in perfect harmony, which one has the power? |
| 22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but also by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4) | |
| A reaction: The classic modern instances of this are advertising and control of the media. This was apparently a new idea from Lukes, but it seems fairly obvious now. This is his third dimension of power. |
| 22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: In the 1950s there was talk of the 'end of ideology' - that grand passions over ideas were exhausted, and in future problems would be solved by technical expertise. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: An understandable thought, once fascism and communism seemed to have burned themselves out. Political commentators always try to grip the crowds with simplistic labels, but fewer people will now read up an ideology. Tacit ideology. |
| 22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Liberals take people as they are, and relates their interests to what they actually want or prefer. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6) | |
| A reaction: He contrasts this with 'reformists' and 'radicals'. I don't see why liberals should be so uncritical of people's desires. Liberals aren't going to implement harmful policies, simply because people want them. He treats liberals as one-dimensional. |
| 22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |
| Full Idea: Wage earners consent to capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism. | |
| From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro) | |
| A reaction: [He is citing Przeworski 1985] Not plausible as it stands. Does a prisoner who tries to improve their life within a hideous prison thereby endorse the prison system? In Auschwitz? Slaves can go along with the system for years, then suddenly rebel. |