Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lukes, Tertullian and Jonathan Wolff

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49 ideas

20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes]
     Full Idea: There is a phenomenon of collective action, where the policy or action of a collectivity is manifest, but not attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4)
     A reaction: This observation of Lukes is seen as important in the understanding of social power, but it is also significant for the understanding of the theory of action. Small racial slights by individuals can indicate institutional racism.
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We must agree with Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that nothing genuinely worthy of being called a state of nature will, at least in the long term, be a condition in which human beings can flourish.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Conc')
     A reaction: Given our highly encultured concept of modern flourishing, that is obviously right. There may be another reality where hom sap flourishes in a quite different and much simpler way. Education as personal, not institutional?
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We need to distinguish between individual and collective rationality. Collective rationality is what is best for each individual, on the assumption that everyone else will act the same way.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Hobbes')
     A reaction: Wolff is surmising what lies behind Hobbes's Laws of Nature (which concern collective rationality). The Prisoner's Dilemma is the dramatisation of this distinction. I would making the teaching of the distinction compulsory in schools.
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Love, or at least affection, not justice, is the first virtue of the family. Should mutual affection also be the first virtue of social and political institutions?
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
     A reaction: Surely this ideal should be at the heart of any society, no matter how far away from the ideal it is pushed by events and failures of character? I take 'respect' to be the form of love we feel for strangers.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: On the utilitarian account the state is justified if and only if it produces more happiness than any alternative. Whether we consent to the state is irrelevant.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Intro')
     A reaction: The paternalistic character of utilitarianism is a familiar problem. I quite like this approach, even though liberals will find it a bit naughty. We make children go to school, for their own good. Experts endorse society, even when citizens don't.
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Social contract theory ...satisfies the twin demands of universalism - every person must be obligated - and voluntarism - political obligations can come into existence only through consent.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
     A reaction: I'm going off the idea that being a member of large society is voluntary. It can't possibly be so for most people, and it shouldn't be. I'm British, and society expects me to remain so (though they might release me, if convenient).
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: One thought is that consent to government is communicated via the ballot-box. In voting for the government we give it our consent.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Voluntaristic')
     A reaction: Hm. This may be a strong positive reason why some people refuse to vote. We shouldn't load voting with such heavy commitments. It's just 'given the current situation, who will be temporarily in charge'.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The general will demands the policy which is equally in everyone's interests. Thus we can think of the general will as the general interest.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Rousseau')
     A reaction: That seems to assume that the people know what is in their interests. Rousseau's General Will mainly concerns who governs, and their mode of government, but not details of actual policy.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 1. Social Power
Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Poulantzas (1968) defined his concept of power as the capacity of a social class to realise its specific objective interests.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.8)
     A reaction: Lukes offers this as an account of power in terms of structures, rather than of the actions of individuals. Lukes says that power must include the ability of the agent to act differently. Power must involve responsibility. Power is not fate.
Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Is it not the supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires you want them to have - that is, to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires?
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], p.27), quoted by Andrew Shorten - Contemporary Political Theory 06
     A reaction: This seems to be beyond dispute. When the operation is successful, those under your power not only do not need to be intimidated, but they don't even need to be guided. But if two people are in perfect harmony, which one has the power?
Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Power is at its most effective when it is least observable.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: Kind of common sense, though his account has been very influential. We must be cautious about asserting the existence of powers which are massive but totally undetectable.
The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes]
     Full Idea: In the 1950s 'pluralism' was a common idea about power - that the concentration of power in America is not excessive because one group always balances the power of others.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: [He cites Alan Wolfe's 2000 intro to C. Wright Mills] There must be something to this idea. In the UK we encourage the existence of an official opposition to the government for that reason.
Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity (it may never be, and never need to be, exercised); and you can be powerful by satisfying and advancing others' interests.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: A school teacher could, in extremis, bring in the army to control a wildly anarchic class of kids. You control kids by making them want to do what you want them to do.
The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes]
     Full Idea: The two-dimensional view of power is a major advance over the one-dimensional view. It incorporates the question of the control of the agenda in politics.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4)
     A reaction: So One-D is controlling what happens in conflicts, and Two-D is controlling the nature of the conflicts. If we keep digging we may come to the power which no one knows exists.
One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes]
     Full Idea: The one-dimensional view of power involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, revealed by political participation.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.2)
     A reaction: It seems unbalanced to give this the pejorative label 'one-dimensional', as if it wasn't really power at all. Watching police beating demonstrators looks like real power to me. His point that power runs deeper is, of course, a good one.
Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes]
     Full Idea: All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.3)
     A reaction: [He cites Schattschneider 1960] This is what Lukes calls the two-dimensional theory of power. The point is that students of power should observe what does not happen, as well as what does.
The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes]
     Full Idea: It is inadequate to insist that nondecision-making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process in the form of issues.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4)
     A reaction: A simple example would be where they tricked you into thinking you couldn't vote in an election, or where the women didn't realise the men were paid more. Part of his third dimension of power.
Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes]
     Full Idea: I have defined the concept of power by saying that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6)
     A reaction: I assume he is not referring to when I accidentally spill your beer. His point is, I think, that neither A nor B may be fully, or even partly, aware of what is going on. Presumably A can also exert power over B which is in B's interests. Dentists.
Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes]
     Full Idea: A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but also by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.4)
     A reaction: The classic modern instances of this are advertising and control of the media. This was apparently a new idea from Lukes, but it seems fairly obvious now. This is his third dimension of power.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Even if a dictator wants to advance the interests of the people, how are those interests to be known? In a democracy people show their interests, it seems, by voting: they vote for what they want.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Knowledge')
     A reaction: I suppose a wise and kind despot could observe very carefully, and understand the interests of the people better than they do themselves. Indeed, I very much doubt, in 2017, whether the people know what is good for them.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The Federalists took the idea of 'separation of powers' from Locke and Montesquieu. This places the legislative, executive and judicial functions in independent hands, so that in theory any branch of government would be checked by the other two.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Representative')
     A reaction: [The American Federalist writers of 1787-8 were Madison, Hamilton and Jay] This is a brilliant idea. An interesting further element that has been added to it is the monitoring by a free press, presumably because the other three were negligent.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes]
     Full Idea: In the 1950s there was talk of the 'end of ideology' - that grand passions over ideas were exhausted, and in future problems would be solved by technical expertise.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: An understandable thought, once fascism and communism seemed to have burned themselves out. Political commentators always try to grip the crowds with simplistic labels, but fewer people will now read up an ideology. Tacit ideology.
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Political choices can be made by the utility principles (maximising total utility), or maximin (maximising for the worst off, a view for pessimists), or maximax (not serious, but one for optimists, being unequal, and aiming for a high maximum).
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: [my summary of a page of Wolff] Rawls embodies the maximin view. Wolff implies that we must choose between utilitarianism and Rawls. Would Marxists endorse maximin? He also adds 'constrained maximisation', with a safety net.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: As the anarchist picture of society becomes increasingly realistic and less utopian, it also becomes increasingly difficult to tell it apart from a liberal democratic state.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
     A reaction: Nice challenge to anarchism, which is clear in what it opposes, but isn't much of a political philosophy if it doesn't have positive aspirations. Anarchists may hope that people will beautifully co-operate, but what if they re-form the state to do it?
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Many anarchists have accepted the need for the authority of experts within society
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 1 'Anarchism')
     A reaction: The status of experts may be the hottest topic in contemporary politics, given the contempt for experts shown by Trump, and by the Brexit campaign of 2016. It is a nice point that even anarchists can't duck the problem.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A utilitarian political philosophy would probably be a free market with a welfare state.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: This is roughly how Britain became, after the welfare state was added to Millian liberalism. What's missing from this formula is some degree of control of the free market, to permit welfare.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: We are very unlikely to be able to find an instrumental defence of democracy which also builds the values of freedom and equality into a feasible system.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
     A reaction: I increasingly think that freedom is the most overrated political virtue (though it is certainly a virtue). Total freedom is ridiculous, but the aim of sacrificing many other social goods in order to maximise freedom also looks wrong.
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Democracy is a way of expressing equal respect for all, which is perhaps why we withdraw the vote from criminals: by their behaviour they forfeit the right to equal respect.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Conc')
     A reaction: I disagree, and he has converted me to franchise for criminals. One-off criminals do not forfeit my respect for them as people, though their action may merit a controlling response on our part. Bad character, not a bad action, forfeits respect.
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Greeks assumed democracy was consistent with slavery, Rousseau that it was consistent with sexual inequality, and Wollstonecraft that it was consistent with disenfranchisement of the poor.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Freedom')
     A reaction: If you are allowed to restrict the franchise in some way, then a narrow oligarchy can qualify as a democracy, with half a dozen voters.
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A democratic state has power only over the people who make up the electorate. Ruling over a subservient class, or territory, is claimed to be antithetical to the true ideals of democracy.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Intro')
     A reaction: Is making trade deals very favourable to yourself (i.e. good capitalism) antithetical to democracy?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: To avoid mixed-motivation voting, we must choose between one model of people voting in accordance with their preferences, and another of voting for their estimate of the common good.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
     A reaction: Personally I always voted for the common good, and only slowly realised that most people were voting for their own interests. A rational society would at least bring this dichotomy into the open. Voting for self-interest isn't wicked.
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Condorcet proved that provided people have a better than even chance of getting the right answer, and that they vote for their idea of the common good, then majority decisions are an excellent way to get the right result.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Voting')
     A reaction: [compressed] The point is that collective voting magnifies the result. If they tend to be right, the collective view is super-right. But if they tend towards the wrong, the collective view goes very wrong indeed. History is full of the latter.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Most of us can accept losing from time to time, but sometimes an entrenched majority will win vote after vote, leaving the minority group permanently outvoted and ignored.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Protecting')
     A reaction: This is the key problem of the treatment of minorities in a democracy. Personally I have only once been on the winning side in voting for my MP, and he changed party a couple of years later.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Liberals take people as they are, and relates their interests to what they actually want or prefer.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], 1.6)
     A reaction: He contrasts this with 'reformists' and 'radicals'. I don't see why liberals should be so uncritical of people's desires. Liberals aren't going to implement harmful policies, simply because people want them. He treats liberals as one-dimensional.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes]
     Full Idea: Wage earners consent to capitalist organisation of society when they act as if they could improve their material conditions within the confines of capitalism.
     From: Steven Lukes (Power: a Radical View (2nd ed) [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: [He is citing Przeworski 1985] Not plausible as it stands. Does a prisoner who tries to improve their life within a hideous prison thereby endorse the prison system? In Auschwitz? Slaves can go along with the system for years, then suddenly rebel.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The price system is a way of signalling and transmitting information. The fact that the price of a good rises shows that the good is in short supply. And if prices rise in a sector because of increasing demand, then new producers rush in for the profits.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Free')
     A reaction: [Woff is discussing Hayek] Why do we have a shortage of decent housing in the UK? Centralised economies lack this direct way of discovering where their efforts should be directed.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Many laws of contemporary society are very hard to defend in terms of Mill's Liberty Principle, such as laws against duelling, incest between siblings, and euthanasia.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Poison')
     A reaction: [He cites Chief Justice Lord Devlin for this] Being killed in a duel can cause widespread misery. Fear of inbreeding is behind the second one, and fear of murdering the old behind the third one. No man is an island.
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Critics say that the Difference Principle allows inequality of liberty ...and (more often) that liberty means we cannot impose any restriction on individual property holdings.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Nozick')
     A reaction: The second objection is associated with Robert Nozick. The point is that you can implement the Difference Principle without restricting liberty. The standard right-wing objection of social welfare.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The utilitarian argument for equality assumes that people have 'diminishing marginal returns' for goods. If there are two people and two nice chocolate biscuits, then utilitarianism is likely to recommend one each.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Arguments')
     A reaction: The point is that the second biscuit provides slightly diminished pleasure. This is why you can buy boxes of assorted biscuits, which you are then not required to share.
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Choosing')
     A reaction: Rivals would say that inequalities should go to those who have earned them.
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: As Marx observed, and as women have learnt to their cost, equal political rights are worth fighting for, but they are of little value if one is still treated unequally in day-to-day life.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 3 'Participatory')
     A reaction: In fact social equality comes first, because that will imply political equality and financial justice. I think it is all covered under the virtue of 'respect', which should have pre-eminence in both public and private life.
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The normal liberal basic rights are right to life, free speech, free assembly and freedom of movement, plus the rights to vote and stand for office. Some theorists add the right to a decent living standard (shelter, food and health care).
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: I think he has forgotten to add education. In Britain Beatrice Webb seems to have single-handedly added the living standard group to the list.
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: The theory of basic natural rights is problematic, because although the theory is rigorous and principled, the disadvantage is that we are left with nothing more fundamental to say in defence of these rights.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: This is a nice point about anything which is treated as axiomatic - even Euclid's geometry. Presumably rights can only be justified by the needs of our shared human nature.
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: If natural rights have a fundamental status, and so are not arrived at on the basis of some other argument, how do we know what rights we have?
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 4 'Liberty')
     A reaction: He cites Bentham as using this point. Utilitarianism at least provides a grounding for the identification of possible basic rights. Start from what we want, or what we more objectively need? Human needs, or needs in our present culture?
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: A utilitarian justification of property rights says allowing people to appropriate property, trade in it, and leave it to their descendants will encourage them to make the most productive use of their resources.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 5 'Locke')
     A reaction: This obviously has a point, but equally justifies confiscation of land from people who are not making best use of it. In Sicily many landowners refused to allow the peasants to make any use at all of the land.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Justice is the last virtue of society, or at least the last resort. Rights, or considerations of justice, are like an insurance policy: something offering security to fall back on.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 6 'Transcending')
     A reaction: I like this. He points out that a good family doesn't talk of rights and justice. We want a friendly harmonious society, with safety nets.
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]
     Full Idea: Some laws have little grounding in morality. You may believe you have a moral obligation to stop at a red light at a deserted crossroads, but only because that is what the law tells you to do.
     From: Jonathan Wolff (An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev) [2006], 2 'Goal')
     A reaction: I would have thought such a law was wholly grounded in the morality of teamwork. It is the problem of rule utilitarianism, and also a problem about virtuous character. The puzzle is not the law, but the strict obedience to it.
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / d. Heresy
Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: Philosophers are the forefathers of heretics.
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 20.2
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
I believe because it is absurd [Tertullian]
     Full Idea: I believe because it is absurd ('Credo quia absurdum est').
     From: Tertullian (works [c.200]), quoted by Robert Fogelin - Walking the Tightrope of Reason n4.2
     A reaction: This seems to be a rather desperate remark, in response to what must have been rather good hostile arguments. No one would abandon the support of reason if it was easy to acquire. You can't deny its engaging romantic defiance, though.