19 ideas
4568 | If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If 'the Queen of England' is not a referring expression when there is no queen, nor can it be one when there is a queen - since the meaning of the expression is the same in either case. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.1) | |
A reaction: I'm not convinced. Does this mean that since I can point with my finger at nothing, I therefore do not indicate anything when there is an object at which I am pointing. Sounds silly to me. |
4574 | If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If our most basic concepts, like time, space, substance or causality, are not shared by some peoples, it puts paid to the cherished ideal of philosophers to discover a set of concepts or categories which any rational human must employ in his thinking. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a place where a priori philosophy (Aristotle,Kant,Hegel) meets empirical research (Whorf). However, interpreting the research is so fraught with problems it drives you back to the a priori… |
19743 | A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers] |
Full Idea: Beliefs are partly constituted by features of the environment. ....a notebook plays for one person the same role that memory plays for another. ...The information is reliably there, available to consciousness, and to guide action, just as belief is. | |
From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §4) | |
A reaction: This is the modern externalist approach to beliefs (along with broad content and external cognition systems). Not quite what we used to mean by beliefs, but we'll get used to it. I believe Plato wrote what it said in his books. Is memory just a role? |
604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul. | |
From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b | |
A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it. |
4573 | If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If it is claimed that linguistic differences significantly correlate with cultural differences, it must therefore be possible to identify the linguistic differences independently from the cultural ones. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.1) | |
A reaction: This is a basic objection to any extreme relativist version of the S-P hypothesis. They are part of the conspiracy to overemphasise language in philosophy, and they are wrong. |
4575 | A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It would be absurd to say the Hopi lack the concept of time because they lack tensed verbs, ..but how do we find out what a man's concepts are except in terms of his language? | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §5.2) | |
A reaction: Presumably we should look at animals, where concepts must be inferred in order to explain behaviour. I don't see why introspection (scientifically wicked) should not also be employed to detect our own non-verbal concepts. How are new words invented? |
6176 | A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands] |
Full Idea: If the operation of a brain implant inside the brain is a cognitive operation, why should it not count as a cognitive operation when it is outside the brain? There are many mechanisms which would count as cognitive if they were inside the subject. | |
From: report of A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.9 | |
A reaction: This argues for externalism of the vehicle of thought, rather than its content. The idea is that there is no significant difference between remembering a phone number and writing it on a bit of paper. I find it hard to disagree. |
19741 | If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers] |
Full Idea: If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is part of the cognitive process. | |
From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §2) | |
A reaction: In some sense they are obviously right that our cognitive activities spill out into books, calculators, record-keeping. It seems more like an invitation to shift the meaning of the word 'mind', than a proof that we have got it wrong. |
19742 | Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers] |
Full Idea: Many identify the cognitive with the conscious, and it seems far from plausible that consciousness extends outside the head in these cases. But not every cognitive process, at least on standard usage, is a conscious process. | |
From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §3) | |
A reaction: This gives you two sorts of externalism about mind to consider. No, three, if you say there is extended conceptual content, then extended cognition processes, then extended consciousness. Depends what you mean by 'consciousness'. |
19744 | If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers] |
Full Idea: If Otto relies on his notebook, what this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system, a coupling of biological organism and external resources. | |
From: A Clark / D Chalmers (The Extended Mind [1998], §5) | |
A reaction: You start to get giddy as you read this stuff. If two people constantly share a notebook, they begin to blend into one another. It inclines me towards a more 'animalist' view of the nature of a person or a self. |
4561 | Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.3) | |
A reaction: Yet another telling objection to behaviourism. When I look at broccoli I may have a disposition to be sick, but that isn't part of the concept of broccoli. |
4564 | I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It is not meaningless for me to postulate the potential for humans to sense in a manner which is at present unimaginable and indescribable. There is no reason to believe me, but I might be right. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: The key counterexample to verificationist theories of meaning is wild speculations, which are clearly meaningful, though frequently far beyond any likely human experience. Logical positivists are allergic to imagination. |
4565 | The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: It seems that the positivists must admit that there is at least one statement which is meaningful, but which is neither verifiable nor analytic - namely, the statement of the principle of verification itself. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §3.1) | |
A reaction: Some people think this objection is decisive, but I think any theory must be permitted a few metatheoretic assertions or axioms which are beyond discussion. Ayer thought the VP might be treated as analytic. Everyone has to start somewhere. |
4562 | Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Personally I find examples like this decisive against the 'use' theory of meaning. Maybe the defence is that the theory works for sentences, and individual words (like passwords) are peripheral. |
4563 | 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The sentence 'How now brown cow?' has its use in elocutions classes, yet this aspect of its use tells us nothing about its meaning. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §2.4) | |
A reaction: Indeed, and also there are weird sentence of which we can assemble a meaning, but cannot think of any conceivable use ('rats swim in purple marmalade'). |
4571 | Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.2) | |
A reaction: Sounds right. If the basic scenario is picking someone out in a crowd, your listener may think they know which person you are talking about, with a high degree of probability. |
4566 | Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: Any thesis about reference is also going to be a thesis about what there is in existence to refer to. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4) | |
A reaction: I see the point, but we must not put the cart before the horse. I may have an intuition that something exists, but not know how to refer to it (because of my small vocabulary). |
4572 | If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: If predicates are names of entities, then subject/predicate sentences are pairs of names, since subjects are names (or referring expressions). But a pair of names is not a sentence at all, it is a mere list. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §4.4) | |
A reaction: If that is meant to demolish universals it is too quick. Concatenating names is not the same as listing them. A relationship is asserted. There is a (mysterious) Platonic 'partaking' between form and particular. Perhaps. |
4576 | An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE] |
Full Idea: The definition of analytic truth which has, I believe, the most chance of success is one in terms of synonymy; ..an analytic truth is one which can be transformed into a logical truth once synonyms are replaced by synonyms. | |
From: David E. Cooper (Philosophy and the Nature of Language [1973], §7.1) | |
A reaction: Sounds promising, though there is Quine's notorious problem of circularity in all these concepts. If synonymy is conventional, then so is analyticity. I personally feel that the circle can be broken. |