13 ideas
| 8766 | In much wisdom is much grief [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: In much wisdom is much grief. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.18) | |
| A reaction: If this is true, then the question is of what there is in wisdom that will compensate for the grief. Personally I doubt the whole claim. Some wisdom involves grief, but most of it involves pleasure, even when understanding of evil is the target. |
| 7494 | Laughter is mad; of mirth, what doeth it? [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, what doeth it? | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 02.02) | |
| A reaction: Not much of an argument, but an interesting support for the extreme anti-hedonistic puritanical view. Most people would praise laughter as an end in itself, so 'what doeth it?' seems to miss the point. |
| 8767 | Sorrow is better than laughter [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Sorrow is better than laughter: for by the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 07.03) | |
| A reaction: This writer fails to see the good in laughter. If he did, he would have a more balanced view, and we could take this opinion more seriously. Theatre audiences always seem keen to hunt out jokes where none are intended. |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some people claim that modal sentences do not express truths or falsehoods. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: I can only imagine this coming from a narrow hardline empiricist. It seems to me obvious that we make true or false statements about what is possible or impossible. |
| 20476 | If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: If one can only know a priori that a proposition is necessary, then one can know only a priori that a proposition is contingent. The evidence relevant to determining the latter is the same as that relevant to determining the former. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 3.2) | |
| A reaction: This seems a telling point, but I suppose it is obvious. If you see that the cat is on the mat, nothing in the situation tells you whether this is contingent or necessary. We assume it is contingent, but that may be an a priori assumption. |
| 20471 | Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There are three suggested epistemic conditions on a priori knowledge: the first regards the source of justification, the second regards the defeasibility of justification, and the third appeals to the strength of justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] He says these are all inspired by Kant. The non-epistemic suggested condition involve necessity or analyticity. The source would have to be entirely mental; the defeasibly could not be experiential; the strength would be certainty. |
| 20477 | The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: The leading claim of proponents of the a priori is that sources of justification are of two significantly different types: experiential and nonexperiential. Initially this difference is marked at the phenomenological level. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 5) | |
| A reaction: He cites Plantinga and Bealer for the phenomenological starting point (that some knowledge just seems rationally obvious, certain, and perhaps necessary). |
| 20472 | Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: There is reason to view non-epistemic analyses of a priori knowledge (in terms of necessity or analyticity) with suspicion. The a priori concerns justification. Analysis by necessity or analyticity concerns the proposition rather than the justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], 2.1) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] The fact that the a priori is entirely a mode of justification, rather than a type of truth, is the modern view, influenced by Kripke. Given that assumption, this is a good objection. |
| 3913 | Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: Some maintain that experiments in imagination are the source of a priori justification. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A priori/A posteriori [1992], p.1) | |
| A reaction: What else could assessments of possibility and necessity be based on except imagination? |
| 20474 | 'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo] |
| Full Idea: A justified belief that a proposition is not true is an 'overriding' defeater, ...and the belief that a justification is inadequate or defective is an 'undermining' defeater. | |
| From: Albert Casullo (A Priori Knowledge [2002], n 40) | |
| A reaction: Sounds more like a sliding scale than a binary option. Quite useful, though. |
| 604 | Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul. | |
| From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b | |
| A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it. |
| 8765 | All is vanity, saith the Preacher [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Vanity of vanities, saith the Preacher, vanity of vanities; all is vanity. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 01.02) | |
| A reaction: If we are swamped by vanity, then there is presumably no hope for the other virtues. A more balanced view would say that we should aim for a mean on the scale of self-esteem, which probably requires an effort to be objective about ourselves. |
| 8768 | Books are endless, and study is wearisome [Anon (Ecc)] |
| Full Idea: Of making many books there is no end; and much study is weariness of the flesh. | |
| From: Anon (Ecc) (21: Book of Ecclesiastes [c.200 BCE], 12.12) | |
| A reaction: Does anyone share my occasional sinking heart on entering a large library or bookshop? I truly believe that there is nothing better in the world than books. And yet, and yet... |