Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Lycophron, Beth Lord and Paul M. Pietroski

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4 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Only in the 1780s did it become acceptable to read Spinoza [Lord]
     Full Idea: It was not until the 1780s that it became acceptable to read the works of Spinoza, and even then it was not without a frisson of danger.
     From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], Intro 'Who?')
     A reaction: Hence we hear of Wordsworth and Coleridge reading him with excitement. So did Kant read him?
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Knowledge is mind and knowing 'cohabiting' [Lycophron, by Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Lycophron has it that knowledge is the 'cohabitation' (rather than participation or synthesis) of knowing and the soul.
     From: report of Lycophron (fragments/reports [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Metaphysics 1045b
     A reaction: This sounds like a rather passive and inert relationship. Presumably knowing something implies the possibility of acting on it.
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
Hobbes and Spinoza use 'conatus' to denote all endeavour for advantage in nature [Lord]
     Full Idea: 'Conatus' [translated as 'striving' by Curley] is used by early modern philosophers, including Thomas Hobbes (a major influence of Spinoza), to express the notion of a thing's endeavour for what is advantageous to it. It drives all things in nature.
     From: Beth Lord (Spinoza's Ethics [2010], p.88)
     A reaction: I think it is important to connect conatus to Nietzsche's talk of a plurality of 'drives', which are an expression of the universal will to power (which is seen even in the interactions of chemistry). Conatus is also in Leibniz.
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
No language is semantically referential; it all occurs at the level of thought or utterance [Pietroski, by Hofweber]
     Full Idea: For Paul Pietroski no expression in natural language is semantically referential. ....Reference to objects occurs not at the level of semantics, but at the level of thought or utterance.
     From: report of Paul M. Pietroski (Events and Semantic Architecture [2004]) by Thomas Hofweber - Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics 07.2
     A reaction: Love this. It has always struck me that reference is what speakers do. Try taking any supposedly referential description and sticking 'so-called' in front of it. That seems to leave you with the reference even though you have denied the description.